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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The aim of the present work is to contribute to our understanding 
of the development of aggression and thereby also of aggression in 
general. In this chapter the theoretical approach to be taken will 
be introduced and the relations between it and other theories of 
aggression will be indicated. Accordingly, I will give a short over-
view of different types of theories of aggression, while stressing 
the possible interrelations among those theories. However, before 
presenting theories of aggression, the question of how to define 
aggression is discussed. I will deal with this issue first to give the 
reader at least a preliminary idea of how one could define the 
phenomenon that theories of aggression are trying to explain. Dis-
cussing the definition issue before presenting theories of aggression 
is not meant to imply that theorists usually define aggression in-
dependently of their theory. On the contrary, the two will appear 
to be closely interwoven. 
Defining Aggression 
Following Parke and Slaby (1983) and Hartup and De Wit (1978), a 
distinction can be made between three types of definitions of ag-
gression. First, there are topological definitions. In this approach 
towards defining aggression certain patterns of muscle movements 
are specified that are considered to constitute aggressive behavior. 
Topological definitions are mainly used in ethologically oriented 
research (e.g., Blurton Jones, 1967). 
The second type of definition of aggression is not based on 
characteristics of the actor's movement pattern, but on the outcome 
of these actions. For example, any behavior that results in harm to 
another person might be designated as aggressive. In this context 
the concept of harm does not necessarily refer only to physical 
injury or property damage. It can very well be taken to refer to 
psychological damage as well. 
A third approach towards defining aggression stresses neither 
the aggressive act itself nor its actual outcome, but primarily the 
antecedents of the act. A well-known example is the definition 
given by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939): "Aggres-
sion is the behavior for which the goal response is the injury of 
the person towards it is directed". In this definition one of the 
antecedents of the behavior, i.e., the intention to cause injury, is 
the criterion to decide whether the behavior is aggressive or not. 
Now, how should one select a particular definition? There seem 
to be two criteria that a satisfactory and theoretically workable 
definition should fulfill. First, the definition should facilitate agree-
ment among different observers about whether a particular act is 
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aggressive or not. Consequently, the defining characteristics should 
refer to observable aspects of the act. Second, to count as a def-
inition of the commonly used term aggression, the definition should 
neither include acts that are not usually called aggressive, nor 
exclude acts that are usually designated as aggressive. 
When examining the three types of definitions discussed above, 
it is clear that both the topological and the outcome-based defini-
tions do satisfy the criterion of observability of defining charac-
teristics. Both the pattern of muscle movements that constitutes an 
act and the outcome of the act are in most cases easily observable. 
It is not difficult to see, however, that both definitions do not 
satisfy the criterion of agreement with the common use of the term 
aggression. When applied to human behavior, topological definitions 
fail to satisfy this criterion because under particular circumstances 
virtually any behavior can be called aggressive. To cite an example 
provided by Tedeschi: "...learning to control one's fingers (usually 
in the cradle) is a skill that could eventually lead a person to push 
buttons that electrocute another person or to release a barrage of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles" (Tedeschi, 1983, p. 138). Thus, 
any topological definition that is not all inclusive necessarily ex-
cludes behaviors that could under particular circumstances very well 
be called aggressive. This is because, contrary to most other species 
whose behavior patterns arc highly ritualized and specific to situa-
tions, human behavior is relatively flexible and nonspecific (see 
Parke & Slaby, 1983, p. 549). Similarly, it is easy to think of ex-
amples showing that outcome-based definitions also do not satisfy 
the criterion of agreement with common usage of the term aggres-
sion. For example, few people would designate as aggressive the 
harmful behavior of a train passenger who inadvertently steps on 
someone's feet after being pushed by someone else. On the other 
hand, an attempt to kill a person that was both unsuccessful and 
unnoticed could very well be called aggressive even though no 
physical or psychological harm occurred (Tedeschi, 1984). Thus, an 
outcome-based definition of aggression both includes behaviors that 
are usually not considered to be aggressive and it excludes be-
haviors that can very well be called aggressive. 
When turning to the intent-based definitions, things look some-
what different. With this type of definition the observability of 
defining characteristics is no longer self-apparent. It has been 
argued that the concept of intent is inadequate because it does not 
refer to a set of observable behaviors (Tedeschi 1983, p. 137). 
However, this conclusion may be too pessimistic. First of all, it 
should be noted that the concept of intent is often used ambiguous-
ly. A distinction should be made between the concept of intent 
(wanting to reach a certain outcome) and the concept of motive 
(why the outcome was wanted) (Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Grucneich, 
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1982). Intent refers to whether the immediate outcome of one's 
behavior was wanted and motive refers to the reasons for wanting 
the outcome. Now, the observability of intent is problematic as long 
as the term is taken to refer to the motives that a person has for 
her1 behavior. No one can see why a person acts as she docs (see 
Heidcr, 1958). However, whether a person wants to reach the out-
come of her actions is easier to observe. Illustrative of this is an 
experiment by Smith (1978) in which children were shown short 
films of an actress making movements that were either voluntary 
(e.g., walk), involuntary (e.g., sneeze) or object-like (e.g., being 
pushed by an object). In addition, whether these movements had 
desirable or undesirable effects and whether the actress did or did 
not look at what she was doing were also varied. Results indicated 
that children from 5 year onwards distinguished voluntary acts from 
other acts and that they also began to to discriminate intended 
versus unintended effects of someone's acts. (See Shantz, 1983, p. 
501-502, for a review of this research). Thus, as long as one dis-
tinguishes intentionality from motivation, an intent-based definition 
of aggression might well satisfy the criterion of observability of 
defining characteristics. 
With respect to the other criterion -agreement with common 
usage- it is clear that an intent-based definition fares better than 
topological and outcome-based definitions. Unlike a topological 
definition, it includes any behavior aimed to cause harm, regardless 
of the specifics of the movement pattern and, unlike an outcome-
based definition, it includes unsuccessful attempts to cause harm 
and it excludes cases of accidental harm-doing. 
This is not to say that an intent-based definition of aggression 
is fully satisfactory. It is not, because an intent-based definition 
does not always fully agree with common usage of the term ag-
gression. In common usage the concept of motive that I distin-
guished from intentionality, also plays a role. This can be illustrated 
with the following example that was originally used by Mummendey 
(1984). In September 1983 a Korean Air Lines (KAL) passenger 
1
 In an attempt to avoid the use of sexist Language, I will use the female 
personal and possessive pronouns whenever reference is made indiscriminately 
to both males and females. As a consequence, 'she' and 'her' will frequently 
be used in conjunction with the term 'aggressive'. This should, however, not 
be taken to reflect the author's views concerning the existence of sex-related 
differences in aggression. It will be left to the reader to decide whether any 
uneasiness that might arise from this practice reflects the reader's own sexist 
stereotypes or rather her empirically validated knowledge concerning the 
frequency of female versus male aggression. 
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airplane that had entered Soviet territory was shot down by Soviet 
fighters. A glance at newspaper articles on this incident suggests 
that if one wants to answer the question whether the shooting was 
an aggressive act, the question of intcntionalily (did the Soviets 
intend to cause the KAL plane to crash?) seems not to be the only 
relevant question. Also important might be to ask what the Soviets' 
motives were for shooting down the plane. The shooting might, for 
example, be less likely to be called "aggressive" by a person who 
believes that the motive was to prevent espionage, than by a person 
who believes that the only motive was to try out a new weapon 
system. Thus, the question of justification becomes important. An 
intentional act without an acceptable justification is more likely to 
be called aggressive than the same act with an acceptable justifica-
tion. 
Why not then include the motive concept in our definition of 
aggression? As was mentioned above, one reason is that someone's 
motives for causing harm cannot be observed, which makes it dif-
ficult to reach inter-observer agreement about whether the act was 
aggressive. Second, reaching such agreement is made even more 
difficult because the concept of motive is closely associated to the 
concept of justice. That is, even if observers would agree about 
what the motive for the act was, they might still disagree about 
whether the particular motive would provide an acceptable justifica-
tion of the act. Consider again the case of the KAL plane. Even if 
observers would agree that the motive for shooting down the plane 
was to prevent espionage, they would very likely disagree on 
whether this particular motive justified the action of shooting down 
the plane. Since an observer who considers a harmful action to be 
justified is less likely than other observers to count it as an in-
stance of aggression, reaching inter-observer agreement about what 
would constitute aggressive behavior would again become more 
difficult. 
In sum, no definition fully satisfies the two criteria mentioned, 
but a definition based on the intent to cause harm seems to be a 
reasonable compromise. Intcntionalily, when distinguished from 
motivation, is to some extent observable and an intent-based defini-
tion of aggression has a great deal of overlap with the common 
usage of the term. Therefore, in the remainder of this work, I will 
use the term aggression to refer to those behaviors that are in-
tended to cause harm to other persons. In the next section I will 
examine how different theories try to explain the occurrence of 
this type of behavior. 
Explaining Agression 
Aggression can be studied from a variety of widely diverging theo-
retical perspectives. These include psychoanalysis (Freud, 1920), 
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motivation theory (Kornadt, 1982, 1984), ethology (Hinde, 1975; 
Lorenz, 1966; Strayer, 1980), social learning theory (Bandura, 1973; 
Berkowilz, 1983; Patterson, Littman, & Brickcr, 1967; Patterson, 
1982), attribution theory (Ferguson & Rule, 1983), information pro-
cessing theory (Dodge, 1982), and several physiologically oriented 
approaches (e.g., Olweus, Mattsson, Schalling, & Low 1980) to men-
tion a few of them. To some extent, these and other theoretical 
perspectives can be seen as mutually exclusive theories that com-
pete with each other in order lo explain as much of the variance 
in aggressive behavior as possible. However, the interrelations among 
different theories can also be seen in a different way. Therefore, I 
will first sketch a framework that indicates how different perspec-
tives might relate to each other. Subsequently, this framework will 
be used to sketch a rough picture of the theoretical "landscape" 
formed by aggression theories. Finally, it will be pointed out where 
in that "landscape" the approach that is taken in the present series 
of studies should be placed. Note, that it is not the aim of this 
section to present an exhaustive or even extensive description of 
existing theories of aggression. The aim is simply to give the reader 
a feel for where in the large field of aggression research the work 
that will be presented here should be placed. 
In order to interrelate different theoretical perspectives on 
aggression, I will borrow a concept that was originally used by 
Tolman (1932). To indicate the difference between the concepts that 
he used to analyse how rats learned to run in a maze and the 
concepts used by other behaviorists, Tolman coined the concept of 
molarity. According to Tolman, an explanation of the rats' behavior 
in terms of their cognitive maps was not necessarily incompatible 
with analyses in terms of S-R bonds, but such an explanation was 
situated at a more molar, that is a less fine-grained and more 
inclusive, level of analysis. A modern exposition of the same idea 
can be found in Hofstadtcr (1979, chapter X). Hofstadtcr shows how 
the workings of a computer program can be described at different 
levels of analysis or, to use Tolman's term, at different levels of 
molarity. The description of what happens when a program runs 
could in principle take place in terms of the movements of elec-
trons that constitute the electric currents in the diverse parts of 
the computer. Alternatively, the description could be in terms of 
machine language, that is, in terms of the patterns of ones and 
zeros that constitute the most basic building blocks of a program. 
At the next higher level, the description would be in terms of 
assembly language, in which chunks of the machine language's ones 
and zeros are referred to by a single word that specifics a par-
ticular operation. Finally, the description could be given in terms 
of a higher order programming language which would constitute a 
description at a relatively molar level. 
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This example can be used lo illustrate two important points: 
First, there is no a priori reason to reject a relatively molar level 
of analysis in favor of a less molar one. If possible, a description 
of a computer program's workings in terms of electrons travelling 
around in the hardware would be completely unintelligible. Similarly, 
the description in terms of machine language would be much more 
difficult to understand than a description in terms of a higher 
order language. In other words: Reduci ionism does not necessarily 
pay. Second, analyses at different levels of molarity arc not neces-
sarily incompatible with each other. This is also true when, unlike 
the case in the computer program example, the interrelations among 
different levels of analysis are unknown. Even when it is unclear 
how an analysis at one level of molarity should be translated into 
another level, each of the two analyses might be equally true, that 
is, each of them might equally well explain empirical findings. 
When turning again to aggression theories, it appears that they 
can be distinguished from each other in terms of their position on 
a continuum of molarity of explanatory concepts. Examples of a 
relatively molar explanation of aggressive behavior can be found in 
the works of anthropologically oriented theorists. For example, 
Marsh (1983) explained the aggression of British soccer fans in 
terms of the subcultural rules that govern interaction in the social 
groups of the so-called hooligans. In such an account, individual 
aggression is explained at a level of analysis that transcends the 
individual person, i.e., at the level of culture. Similarly, some etho-
logically oriented researchers explain individual aggression in terms 
of the characteristics of the social group to which the aggressor 
and her victim belong. For example, Slraycr (1980) explained chil-
dren's aggressive behavior in terms of the dominance structure in 
the children's social group. Again, an individual's aggression is 
explained in terms of a relatively molar explanatory construct. 
At a somewhat less molar level of analysis, researchers focus on 
the concrete interactions of aggressor and victim. This level is 
again used by ethologically oriented theorists when they explain 
aggressive behavior in terms of how it is caused by the victim's 
behavior that preceded the aggressive act as well as in terms of 
the aggressive act's immediate consequences. According to these 
theorists, the underlying regularities of aggressive behavior can be 
revealed by carefully observing real-life aggression. Al a similar 
level of molarity the aggressor's behavior can be explained in terms 
of other environmental determinants of that behavior. This is of 
course the aim of behaviorally oriented theorists. The possible 
environmental determinants that have been proposed include frustra-
tion (Dollard et. al. 1939, see also Berkowitz, 1989), specific aggres-
sion eliciting cues (Berkowitz & LcPagc, 1967), models who behave 
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aggressively (Bandura, 1973) and aggression reinforcing conditions 
(Bandura, 1973; Patterson, 1982). 
At a less molar level of analysis arc those theories that try to 
specify the intra-psychic processes that precede and/or accompany 
aggressive behavior. Since the research that will be presented later 
on in this book analyzed aggression at this level of explanation, I 
will discuss the basic ideas of theories that belong here somewhat 
more elaborately than those of the other theories mentioned. 
At the intra-psychic level we find Bandura's theory, at least 
when considering its versions from 1977 and later (Bandura 1977, 
1983). Although these revisions of the theory have fully maintained 
the learning theoretical nature of earlier accounts (e.g., Bandura, 
1973), several explanatory concepts have now been integrated into 
the theory that belong at the intra-psychic level of description. For 
example, Bandura (1977, 1983) argues that attcntional and cognitive 
processes arc important both in observational- and in reinfor-
cement-based learning of aggressive behavior. In particular, the 
self-reinforcement of aggression depends to a large extent on so-
cial-cognitive processes such as moral justification, attribution of 
blame and displacement of responsibility. 
A second approach towards explaining aggression that places its 
explanatory constructs at the intrapsychic level of description is 
psychoanalysis. Classical theories of psychoanalysis explain aggressive 
behavior in terms of a build-up of aggressive energy that has to be 
released from time to time. Differences in aggressiveness between 
individuals occur because people differ in terms of the amount of 
aggressive energy that they have and in terms of their ability to 
control the release of that energy. 
A further attempt to explain aggression in terms of the aggres-
sor's intra-psychic processes is motivation theory (Kornadl, 1982, 
1984). In this approach the tendency to behave aggressively is 
assumed to be a function of the difference in strength between two 
motivational components, i.e., an aggression motive and an inhibition 
motive. In addition, it is assumed that the relative influence of the 
aggression motive on actual aggressive behavior depends on the 
expectancy to be successful and on the incentive of being aggres-
sive. Similarly, the relative influence of the inhibition motive is 
assumed to depend on the expectancy to be punished and on the 
(negative) incentive of being punished. 
A fourth approach that belongs at the intra-psychic level of 
analysis is coined by Parke and Slaby (1983) as the social-cognitive 
approach. The central idea of this approach is that much aggression 
can be seen as the aggressor's counteraction to some earlier be-
havior of the victim, which was in the eyes of the aggressor blame-
worthy. Thus, and again in (he eyes of the aggressor, her behavior 
towards the victim is a justified counteraction to some earlier 
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misbehavior of the victim. Now, in this reasoning it becomes impor-
tant to know how people arrive at the conclusion that someone 
else's behavior is blameworthy. That is, if one knows what an in-
dividual considers to be blameworthy, one also knows under what 
circumstances that individual is likely to act aggressively. Thus, 
social-cognitive theories on aggression aim at describing the cogni-
tive processes that determine whether an individual reacts aggres-
sively to someone else's behavior. Specifically, it is important to 
know what criteria people use when perceiving someone else's be-
havior as blameworthy. 
A different way in which cognitive processes might underlie 
aggressive behavior is proposed by Zillman (1978, 1983). Zillman's 
approach is interesting because, as was the case with Bandura's 
(1977, 1983) analysis, it combines different levels of analysis. Ac-
cording to Zillman, aggression should be explained in terms of an 
integration between both physiological and cognitive processes. 
Physiological arousal is a necessary condition for aggression, but 
whether actual aggression occurs depends on factors like the source 
to which the subject attributes her arousal, the subject's appraisal 
of the arousing situation and whether the subject has the oppor-
tunity to rehearse grievances and/or retaliatory intentions (Zillman, 
1983, p. 96). 
Zillman's theory has brought us to the most molecular level of 
analysis that has been used to explain aggression. At this level 
aggression is explained in terms of physiological and other bodily 
processes that precede and/or accompany the aggressive act. This 
work includes research on the role of genetic factors, autonomous 
and central nervous system factors and biochemical factors. (Sec 
Mednick, Pollock, Volavka & Gabrielli (1982) for an overview of 
this kind of research). 
Finally, to conclude this section on how to explain aggression, I 
want to cite the conclusion that was reached by Parke and Slaby 
(1983) at the end of a section on the relation between hormones 
and aggression: "... it is clear that there is no tyrannical control of 
aggressive behavior by hormones; instead hormones should be seen 
as part of a multivariate set of determinants rather than as suffi-
cient causes of aggression". What was true for hormones can be 
said of any of the factors discussed in this whole section. A fully 
adequate explanation of aggression should ideally consist of a des-
cription of phenomena at each of the levels of analysis that were 
described. Furthermore, one should not be surprised if a more re-
fined description of the levels of analysis would appear to be neces-
sary than the one that I gave here. Needless to say, such a "grand 
theory" that integrates theories at the physiological, intra-psychic, 
behavioral and interpersonal or cultural levels does not yet exist. 
(Although theorists like Bandura, Berkowitz and Zillman have made 
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promising attempts towards integrating different levels of descrip-
tion). As long as the ideal "Grand Theory of Aggression" does not 
exist, any theory that is empirically supported should be welcomed 
as a useful step into the direction of formulating an overall theory, 
regardless of its level of analysis. 
Choice of a Theoretical Framework 
The present series of studies was guided by what has been called 
the social-cognitive approach. Why was this framework chosen? The 
reasoning that was followed in the preceding section implies that 
the choice of a particular level of analysis in itself requires no 
justification. Since the ideal theory will consist of explanations of 
aggression at several levels of analysis, each contribution should be 
welcomed regardless of its level of analysis. 
There was, however, a specific reason for choosing the social-
cognitive approach to guide the investigations that will be reported 
in this book. The social-cognitive approach is well suited to address 
the issue of developmental differences in aggression (see Parke & 
Slaby, 1983, p. 556). This is because the processes that are hypo-
thesized to mediate aggressive behavior can be expected to depend 
on developing abilities. For example, one of the interpretative pro-
cesses that the social-cognitive approach assumes in a pcrcciver of 
harmful behavior is an inference of the responsibility and blamewor-
thiness of the person who caused the harm. Consequently, both the 
Piagetian-based literature on the development of children's tendency 
to base their moral judgments on inlenlionalily (Piaget, 1932/1977) 
and the Heiderian-based literature on children's conceptions of 
responsibility (Heider, 1958) are directly relevant here. In sum, the 
social-cognitive approach is promising if one's interest is in con-
tributing to our knowledge of the development of aggression. 
Several social-cognitive analyses of aggression and their develop-
mental implications will be presented in detail in the next chapter. 
I will conclude the present chapter by discussing some general 
objections that are sometimes made against analyzing aggression 
from a social-cognitive perspective. First, the judgmental processes 
that are assumed in the social-cognitive approach are not necessarily 
conscious. Although in some cases a pcrcciver of harm might con-
sciously judge a harm-doer's behavior (e.g., when the harm is unex-
pected or extreme, see Ferguson & Rule, 1983, p. 46), in many 
other cases pcrceivers need not be aware of the judgmental proces-
ses that undcrüe their tendency to retaliate for harm caused to 
them. Second, a sceptic could argue that the social-cognitive ap-
proach necessarily limits itself to explaining reactive aggression and 
that it therefore cannot explain the behavior of an aggressor who 
tries to cause harm to a victim for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the victim's earlier behavior or even for no apparent reason 
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at all. In principle, this remark is correct. That is, the social-cogni-
tive approach has nothing to say about, for example, the aggressive 
behavior of a criminal committing a robbery if that behavior only 
serves to facilitate getting hold of the victim's possessions, rather 
than being a reaction to the victim's earlier behavior. With respect 
to instances of so-called "spontaneous" aggression, however, things 
are somewhat more complicated. Specifically, it should be realized 
that it is usually far from obvious whether a concrete case of 
aggression should be classified as spontaneous or as reactive. Ac-
cording to the social-cognitive approach, the cognitions of the 
aggressor which lead her towards behaving aggressively can be 
quite idiosyncratic. That is, the aggressor need not have any objec-
tive reason to blame the victim for the harm that was caused to 
her, nor does the harm to which the aggressor responds necessarily 
have any objectively verifiable characteristics. Furthermore, the 
victim need not be a concrete person, it could as well be an 
abstract entity as "the state" or "the jews". With these considera-
tions in mind, it becomes clear that despite the social-cognitive 
approach's limitation to reactive aggression, it potentially includes 
much of what is usually called 'spontaneous' aggression. Even when 
appearing 'spontaneous' from the viewpoints of observer and victim, 
the aggression might still be reactive from the perspective of the 
aggressor, which makes it explainable in terms of the social-cogni-
tive approach2. 
This is not to say that it will not be extremely difficult to empirically 
demonstrate that a given instance of so called "spontaneous" aggression actual-
ly resulted from the aggressor's judgments of her victim's earlier behavior, 
especially when such judgments are idiosyncratic and unconsciously made. 
However, these are the practical problems of empirical research. The point to 
be made here is only that there is no a priori reason to exclude instances of 
apparently spontaneous aggression from a social-cognitive analysis. 
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Chapter И 
Social-Cognitive Analyses of Aggression 
The aims of this chapter are twofold. The first aim is to specify a 
social-cognitive model of aggression that can serve as a framework 
for formulating hypotheses. To reach this aim, I will discuss dif­
ferent social-cognitive approaches to aggression while focusing 
especially on their developmental implications. Second, an overview 
will be given of the research questions which have been derived 
from this model, together with the studies which were designed to 
answer them. 
A social-cognitive analysis of aggression is by definition focused 
on how an aggressive person processes information about the ag­
gression-eliciting situation. Consequently, in such an analysis two 
issues have to be dealt with: First, what type of information is 
being processed and second, what is the nature of the processes 
that deal with such information? These issues will be discussed in 
the next two sections. 
What Information is Being Processed? 
Researchers working from a social-cognitive perspective on chil­
dren's aggression have followed Piaget's (1932/1977) lead in staling 
that an actor (A 1) will be more likely to react aggressively towards 
another actor В when A has perceived B's earlier behavior as harm­
ful and intentional (e.g., Dodge, 1982). However, as noted in the 
discussion of the definition of aggression (Chapter I), the concept 
of intcntionality is often used in a rather global way. That is, it is 
taken to encompass several different aspects of responsibility that 
can be distinguished from each other (e.g., the avoidabilily of harm 
and the acceptability of the harmdoer's motives can be distinguished 
from a more narrowly defined concept of intcntionality; Ferguson & 
Rule, 1983; Grucncich, 1982). Accordingly, some social-cognitive 
theorists of aggression have presented more detailed analyses of the 
dimensions that people use to interpret an aggression-provoking 
situation (e.g., Averill, 1982; Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Mummendey, 
Lfrchper & Linneweber, 1984; De Ridder, 1980; Rule & Ferguson 
1984). Common to all these analyses is the idea that the aggressive 
behavior of an actor A towards another person В can be understood 
as A's reaction to B's previous behavior. Specifically, A is assumed 
1
 Throughout this chapter reference is made to two hypothetical persons 
A and B. The to-be-explained aggression is in all examples A's behavior 
towards В (and not B's earlier behavior towards A, even though that behavior 
might often be called aggressive as well). 
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to react aggressively when B's previous behavior did not satisfy the 
normative criteria that A used to evaluate B's behavior. Stated in 
the terms used by Ferguson and Rule: When perceiving another 
person B's behavior leads the actor A towards experiencing a dis­
crepancy between what is the case and what ought to be the case, 
then A will act aggressively towards В (unless inhibitory factors 
prevent the aggressive act from being executed). The ought aspect 
depends on what normative criteria A considers to be relevant in 
the particular situation and the tv aspect refers to what actually 
happened (as interpreted by A). 
Now, what precisely arc the normative criteria that perceiver A 
might take into account? De Ridder (1980) refers to interaction 
norms, the violation of which elicits aggression. These interaction 
norms specify the rules of conduct that arc to be followed in inter­
active situations (e.g., when playing soccer one should not attack 
members of the other team who do not have the ball). Similarly, 
Mummcndcy et al. consider norm deviation to be one of the criteria 
that people use to evaluate someone else's behavior, and this evalua­
tion mediates their own aggressive counteraction. In addition, Mum­
mcndcy et. al. specify two other criteria, i.e., intent (the intent to 
cause harm) and injury (the amount of harm caused). Finally, apart 
from the harm itself, Ferguson & Rule take the responsibility of an 
actor for the occurrence of harm explicitly into account. Based on 
Heider's (1958) analysis of responsibility, they specify the following 
normative criteria2: (1) Association (harm should not occur), (2) 
Causality (one should not cause harm), (3) Avoidability (one should 
not cause harm carelessly), (4) Intentionalily (one should not mean 
to cause harm), and (5) Justificalion (one should not mean to cause 
harm with malevolent motives). Although Mummendey ci al. do not 
focus explicitly on Ferguson & Rule's normative criteria of causality 
and avoidability in their analysis and research, these criteria are 
nevertheless implicit in their criterion of intent. That is, when a 
perpetrator В causes harm intentionally in the sense of Mummendey 
et al., these authors also imply that В was the causal agent and 
that her causing the harm was avoidable. Ferguson and Rule's ex­
plicit inclusion of the normative criteria of causality and avoidability 
enables them to make a more detailed analysis of how a perceiver 
A attributes responsibility to a perpetrator of harm В and of the 
2
 In this context Ferguson and Rule use the term "norms" only. However, 
to avoid confusion with De Ridder's and Mummendey et al.'s more specific use 
of this term (i.e., in "interaction norms" and "norm deviation" both of which 
are particular instances of Ferguson and Rule's more general concept of 
"norms"), I will use "normative criteria" or just "criteria" where Ferguson and 
Rule use "norms". 
12 
behavioral consequences of A's attributions. For example, their 
analysis enables Ferguson and Rule to investigate whether even B's 
unintcntionally-but-avoidably caused harm is under particular cir­
cumstances sufficient to elicit A's aggressive counteractions. 
Even though the criterion of norm deviation (Mummendey et al.) 
or violation of interaction norms (De Ridder) is not explicitly men­
tioned in Ferguson and Rule's analysis, this criterion is, in my 
view, implicitly represented in that analysis. Consider the example 
presented by De Ridder in which a soccer player A is attacked by 
a competitor В while A does not have the ball. The first important 
aspect of this example is the harm that В caused to A. Such harm 
can be physical (A may be injured), but it can also be less concrete 
(A might otherwise have had a chance to make a goal). One could 
even argue that the fact that В violated an accepted rule is in 
itself harmful, irrespective of whether any further harm resulted 
from this behavior. Any observer who lays worth to the ideal of 
fair play is likely to be hurt psychologically by B's violation of 
accepted rules. Thus violation of interaction norms (De Ridder) and 
norm deviation (Mummendey et al.) can be seen as being part of 
the normative criterion that hann should not occur (Ferguson & 
Rule), provided that perceiver A defines harm broad enough to 
include non-physical effects.3 
The criterion of norm deviation has a second and possibly even 
more important feature, i.e., it is closely associated with the concept 
of motive. B's violation of an accepted rule of conduct immediately 
gives rise to the question of why В acted as he did. Since B's 
behavior is illegitimate, B's motives arc easily inferred to be il­
legitimate, and thereby also unacceptable. For example, without 
additional information one can only infer that De Ridder's player В 
had malevolent motives for attacking A. Although additional informa­
tion might lead to a different inference (e.g., if A had attacked В 
earlier on in the game), just being informed about a violation of an 
accepted rule of conduct easily leads to the inference of malevolent 
motives. Thus, a second aspect of the criterion of norm deviation 
or violation of interaction norms is that it is closely associated 
with Ferguson and Rule's normative criterion that one should not 
mean to cause harm with malevolent motives. 
In short, the different normative criteria that have been dis­
cussed in the literature are to a large extent represented in the 
3
 Perceivers often just do this. See for example Shweder's (1982) discus­
sion of the concept of "territories of the self" as introduced by Goffman 
(1971). 
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model that was proposed by Ferguson & Rule. Therefore, I will 
concentrate on this particular model in the remainder of this work. 
Wltich Processes? 
A rather detailed model of how a pcrceiver A processes information 
about an aggression-eliciting situation, has been formulated by 
Dodge (1982). According to Dodge, five cognitive steps can be 
distinguished in A's processing of information before acting aggres-
sively. First, information from a potentially aggression-eliciting 
situation has to be decoded. Actor A has to attend to and to per-
ceive social cues. For example, such cues might consist of informa-
tion that is relevant to the question of whether another person B's 
harmful behavior towards A was carried out intentionally. The 
second step in Dodge's model is that perccivcr A has to interpret 
the social cues. To reach such an interpretation, A's perception of 
the situation is matched with what Dodge calls a programmed rale 
structure. The rules in this structure specify how certain cues 
should be interpreted (e.g., a rule might be "if a peer laughs after 
hitting me, then I know she meant to hurt me"). Based on the 
information concerning the rule structure in memory and information 
about the situation itself, an interpretation is made of B's behavior 
(e.g., "she is trying to be mean" or "she caused harm accidentally"). 
Third, after having interpreted the situation, A has to search for a 
response. At this step response rules are applied (e.g., "if a peer 
intends to hurt me, then I can hit back" or "if a peer hurts me, 
then I can hit back"). Fourth, after considering the consequences 
and the adequacy of each of the responses generated at step three, 
a decision is made about which response is the optimal one. Fifth, 
to carry out the response chosen, it has to be encoded in terms of 
the actual motoric actions that are necessary to emit that response. 
As with Dodge's model, the analyses of Ferguson and Rule (1983) 
and Mummendey et al. (1984) imply that one source of age-related 
and other individual differences in aggressive behavior is how chil-
dren interpret potentially aggression-provoking situations. In Dodge's 
terminology, children might differ from each other in terms of the 
rule structure that they use to infer whether an instance of harm-
doing is avoidable, intentional and malevolently motivated. In addi-
tion, Ferguson and Rule's suggest a second source of individual 
differences that is only implicit in Dodge's analysis. This second 
source is the importance that a perccivcr A attaches to the informa-
tion that results from the process of interpreting a perpetrator B's 
harmful behavior. According to Ferguson and Rule, perceivers com-
pare the situation-as-interpreted with the normative criteria that 
they consider to be important in that situation. The output of this 
is-ought comparison is A's assignment of blame to the B, which is 
one of the factors that determines whether A will retaliate against 
B. If two perceivers A 1 and A2 differ in terms of what normative 
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criteria they consider to be important, they will also assign different 
degrees of blame to the perpetrator В and will subsequently behave 
differently towards B. This would be true even though they might 
well have made identical interpretations of B's behavior. Accordingly, 
Ferguson and Rule's model implies that even when two children Al 
and A2 interpret a particular instance of harm-doing by another 
child В in the same way (e.g., as being avoidable, but unintentionally 
caused and non-malcvolently motivated), they might still react 
differently towards B. This would for instance be the case if the 
normative criterion that one should not cause avoidable harm would 
be relatively unimportant for child A1, but relatively important for 
child A2. In this example child A 2 is more likely to react aggres­
sively towards В than child A1, their identical interpretations of the 
situation notwithstanding. Accordingly, one aim of the present 
series of studies is to empirically distinguish between a pcrcciver 
A's interpretation of B's harmful behavior and A's assignment of 
importance to the normative criteria that she uses to evaluate B's 
behavior-as-interpreted. 
Anger and Aggression 
Up to this point the analysis of aggression has been entirely cogni­
tive; that is, no reference has been made to affective processes. 
This neglect of affect stands in marked contrast to the important 
role that one particular type of affect, i.e., anger, plays in some 
modern theories of aggression that do not especially focus on social-
cognitive processes (e.g., Berkowit/, 1983, 1989; Zillman, 1983). For 
both Berkowitz and Zillman the relation between anger and aggres­
sion goes via a more fundamental concept, i.e., that of arousal. In 
Berkowitz's view, anger is subjectively experienced arousal, while 
the arousal is caused by aversive events. A high degree of arousal 
leads to subsequent aggressive behavior. According to Zillman, 
anger (and subsequent aggression) results when arousal, irrespective 
of its actual cause, is attributed to provocation. Thus, for both 
theorists anger or, more precisely, arousal is a central mediating 
factor in the occurrence of aggressive behavior. 
Is it possible to integrate the idea that anger and arousal are 
central concepts in an explanation of aggression, with a social-
cognitive analysis? According to Ferguson and Rule (1983) it is. In 
their view, a person A's anger towards a perpetrator of harm В 
involves the desire to retaliate against B. This desire may lead to 
A's actual aggression towards В if no inhibitory factors prevent the 
occurrence of such a counteraction. Thus, A's anger is an important 
determinant of her aggressive behavior against B. 
With respect to the origins of anger, Ferguson & Rule argue 
that one of the factors that determine how angry A will get is the 
arousal that results from harm being caused to her. However, A's 
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anger docs not depend only on the arousal engendered by harm 
(with instances of extremely high arousal being a possible excep­
tion), but also on a second factor, i.e., the amount of blame that A 
assigns to the perpetrator of harm B. The more blameworthy A 
considers the perpetrator to be, the more angry she will get. Now, 
as was discussed above, assigned blame is a function of an is-ought 
discrepancy. That is, the more the actual behavior of perpetrator В 
as interpreted by A (the is aspect) is discrepant from what ought 
to have happened according to A (the ought aspect), the more 
blame that A will assign to B. 
Issues to be investigated 
From the above discussion of social-cognitive models of aggression 
two themes emerge that merit further empirical investigation. First, 
it was claimed that a child A's anger- and aggression-related res­
ponses to a perpetrator B's harmful behavior depend to at least 
some extent on the amount of blame that A assigns to B. Said 
differently: Child A's angry aggression towards В is a function of 
(among other things) A's moral evaluation of B's previous behavior. 
Such moral evaluations depend on their turn on the extent to which 
В caused harm avoidably, intentionally and with unacceptable mo­
tives. Second, it was claimed that two processes can be distinguished 
in A's processing of information about B's responsibility for causing 
harm, i.e., the interpretation of responsibility information and the 
assignment of importance to that information. Both claims raise a 
number of issues that will be investigated in the remainder of this 
work. In addition, two further issues will be examined that are 
indirectly relevant to the above claims. An overview of these issues 
and of the studies that were carried out to address them will be 
presented in the next subsections. 
Children's Moral Evaluations and their Anger- and Aggression-related 
Responses 
The first issue to be examined concerns the extent to which moral 
evaluations and the anger- and aggression-related responses of 
children of different agegroups depend on the three dimensions of 
responsibility that were postulated by Ferguson & Rule. As is true 
for most previous research, the studies that are to be reported will 
focus on the situation where it is clear that a perpetrator has 
caused harm, thus keeping the causality dimension constant. In 
addition, the amount of harm caused will also be kept constant. 
Accordingly, the first prediction is that the remaining three dimen­
sions, i.e., Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive Acceptability, will 
affect both children's moral judgments and their anger- and aggrcs-
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sion-related responses. In addition, it is predicted that the older 
children are, the more they differentiate their responses in terms 
of these dimensions. 
Although empirical confirmation of the first prediction would 
increase confidence in the social-cognitive analysis of aggression 
that was presented above, its confirmation docs in itself not yet 
yield much credence to the claim that the expression of anger and 
aggression towards a perpetrator of harm is based on a moral eval-
uation of the perpetrator's behavior. The latter claim implies a 
stronger prediction, i.e., that the nature of the dimensions' effects 
should be very similar for each of these measures. These issues 
were addressed for children's moral judgments and their anger-
related responses in an experiment (see Chapter III) in which chil-
dren responded to several instances of harm-doing that varied in 
terms of the perpetrator's responsibility for causing the harm. 
Eventual confirmation of the first predictions raises a further 
question that is not explicitly treated in the literature discussed 
above. Specifically, suppose that the relations between making moral 
judgments and responding angrily and/or aggressively have been 
established empirically and that individual- and age-related differen-
ces in dimension use have been found. At this point a further ques-
tion could be asked about the relation between children's use of 
the dimensions of responsibility and their tendency to respond 
angrily and/or aggressively: Is the ability to use information about 
responsibility when evaluating a perpetrator's harmful behavior a 
necessary condition for responding angrily and/or aggressively, or 
should this ability be better seen as a factor that primarily inhibits 
otherwise high degrees of anger and/or aggression? Said differently, 
do children who use the dimensions of responsibility respond more 
or less often with anger and/or aggression than children not using 
the dimensions? This question is also addressed in the experiment 
to be reported in Chapter III. 
Interpretation and Importance 
A further issue to be addressed concerns the distinction that Fer-
guson and Rule made between an actor A's interpretation of another 
person B's harmful behavior in terms of the dimensions of respon-
sibility and the importance that A attaches to each of these dimen-
sions. The question to be answered is: Should individual differences 
among children (including those that are related to age) in their 
patterns of dimension use best be understood as the consequence of 
differences in interpreting the dimension-relevant information, or as 
the consequence of differences in the importance that they assign 
to that information? 
This question was addressed in a study (to be reported in Chap-
ter IV) in which measures of both dimension use and dimension 
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interpretation were taken. Subsequently, an attempt was made to 
isolate the variance due to differential assignment of importance to 
dimensions from the variance due to differential interpretation of 
the dimensions by comparing the interpretation and use data to 
each other. 
Effects of Contextual Factors 
In two studies that will be reported in Chapter V, we* elaborated 
on the issues mentioned above in four different ways. First, the 
ecological validity of the experimental situation was enhanced by 
adding further contextual information. The first experiment examined 
whether children's responses would be affected by having a negative 
expectation about the perpetrator of harm. Experiment 2 examined 
whether the source of the information about what happened (some 
neutral observer vs. the perpetrator himself) would have an effect 
on childrens' judgments. The Expectation and Account Source mani-
pulations enabled us to examine children's patterns of dimension 
use across different contexts. 
Second, in addition to measures of children's moral evaluations 
and their anger-related responses, measures were also taken of 
children's tendency to counteract against a perpetrator of harm. 
This provided us with an opportunity to extend the analysis of 
children's moral- and anger-related judgments that was presented in 
Chapter III, to their estimates of how they would behave in response 
to harmful events. 
Third, the manipulations of Expectation and Account Source in 
the experiments of Chapter V can also be seen as an attempt to 
validate the conceptual and empirical distinctions that were made in 
Chapter IV between the interpretation of dimension information and 
the importance assigned to that information. One way to do this is 
to choose two different experimental manipulations in such a way 
that one of them can on theoretical grounds be expected to affect 
importance, but not interpretation, whereas the reverse should be 
true for the other manipulation. Obviously, empirical confirmation 
of such predictions would increase confidence in the conceptual 
distinctions that were made and in the procedures that were used 
lo operationalize them. Accordingly, experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 
V were designed in such a way that the Expectation manipulation 
of experiment 1 could be expected to affect the importance, but 
not the interpretation of the dimension-relevant information, wherc-
4
 Since the experiments that will be reported result from the collaborat-
ive effort of several people (see the footnotes on the first pages of Chapters 
III, IV, V, VI and VII), I will use the first person plural in connection with 
these experiments. 
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as the reverse was true for the Account Source manipulation of 
experiment 2. 
Finally, in Chapter V attention will again be given to the issue 
that we first addressed in Chapter III, i.e., whether the ability to 
use information about responsibility when evaluating a perpetrator's 
harmful behavior is a necessary condition for responding angrily 
and/or aggressively, or whether this ability primarily inhibits anger 
and aggression. In Chapter III this issue was addressed by comparing 
the anger-related responses of children who did versus who did not 
use the dimensions of responsibility for making moral judgments. In 
Chapter V a similar comparison will be made, but now within sub-
jects. Specifically, in experiment 1 of Chapter V children first gave 
their anger- and aggression-related responses immediately after 
receiving the information that a perpetrator had caused harm, but 
before knowing how the harm had been caused. Subsequently, chil-
dren received information about the perpetrator's responsibility for 
causing the harm and they responded again. Comparing the responses 
that children gave before versus after being informed about the 
perpetrator's responsibility enabled us to further elaborate on the 
issue of whether the use of information about personal responsibility 
is or is not a necessary condition for responding angrily and aggres-
sively. 
Children's Conceptions of Responsibility 
In the studies mentioned above three dimensions of responsibility, 
i.e., Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive Acceptability, were 
combined orthogonally to yield eight instances of harm-doing. Only 
a subset of these instances have been used in previous research on 
children's conceptions of responsibility. The combinations that are 
new relative to earlier studies contain information that is, strictly 
speaking, irrelevant when seen from of the perspective of the con-
ception of responsibility that guided previous research. Specifically, 
both theorists (e.g., Hcider, 1958) and researchers (e.g., Fincham, 
1981, Fincham & Jaspars, 1979) have assumed a nested hierarchical 
structure among the three dimensions. In this conception, the dis-
tinction between acceptable and unacceptable motives is relevant 
only in the case of intentional harm. Furthermore, the distinction 
between intentional and unintentional is appropriate only in the 
case that harm is avoidable. 
In my view, these assumptions may well be too restrictive in 
those cases where additional information is in fact available, because 
children cannot always be expected to ignore available information 
even when it is logically irrelevant. For example, even when a 
perpetrator caused harm accidentally and/or unintentionally, the 
victim of the harm might well get angrier at the perpetrator when 
the latter had malevolent instead of benevolent motives in the 
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harmful situation. This might be true even though the perpetrator's 
bad motives cannot logically have contributed to the causation of 
harm (sec Grueneich, 1982). 
In Chapter VI these ideas will be tested by reanalyzing the data 
of the children who participated in the earlier studies in terms of 
the extent to which their moral evaluations and their anger-related 
responses were affected by the logically irrelevant information that 
was incorporated in the eight personal responsibility stories. 
Cogiitive Requirements of the Rating Scale Methodolog 
Finally, in Chapter VII a methodological issue will be addressed. 
Obviously, there are numerous ways in which both the independent 
and the dependent variables in the studies described above could be 
opcrationalized. As will be elaborated in the final section of this 
chapter, making an informed choice among these possibilities re-
quires a theory of how different operationalizations affect children's 
performance. As an, admittedly modest, contribution towards for-
mulating such a theory, Chapter VII contains a detailed analysis of 
the demands that one particular response mode, i.e., giving quantita-
tive ratings, places on the respondents. Specifically, the study 
reported in Chapter VII examined the cognitive requirements of the 
quantitative rating scale methodology by contrasting it to another 
method that has been used extensively in Piagctian-based moral 
judgment research i.e., the paired comparison task. 
A Note Regarding Methodology 
Prior to the discussion of the methodological study in the previous 
subsection, little explicit reference was made to how the studies 
were carried out. That is, it was left deliberately unclear whether 
the manipulations in the studies involved real-life harmful incidents 
or whether hypothetical events were used. Similarly, it was left 
open whether actual anger and aggressive behavior were measured 
or whether children's responses reflected their ideas about anger 
and aggression. Since these issues have important implications, both 
for the present series of studies and for developmental social-cogni-
tive research in general, they will be discussed here in some detail. 
Operationalizing the Variables 
Investigating the issues that were mentioned above requires an 
experimental approach. To determine whether the postulated dimen-
sions of responsibility have the predicted effects on children's 
moral judgments and on their anger- and aggression-related respon-
ses, one has to manipulate the way in which a perpetrator of harm 
is responsible for causing the harm. Still, such an experiment could 
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be set up in many different ways, depending on how the dependent 
and independent variables are operationalized. For example, operat-
ionalizations of the independent variables can vary in terms of 
whether the resulting stimulus situations include causing real-life 
harm to the respondents. Alternatively, instead of using real-life 
harmful events, subjects could be presented with hypothetical events. 
In this case the stimulus material might consist of harmful events 
that are presented in the form of stories. 
A similar distinction can be made for some of the dependent 
variables, i.e., those that are intended to reflect subjects' behavioral 
responses to stimuli. Specifically, one way to obtain children's 
anger- and aggression-related responses is to observe their behavior 
or to measure important aspects of that behavior directly. In the 
present series of studies children's anger and aggression could, for 
example, be measured by observing their facial expressions and 
their retaliatory behavior. Alternatively, children could be asked 
about how angry they are at the perpetrator of harm and about 
how they wish to retaliate. That is, instead of assessing children's 
behavioral responses directly, one could ask them lo communicate 
their ideas about their own behavioral responses. 
In my view, the real-hypothetical distinction for independent 
variables and the behavior-idea distinction for dependent variables 
can both be seen as two continuous dimensions along which operat-
ionalizations of variables can differ. Accordingly, any experimental 
set up can be instantiated in many different ways, depending on 
the operationalizations of the dependent and independent variables 
that are chosen. 
In What Respects Do Different Operationalizations Matter? 
How should the variables that are used in the present series of 
studies be operationalized? To my knowledge no systematic research 
has been carried out lo compare different independent variable 
operationalizations varying along the real-hypothetical dimension 
and different dependent variable operationalizations varying along 
the behavior-knowledge dimension. There are, however, reasons to 
assume that differences between independent-, and dependent vari-
able operationalizations along these dimensions do matter. 
First, the effect of using real-life stimulus situations versus 
symbolic representations of such situations obviously depends on 
the quality of the representations that arc used. This is especially 
true when the respondents are children. That is, if a particular 
child does not understand a highly abstract and exclusively verbal 
representation of a particular event, this does not imply that the 
same child would also not have understood a more concrete repres-
entation of the same event or even the event itself if it had oc-
curred to the child. 
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Second, different opcralionali/ations of the dependent variables 
along the knowledge-behavior continuum would not matter if one 
could safely assume that the respondents' ideas about their behavior 
are veridical. There obviously are many cases in which there is no 
reason to doubt this assumption. (E.g., a respondent's answer to the 
question "Where arc you going?" is likely to be veridical, cases of 
insincerity left aside). In other cases, respondents are definitely not 
able to give veridical answers, simply because they do not have 
access to the relevant information about the behavior in question. 
(E.g., respondents are unlikely to give a veridical answer to the 
question "What do you do to remain upright when riding a bicycle?" 
see Polanyi, 1958). 
There is, however, an interesting class of questions for which it 
is not a priori clear whether respondents' answers are likely to be 
veridical or not. On the basis of research in which people were 
asked about the causes of their behavior, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
claimed that their respondents responded as if they had access to 
the relevant information, while this was actually not true. Irrespec-
tive of whether Nisbett and Wilson's claim was valid (sec for ex-
ample White, 1988 for a critical evaluation), their research at least 
implies that the veridicality of respondents' statements about their 
behavior cannot simply be assumed, but is likely to depend on 
which questions are asked about which types of behavior. 
In addition, the veridicality of respondents' ideas about their 
behavior may also be related to age. For example, Ro/in (1976) 
argued that gaining conscious access to previously inaccessible 
cognitive processes is in itself an important developmental phenom-
enon. Similarly, Piaget (1976, chapter 1) reports several observations 
of young children whose verbal accounts of what they were doing 
when walking on all fours were strikingly discrepant from their 
actual behaviors. Only older children were able to match the verbal 
descriptions of what they were doing with their actual behavior. 
The younger children's ideas about their behavior as reported upon 
questioning were evidently not veridical, whereas the older children's 
were. 
TIte Ideal Operationalization and its Problems 
The above discussion permits only one conclusion about what type 
of operationalization of the dependent and independent variables 
should be used: If one is interested in explaining aggressive behavior 
in real-life situations, the safest way towards getting relevant 
results is to use real-life harmful events as stimuli and to measure 
the real-life emotional and aggressive behavior that is elicited by 
those events. Even if there is no strong evidence, the arguments 
presented above do make it plausible that the assessment of chil-
dren's knowledge about their anger- and aggression-related behavior 
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in hypothetical situations might yield results that cannot be used 
directly to predict their actual behavior in real-life aggression-
eliciting situations. 
Nevertheless, despite the obviousness of the need to observe 
angry and aggressive behavior in real-life anger-eliciting situations, 
a different method was used in the present research and for an 
equally obvious reason. Imagine what it would mean to use the 
real-life situation method. Respondents would have to be brought 
into situations in which actual harm would be caused to them. For 
example, a confederate of the experimenter could ruin some property 
of the respondent. The confederate's responsibility for ruining the 
respondent's property should be varied in terms of whether the 
damage was caused unavoidably or avoidably, unintentionally or 
intentionally and in the context of good or bad motives. The depen-
dent measures would include physiological and facial expressive 
measures of the respondents' anger and observational measures of 
their retaliatory behavior. Needless to say, serious practical and 
ethical problems would accompany such an approach. To mention 
only a few: It would require both a confederate (of about the same 
age as the respondent) possessing considerable skills as a stage 
actor and an extremely talented stage manager to make the harmful 
incidents appear authentic to the respondent. Even more importantly, 
ethical considerations would simply make it impossible to elicit 
actual anger in child-respondents by causing real-life harm to them. 
We arc thus caught in a dilemma: On the one hand, theoretical 
and methodological considerations led to the conclusion that actual 
anger- and aggression-related behavior should be observed in real-
life situations. On the other hand, it is impossible to follow the 
theoretically ideal approach due to ethical and practical problems. 
Escaping from the Dilemma 
In the present scries of studies an attempt will be made to escape 
from the dilemma that was sketched above by trying to remain as 
close as possible to the method of observing children's real-life 
anger- and aggression-related behavior in real-life aggression-elicit-
ing situations, while actually assessing children's ideas about their 
behavior in hypothetical situations. To do this, two measures will 
be taken with respect to the independent variables. First, the hypo-
thetical events will be chosen so that they represent natural and 
well-known situations in children's lives. Second, the events will be 
presented in a way that is as concrete as possible, by using clear 
and attractive pictures to illustrate the stories about the hypotheti-
cal events. 
With respect to the dependent measures, it is less clear how to 
ensure that the results obtained are as close as possible to those 
that would have been obtained by observing actual behavior. The 
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question is how to assess children's ideas about the specific features 
of situations that elicit their anger and aggression in such a way 
that their responses correspond as closely as possible to those in 
actual anger- and aggression-provoking situations. Essentially, a 
satisfactory answer to this question requires an empirically-based 
theory about the nature and the origins of children's ideas about 
their behavior and about how these ideas relate to their actual 
behavior. I am unaware of any such theory, but some authors have 
provided important ideas that might constitute a beginning. Specifi-
cally, Piaget (1976) argued that children's verbally expressed ideas 
about their behavior become more and more veridical with increasing 
age. Thus, verbally expressed ideas about behavior should not un-
thinkingly be taken as veridical, especially not if they arc generated 
by young children. At the same time, however, an argument can be 
made that even though young children are unable to verbally express 
explicit and veridical knowledge about their behavior, they might 
nevertheless possess such knowledge, be it of an implicit, not ver-
balizable and context dependent nature (Ro/.in, 1976). Accordingly, 
it seems reasonable to argue that assessing (young) children's ideas 
about their behavior should occur at a level of explicitness that is 
as low as possible. The less that a method of assessing ideas about 
behavior requires that those ideas be explicit, verbali/able, and 
context-free, the greater the chance that those ideas correspond to 
children's actual behavior. For example, a method that requires 
subjects to just recognize whether a particular harmful event would 
elicit anger, is more likely to yield results that can be used to 
predict actual anger, than a method that requires children to express 
verbally what features generally make events elicitors of anger and 
aggression. 
Based on the above arguments, the measures of anger and aggres-
sion in the following studies will consist of children's judgments of 
the angry and the retaliatory responses that victims of harm-doing 
would exhibit in a variety of potentially anger- and aggression-
eliciting hypothetical situations. Thus, children are required only to 
recognize particular events as elicitors of anger and aggression, not 
to produce the features of such situations verbally. 
Finally, to comfort those readers who are by now at loss about 
whether the following research deals with behavior, ideas about 
behavior, or both, I will cite Piaget (1932/1977, p. 109) who remar-
ked, when struggling with precisely this problem: "...any method 
that leads to constant results is interesting, and only the meaning 
of the results is a matter of discussion..." 
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Chapter HI 
Personal Responsibility Antecedents of Anger 
and Blame Reactions in Children1 
A central developmental task for children is learning to control the 
expression of negative emotions such as anger. In his examination 
of developmental changes in hostile aggression, Hartup (1974) sug­
gested that the expression of such aggression presupposes cognitive 
antecedents that mediate anger and its behavioral expression. These 
antecedents seem to include, among other factors, the person's 
perceptions of why harm occurred and whether it was justified. 
Epstein (1979), for example, stales that an adult's "appraisal that 
someone is at fault or that an attack or injury is unwarranted 
appears to be an important contributor to anger" (p. 59). And, 
according to Avcrill (1982, 1983), anger for the lay adult is effec­
tively an attribution of blame. 
Central in these analyses is the proposition that anger has a 
normative or moral quality to it (Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Rule & 
Ferguson, 1984) and that anger involves the experienced discrepan­
cy between what people believe ought to be the case and what, in 
fact, is the case. It might therefore be hypothesized that children's 
ability to differentiate among harmful events in terms of moral 
criteria would also enable them to differentiate their anger in 
response to those events (sec Weiner & Graham, 1984). In line with 
these ideas, we first need to establish which moral criteria underlie 
children's ascriptions of blame. 
A perceiver's moral judgment about a harmful event is affected 
by at least four dimensions of personal responsibility, which may be 
labelled: causality (did the perpetrator cause the harm), avoidability 
(could the perpetrator have avoided the harm), intentionality (was 
the perpetrator trying to produce the harm) and motive acceptabi­
lity (were the perpetrator's motives acceptable or not). These di­
mensions were derived from analyses of jurisprudence and Hcidcr's 
(1958) analysis of personal responsibility (see Darley & Zanna, 1982; 
Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Fincham & Jaspars, 1979; Grueneich, 1982; 
Hamilton, 1978; Shultz, Schleifer & Altman, 1981). 
Many previous writers, however, have conceptualized or opcra-
tionalized the four dimensions as a nested hierarchical scheme of 
personal responsibility. Harm that was unavoidably caused is almost 
1
 This chapter has been published in CHILD DEVELOPMENT. The 
complete reference is: Olthof, T., Ferguson, T.J., Ь Luiten, Α. (1989). Personal 
responsibility antecedents of anger and blame reactions in children. Child 
Development. 60, 1328-1366. 
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always operationali/ed as being unintentionally caused, whereas 
avoidably caused harm is presented as being unintentionally or 
intentionally produced. Similarly, unintentionally caused harm is 
presented without specification of the acceptable versus unaccep-
table nature of the perpetrator's motives, whereas motive accep-
tability is generally clarified only in cases of intentionally produced 
harm. As others have pointed out, unavoidable harm may neverthe-
less be produced intentionally, and a perpetrator usually has a 
motive for behaving even in those cases where harm is unintention-
ally caused (Gruencich, 1982; Rule & Ferguson, 1984). In accordance 
with these ideas, the four dimensions were treated as being ortho-
gonal to one another in the present analysis. 
Do children use these dimensions when making moral judgments? 
Previous investigations have focused mainly on situations in which 
it is clear that a perpetrator caused the harm, thus keeping the 
causality factor constant. Those studies show that motive accep-
tability influences even three-year-old children's evaluations, and 
this criterion increases in importance up to the age of 8 to 9 years 
(Kcascy, 1977). In addition, in some studies, it has been found that 
intentionalily appears to be used from 7 to 8 years onward (Berndt 
& Berndt, 1975), whereas children's moral judgments are not re-
liably influenced by avoidability before the age of 10 years (Fer-
guson & Rule, 1980; Fincham & Jaspars, 1979; Shaw & Sul/.cr, 1964). 
Other research indicates that even 5 year-old children can use the 
intenlionality and avoidability dimensions in making moral judg-
ments when information about these dimensions is made explicit 
(Fincham, 1981; Shultz, Wright & Schleifer, 1986). Nevertheless, 
even in Shultz et al.'s study, age-related increases in dimension use 
were found. It can therefore be concluded generally that the three 
dimensions of responsibility are increasingly used as a basis for 
moral judgments as children grow older. 
Several predictions can be derived from this analysis. First, the 
dimensions of avoidability, intentionalily, and motive acceptability 
should affect both children's moral judgments about a perpetrator's 
harmful behavior and their anger-related responses towards the 
perpetrator. Second, when giving moral judgments, any age-related 
differences in dimension use should also be revealed in children's 
anger-related responses. Third, if anger responses are closely re-
lated to giving moral judgments, then the dimensions should simi-
larly affect children's anger-related responses and their moral judg-
ments. 
These three predictions imply that the anger responses of child-
ren who actually use these three dimensions of responsibility will 
be more differentiated than those of children who do not use the 
dimensions. The fourth issue to be explored is whether the overall 
intensity of the anger responses given by these two groups of 
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children differs. In our view, a person becomes "angry" (as opposed 
to "sad", for example) when the perpetrator is held responsible for 
the harmful consequences of the deed (see Avcrill, 1982, 1983). 
From this perspective, children who do not use the three dimen-
sions of responsibility should consistently express high anger, since 
the perpetrator was the cause of harm in all cases. They make, as 
it were, a primitive responsibility attribution based only on the 
causality criterion. In contrast, children who use one or more of 
the remaining three dimensions for assigning responsibility should 
become less angry when averaged across the incidents representing 
avoidability, intenlionalily, and motive acceptability. These children 
would, after all, be expected to hold the perpetrator less respon-
sible for harm that was caused unavoidably and/or unintentionally 
and/or with good motives (as opposed to avoidably, and/or inten-
tionally and/or with bad motives). This issue was explored by de-
termining whether children's tendency to use the dimensions was 
positively, negatively, or nonsignificantly related to their anger 
intensity ratings. 
The best way of testing our hypotheses would be to examine 
children's anger responses and moral evaluations in vivo. Practical 
and ethical considerations, however, led us to choose an alternative 
procedure. Children 5 to 15 years old received information about 
eight incidents of property damage that consisted of the factorial 
combination of avoidability, intenlionalily and motive acceptability. 
After each incident, they then rated how naughty the perpetrator 
was, as well as how angry the victim would be. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen children (eight boys and eight girls) from each of five 
grade levels participated. Grade levels were kindergarten (mean age 
5-7, range 5-3 to 6-1), first (mean age 6-11, range 6-3 to 7-3), 
third (mean age 9-1, range 8-8 to 9-7), fifth (mean age 11-0, range 
10-4 to 12-3) and ninth (mean age 15-2, range 14-5 to 16-5). Child-
ren were selected from several different schools serving middle-
class areas in Nijmegen (the Netherlands). 
Stones and Training 
Each child received eight stories in which a perpetrator caused 
damage to the property of another child. The eighl stories repre-
sented the factorial combinations of avoidability (unavoidable, 
avoidable), intentionality (unintentional, intentional), and motive 
acceptability (good, bad). Before judging these eight stories, the 
children made naughtiness and anger judgments about two anchor 
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Stories Used to Represent the Eight Motive Acceptability χ 
Intcnlionalily χ Avoidabihty Combinations 
for the Castle Theme 
All stories were preceded by the following introduction This story is about 
a boy named Henk Henk hves in Nijmegen There is a boy who lives next door 
to Henk and (us name is Wim (1)" One day Henk and Wim are playing in the 
yard They have both taken their toys outside Both of them are building a big 
castle But then Wim has to go home to eat His castle is already mcc, but it is 
still not finished Henk keeps playing on his own Henk sees that Wim's castle 
is getting really nice" (2) 
Good MoUveslUnavotdablelUmntenlionai 
[AM]b But he also sees that Wim does 
not have enough blocks to finish his 
castle Henk wants to help Wim to 
make his castle even nicer (3) Then 
Henk goes to fetch more blocks for 
Wim's castle 
[UA] But, suddenly, a big dog shows 
up The dog jumps on Henk and Henk 
falls (4) He falls right on Wims 
castle and the castle is completely 
ruined 
[UI) Henk is shocked to see Wim s 
castle ruined (5) β 
Good motiveslAvoulablelUnwtenüonal·* 
[AM] But he also sees that Wim does 
not have enough blocks to finish his 
castle Henk wants to help Wim to 
make his castle even nicer (3) Then 
Henk goes to fetch more blocks for 
Wim's castle 
[A] But, then, Henk isn't paying 
attention to what he is doing He is 
not looking out where he is walking 
He runs right into Wim's castle and 
Wim's castle is completely ruined 
(И) 
[UI] Henk is shocked to see Wim's 
castle ruined 
Bad Motives/Unavoidable/Uruntenüonal 
[UM] But he also sees that Wim has 
a lot of extra blocks that he still 
needs to use in order to finish his 
castle Then Henk wants to take all 
those extra blocks away He thinks, 
That way Wim won't be able to 
finish building his castle" (S) So 
Henk goes to take Wim s blocks away 
[UA] But, suddenly, a big dog shows 
up The dog jumps on Htnk and Henk 
falls (4) He falls right on Wims 
castle and the castle is completely 
ruined 
[UI| Henk is shocked to see Wim's 
castle ruined (5) 
Bad MoUveslAvoidablelUmntentional 
[UM] But ho also sees that Wim has 
a lot of extra blocks that he still 
needs to use in order to finish his 
castle Then Henk wants to take all 
those extra blocks away He thinks, 
That way Wim won t be able to 
finish building his castle" (8) So 
Henk goes to take Wim's blocks away 
[A] But, then, Henk isn't paying 
attention to what he is doing He is 
not looking out where he is walking 
He runs right into Wim's castle and 
Wim's castle is completely ruined 
(H) 
[UI] Henk is shocked lo see Wim's 
castle ruined 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Good MotiveslUnavoidabtellrüenüonaf 
[AM] But bc also sees that Wim does 
not have enough blocks to finish his 
castle. Henk wants to help Wim to 
make his castle even nicer (3). Then 
Henk goes to fetch more blocks for 
Wim's castle. 
[UA] But suddenly it starts raining 
really hard. It's really windy and it's 
raining really hard. Hcnk's mother 
comes out of the house and she 
shouts at Henk, "Bring all those toys 
inside immediately, or else..." (9). 
Henk thinks: "Uh oh, I'm going to 
have to ruin Wim's castle, otherwise I 
can't bring the blocks inside." 
[I] So, Henk goes and ruins Wim's 
castle (10). 
Good MoüveslAvoidablellnUnlional 
[AM] Henk thinks, "I want to do 
something that Wim will like very 
much". 
[A] "But what can I do? I could tell 
him thai his castle is really getting 
nice or I could try to make his casllc 
even nicer (12). I think I'll make his 
castle even nicer (3). But then, I'd 
first have to ruin the castle'. 
[I] So, Henk goes and ruins Wim's 
casllc (10). 
Bad MotiveslUnavoidablellnUntional 
[UM] But he also sees that Wim has 
a lot of extra blocks that he still 
needs to use in order to finish his 
castle. Then Henk wants to take all 
those extra blocks away. He thinks, 
That way Wim won't be able to 
finish building his castle" (8). So 
Henk goes to take Wim's blocks away. 
[UA] But suddenly it starts raining 
really hard. It's really windy and it's 
raining really hard. Henk's mother 
comes out of the house and she 
shouts at Henk, "Bring all those toys 
inside immediately, or else..." (9). 
Henk thinks, "Uh oh, I'm going to 
have to ruin Wim's castle, otherwise 
I can't bring the blocks inside." 
[I] So, Hcnk goes and ruins Wim's 
castle (10). 
Bad MoliveslAvoidablellntenlional 
[UM] Henk thinks, "I want to do 
something that will really bug Wim". 
[A] "But what can I do? I could lell 
him that his castle is a piece of junk 
or I could ruin his castle (13). I 
think I'll ruin his castle." (8) 
[1] So, Hcnk goes and ruins 
castle (10). 
Wim's 
" Numbers in parentheses refer to pictures illustrating the particular 
part of the story. Detailed descriptions of the pictures can be obtained from 
the first author. 
ь
 AM - acceptable motives, UM - unacceptable motives, UA -
unavoidable, A - avoidable, UI - unintentional, I = intentional. 
" All stories had the following ending: "Then Wim comes back with 
another boy. He wants to show how nice his castle has already become, but 
he cannot do that anymore because the castle is completely ruined (6)". 
л
 Consistent with the attributional approach, unavoidable versus 
avoidable barm that was unintended was operationalized as the absence versus 
presence of foreseeability. In contrast, unavoidable versus avoidable harm that 
was intended was operationalized as the absence versus presence of freedom 
of choice. 
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stories that were designed to: (a) elicit use of each extreme of the 
seven-point naughtiness and anger scales, (b) familiari/c the child 
with the range of variation in the transgressivc scenarios, and c) 
familiarize the child with the naughtiness and anger rating proce-
dure. In the first anchor story, a boy was shown actively ruining 
another boy's hand-made car and throwing the remains in a ditch. 
In contrast, in the second anchor story, the actor enhanced the 
beauty of the other boy's car even more by attaching his own horn 
and some flags to it. The mean ratings for the positive versus the 
negative anchor story were 1.09 versus 6.30 for naughtiness and 
1.20 versus 6.46 for anger. 
Two different story themes were developed for each of 10 
stories. The first story theme was about a perpetrator (Klaas) who 
ruined another boy's snowman. The second story theme was about 
another perpetrator (Henk) who destroyed yet another boy's brick 
castle. An English translation of the eight main castle theme 
stories is presented in Table 3.1. 
For each story, the perpetrator was first introduced and the 
initial situation was described. This information was the same for 
all 10 stories. Information was then given about (a) the acceptabi-
lity of the perpetrator's motives, (b) whether the outcome was 
avoidable, and (c) whether the perpetrator intended to produce the 
outcome. This information was followed by a theme-appropriate 
ending that was the same for each of the eight main stories. 
Because each child heard several relatively complex stories, two 
precautions were taken to ensure comprehension. First, in addition 
to verbal descriptions of each story, children saw five realistically 
drawn and partly colored illustrations that were mounted on a 
12x40cm piece of cardboard. The five illustrations depicted: (1) the 
introductory information (e.g., the perpetrator looking at the snow-
man), (2) the perpetrator's motives, (3) outcome avoidability, (4) 
outcome intent, and (5) the concluding information (the owner of 
the snowman looking at the ruined snowman). Illustrations depicting 
the same level of a personal responsibility factor were identical 
across the eight stories, with the exception of the pictures repre-
senting avoidable and unavoidable harm. These pictures were dif-
ferent depending on whether the outcome was intentionally caused. 
Second, following each story, a standardized summary was given of 
the level of motive acceptability, avoidability, and intentionalily 
represented in the story by repeating appropriate phrases from the 
story. 
Procedure 
Children were individually tested in a quiet room of their school by 
either a male or a female experimenter, each of whom tested an 
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equal number of boys and girls in each grade. Each session lasted 
approximately 20 min. 
Naughtiness and anger ratings. The session started with training 
the child to use a 7-poinl rating scale that was later used to make 
naughtiness and anger ratings. The child indicated each rating by 
pointing to one of seven si/e-gradualed rectangles that were or-
dered from small to large. For the kindergarten and first-grade 
children, the experimenter demonstrated scale usage using questions 
such as "How scary is a lion (a lamb, a big dog, etc.)?" To check 
scale comprehension, children were asked to rate how strong 
several people were (including the Hulk, a policeman, a father, a 
big child, an old lady, a small child, and a baby). Finally, children 
were asked to rale how much they liked themselves. Older children 
received a briefer version of the scale training. Scale training was 
considered to be successful when the child reasonably differentiated 
among the presented examples. Three kindergarten children, who 
appeared to have difficulties with scale usage, were replaced by 
other children of the same age. 
Following scale training, children were first presented with the 
two anchor stories and then the eight main stories. Within each 
story, information was always presented in the following order: 
motive acceptability, avoidability, intenlionality (see Table 3.1). Half 
of the children always received stories representing the snowman 
story theme, whereas the castle story theme was used for the re-
maining children. The 10 stories were presented in one of two fixed 
orders, but both of these started with the negative followed by the 
positive anchor story. Each of the stories was read aloud by the 
experimenter, and the illustrations were placed on an upright story-
board to ensure maximum visibility. While telling the story and 
summarizing the personal responsibility information, the ex-
perimenter pointed to the picture illustrating the part of the story 
he or she was telling. After presenting each story, the child was 
asked "How naughty do you think Klaas (Henk) is?" and "Suppose 
we would tell Piet (Wim) everything that happened, how angry 
would Pict (Wim) then be at Klaas (Henk)?" (l = not at all, 7 = very 
very much). The order of asking the naughtiness and anger ques-
tions was coupled with the story theme that children received. 
Children who received the snowman story theme were asked the 
naughtiness question first, whereas the other children received the 
anger question first. 
Results and Discussion 
Children's use of the dimensions to make naughtiness and anger 
ratings and age-related differences in dimension use were examined 
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by conducting a five-factor mixed-design analysis of variance, with 
grade as the only bctween-subjccts factor (5 [grade] χ 2 [avoidabi­
lity) χ 2 [inlentionalily] χ 2 [motive acceptability] χ 2 [type of 
measure: naughtiness vs. anger]). Four supplementary six-factor 
ANOVAs were conducted, each of which included one of the follow­
ing factors: subject sex, experimenter, story theme/question order 
and story presentation order as an additional betwccn-subjccts 
factor. These additional analyses yielded significant interactions 
including experimenter, story theme/question order, or story pre­
sentation order. Without exception, however, these effects were due 
to relatively small differences in the extent to which children of 
one or more of the grades used the dimension information for 
judging naughtiness and/or anger. None of these effects qualifies 
conclusions based on the five-factor analysis.2 
Dimension Effects on Naughtiness and Anger 
The five-factor analysis revealed significant main effects for avoid­
ability (A), intentionality (I), motive acceptability (MA), and type 
of measure, F s (1,75) =25.75, 41.18, 291.23, 128.18, p's <.O01. These 
effects were qualified by the significant interactions ΜΑ χ type of 
measure, F(l,75) = 74.60, p<.001, and A χ type of measure, F(1,75) = 
5.95, g<.05. 3 The latter effect was again qualified by a significant A 
χ I χ type of measure interaction, F(l,75)=7.07, ρ = .01. The means 
representing the dimension χ type of measure interactions are pres­
ented in Table 3.2. 
In general, the interactions reported in Table 3.2 indicate that 
the stories containing evaluatively positive information elicited 
higher anger than naughtiness ratings, whereas the difference was 
much smaller for the stories that contained evaluatively negative 
information only. As shown in Table 3.2 (left panel), MA affected 
both naughtiness and anger, but the effect was smaller for anger. 
2
 Tabular summaries of the means representing these effects can be ob­
tained from the first author. 
3
 To conserve space, two additional significant interactions that are not 
directly relevant to our hypotheses are presented here. An avoidability χ inten­
tionality χ motive acceptability interaction F 11,75) =• 6.78, £ <.05, indicated that 
the effects of avoidability and intentionality depended to some extent on the 
level of motive acceptability. A grade level χ type of measure interaction, 
F(4,74) - 4.31, 2 <.001, indicated that anger ratings were significantly higher 
than naughtiness ratings for all but the kindergarten children. Tabular sum­
maries of the means representing these effects can be obtained from the first 
author. 
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This was due to the fact that anger ratings were much higher than 
naughtiness ratings for the good motive when compared to the bad 
motive stories. The A and I dimensions also affected naughtiness 
and anger in the expected direction (see Table 3.2, right panel), 
with one exception (the avoidable/intentional story did not elicit 
significantly higher anger judgments than the unavoidable/inten­
tional story). Thus, although children used the entire seven-point 
scale for rating naughtiness, they only used the higher part of the 
scale for rating anger. Morally evaluating the transgressor from an 
outside observer's perspective apparently leads to more moderate 
responses than judging angry reactions to harm from the victim's 
standpoint (see Ferguson & Olthof, 1986). These differences aside, 
the first prediction is clearly supported by the finding that both 
naughtiness and anger ratings were affected by motive acceptabi­
lity, intcntionalily, and, to some extent, by avoidabilily. 
Table 3.2 
Mean Naughtiness and Anger Ratings for the Motive Acceptability χ 
Measure Type and Avoidabilily χ Intcnlionality χ 
Measure Type Interactions 
naughty anger naughty anger 
good motives 2.41 a 4.16e unavoidable/ 3.28tt 4.46d 
(1.42) (1.66) unintentional (1.34) (1.54) 
bad motives 5.28b 5.7511 avoidable/ 3.68b 4.84° 
(1.02) ( .86) unintentional (1.52) (1.39) 
unavoidable/ 3.79b 5.14 e f 
intentional (1.56) (1.41) 
avoidable/ 4.64 e 5.38 r 
intentional (1.18) (1.16) 
Note. Means within columns and within rows not sharing identical super­
scripts differ significantly according to Tukey's HSD test with 
Cicchetty's (1972) extension (£ <.05). Standard deviations are given 
in parentheses. The means for good versus bad motives, uninten­
tional versus intentional harm, unavoidable versus avoidable harm, 
and naughtiness versus anger are, respectively: 3.29 versus 5.52, 
A.07 versus 4.74, 4.17 versus 4.64, and 3.85 versus 4.96. 
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Age-Related Differences in Dimension Use 
The second prediction to be tested was that agc-rclatcd differences 
in dimension use would be similar for naughtiness and anger judg­
ments. The five-factor analysis yielded a significant effect of grade 
F(4,75) = 7.56, 2<.001, that was qualified by a grade χ Ι χ MA inter­
action, F(4,75) = 2.60, ρ < .05. However, consistent with our second 
prediction, the ANOVA did nol yield any significant grade χ dimen­
sion χ type of measure interactions. The means representing the 
grade χ I χ MA interaction arc presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 
Averaged Naughtiness/Anger Ratings for the Grade Level χ 
Inlcntionality χ Motive Acceptability Interaction 
kindergarten 
grade 1 
grade 3 
grade 5 
grade 9 
good 
unintentional 
3.94b 
(2.04) 
3.52-b 
(1.65) 
2 .95 a b 
(1.27) 
2.42-
(1.03) 
2.34 a 
( -91) 
motives 
intentional 
3.73-b 
(2.19) 
4.97 b 
(1.24) 
3.47» 
(1.22) 
2.89a 
(1.03) 
2.64a 
(1.31) 
bad motives 
unintentional intentional 
5 .56^ 
(1.53) 
5.81 e 
( -91) 
4 98-ьо 
(1.03) 
4.50a 
( -82) 
4.63 a 
( .83 
6.06a 
(1.11) 
6.30a 
( -74) 
6.00a 
( -73) 
5.77a 
( -74) 
5.61 a 
( -64) 
Note - Means within columns not sharing identical superscripts differ sig­
nificantly according to Tukey's HSD test (j)<.05). Standard deviations are 
given in parentheses. 
Separate one-way ANOVAs for the four Ι χ MA cells yielded 
significant effects of grade (p's <.05) for all but the cell concern­
ing transgressions of an intentional/bad motive nature. Relative to 
the younger children, older participants showed a strong tendency 
to give lower judgments when the perpetrator damaged the property 
unintentionally and/or with good motives as compared to the per­
petrator who intended the harm and had bad motives. Analyses 
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using Tukey's HSD test bear out this observation. Grade 5 and 
grade 9 children gave lower judgments of the unintentional/good 
motive stories than kindergarten-age children. Although less robust, 
judgments of the unintentional/bad motive and the intentional/good 
motive stories also tended to decrease with increasing age. No age-
related differences were found for the intentional/bad motive stor­
ies. 
77je Similarity of Naughtiness and Anger Rating Patterns 
The dimension χ measure type interactions presented in Table 3.2 
could be taken as evidence that the dimensions did not similarly 
affect naughtiness and anger ratings, which would be inconsistent 
with our third prediction. It should, however, be stressed that these 
interactions might indicate that children used different scale ranges 
when making naughtiness versus anger judgments. In this case, the 
dimension effects on naughtiness and anger could still be very 
similar to one another. To examine the extent to which the 
naughtiness and anger rating patterns resembled each other, Pear­
son product-moment correlations were computed between each in­
dividual child's naughtiness and anger ratings of the eight stories 
(thus treating the eight stories as the cases and the naughtiness 
and anger ratings as variables). Support for our third prediction 
obviously requires significant positive correlations. 
The correlations could not be computed due to lack of variance 
in one kindergarten child's and three first-grade children's naughti­
ness and/or anger ratings. For the remaining 76 children, signifi­
cant (p<.05) positive correlations between naughtiness and anger 
were found for 49 children (64%), and the correlations approached 
significance (p<.10) for another six children. The number of sig­
nificant correlations (with 16 possible per grade level) were, 7, 7, 
10, 13, and 12, respectively, for the kindergarten, grade 1, grade 3, 
grade 5 and grade 9 children. The average correlations and their 
ranges were .44 (range -.38 to .99), .61 (range .22 to 1.00), .69 
(range .22 to .97), .77 (range .45 to .98), and .70 (range -.53 to .98) 
for these five age groups. Anger and naughtiness were clearly re­
lated to each other for most children. This relation also does not 
appear to change with age, since a one-way ANOVA conducted on a 
Fisher's ζ transformation of the correlations did not reveal a sig­
nificant grade effect. 
Failure to detect reliable age-related differences in the size of 
these correlations could be due to within-grade variability. For 
example, it is possible that anger and naughtiness are related for 
some but not all children of the same age. It is also possible that 
some children made more reliable judgments than other children, 
thus yielding stronger correlations. If the latter possibility were 
true, then aggregating the ratings across children would remove 
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random variance from the dala, which should lead to stronger cor­
relations. To examine these ideas, naughtiness-anger correlations 
were also compulcd based on the average ratings of each story per 
grade level. This way of analyzing the data ignores individual dif­
ferences among children, but also removes any random variance due 
to the low reliability of individual children's ratings. The resulting 
correlations for kindergarten and grades 1, 3, 5, and 9 were, res­
pectively, .92, .89, .98, .97 and .98 (p's <.(X)1). These correlations 
did not differ significantly from each other, which indicates that 
all children's naughtiness and anger judgments were similarly af­
fected by the dimensions of responsibility. 
It might be argued that the close correspondence between 
naughtiness and anger is an artifact that resulted from asking the 
two questions in sequence, thereby prompting the child to give 
similar answers. This criticism is of questionable validity, however. 
The dimension χ type of measure interactions (Table 3.2) show that 
children did not give identical answers to the two questions even 
though the two questions were posed so close in time to one 
another. One can also not reasonably assume that children used a 
nonidentical matching rule to make their judgments, since the mag­
nitude of the difference between naughtiness versus anger ratings 
depended on the particular story that was evaluated. Following this 
line of reasoning, one would therefore have to assume that children 
used both a non-identical and story dependent matching rule which, 
in our view, is not a parsimonious explanation of the results. 
Dimension Use and Anger Intensity 
Our fourth question concerned the relation between dimension use 
and overall anger intensity. To obtain indices of dimension use, we 
identified pairs of stories that differed from each other in terms of 
one particular dimension only. The orthogonal nature of the design 
resulted in four such pairs for each dimension (i.e., one for each 
combination of the levels of two remaining dimensions). Subsequent­
ly, the number of story pairs for which the child made an ap­
propriate and an inappropriate naughtiness discrimination were 
tallied for each dimension. Appropriate discriminations were ones in 
which the evaluatively negative story was rated at least one scale 
point higher on the naughtiness scale than the evaluatively positive 
story. All other discriminations were considered inappropriate. The 
dimension-use score for each dimension consisted of the number of 
appropriately discriminated story pairs minus the number of inap­
propriately discriminated ones. If, however, the child made more 
inappropriate than appropriate discriminations for a dimension, then 
his or her score was set to zero. 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were then com­
puted between children's dimension use scores for naughtiness and 
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their average anger ratings across all stories. The resulting correla-
tions for MA, I, and A were: -.31 (p<.01), -.20, 2<.10 and .04 (n.s.), 
respectively (n = 80, two-tailed). Thus, children's average anger res-
ponses were lower the more they based their naughtiness judgments 
on motive acceptability and, to some extent, on inlenlionality. This 
pattern of results is suggestive as to one source of individual and 
developmental differences in the instigation of anger. Specifically, 
the tendency to evaluate incidents of rather severe property dam-
age in terms of personal responsibility dimensions -be that age-
related or experience-related- seems to result in less intense anger 
responses. The possibility nevertheless exists that the child's ability 
to use the dimensions will not result in a reduction of anger in all 
cases. For example, variations in the type of harm (e.g., personal 
injury vs. property damage) and in its severity may affect whether 
and how a dimension is weighted in attributing responsibility and 
becoming angry. To give but one example, a person who attends to 
motive acceptability information may actually get much angrier at 
an instance of mild harm upon learning about the perpetrator's bad 
motives than a person who does not attend to this information. 
General Conclusions 
In general, the results bearing on the first three predictions are 
consistent with the notion that expressing anger essentially is 
giving a moral judgment (see Averill, 1982, 1983). Results pertaining 
to the fourth issue suggest, moreover, that the use of morally 
relevant information might be seen as an important moderating 
influence on children's tendencies to become angry. 
In addition, inspection of Tables 2 and 3 confirms our suspicion 
that children do not use the three dimensions of responsibility in 
accordance with the nested hierarchical structure that is tradition-
ally assumed to underlie responsibility assignment. First, it can be 
seen in Table 3.2 that the inlenlionality dimension affected chil-
dren's judgments of naughtiness and anger both when harm was 
caused avoidably and when it was caused unavoidably. Even when 
intentionally caused harm was unavoidable for the perpetrator, the 
intentionality aspect of his behavior led children to give more 
severe judgments than when he caused harm both unintentionally 
and unavoidably. Similarly, motive acceptability affected children's 
judgments not only in the case of intentionally caused harm, but 
also when the harm was caused unintentionally (see Table 3.2). 
Thus, even when the perpetrator did not try to cause the harm, his 
behavior elicited negative moral evaluations and angry responses if 
he was believed to have had bad motives in the context of produc-
ing harm. Apparently, the presence of bad motives outweighs the 
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perpetrator's lack of intent in causing the harm. This indicates that 
future investigations of anger in children should focus on the dis-
tinctions that are and that arc not "logically sound" in terms of 
the nested hierarchical scheme of personal responsibility. 
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Chapter IV 
Children's Moral Judgments as a Function of the 
Interpretation of Personal Responsibility Information 
and the Importance Assigned to 
that Information1 
The aim of a great deal of research in the area of social-cognitive 
development has been to describe the cognitive processes that 
mediate children's behavioral reactions to their social environment. 
To address this issue, the following research strategy has often 
been used. Children were confronted with several hypothetical situa-
tions that differed systematically in terms of one or more manipu-
lated factors. Subsequently, children evaluated each situation in 
terms of some specified criterion. Children's judgments were then 
examined to assess the extent to which they were affected by the 
manipulated factor(s). Examples of this approach can be found in 
the areas of moral judgment (Piaget, 1932; Scdlak, 1979); achieve-
ment motivation (Weiner & Peter, 1973); emotional development 
(Graham, Doubleday, & Guarino, 1984) and emotion recognition 
(Wiggers & Van Lieshout, 1985). 
In this paradigm children's performance depends on at least two 
types of cognitive processes. First, it depends on whether the child 
perceived, interpreted and understood the stimulus material in the 
way that the researcher intended the material to be perceived, 
interpreted and understood. These interpretative processes obviously 
depend on child characteristics (e.g., their knowledge and intel-
ligence), but also on characteristics of the stimulus material (e.g., 
the attractiveness and salience of important features). Second, 
children's judgments depend on their (implicit or explicit) system of 
values about the domain under investigation. Such a value system 
specifics the importance of each of the manipulated factors for the 
criterion of judgment. An analogy may clarify the distinction. A 
tourist travelling abroad wants to buy a handful of foreign coins. 
How much the tourist is willing to pay may depend on factors such 
as the nominal value of the coins, their appearance (e.g., brilliance, 
presence of scratches), and their estimated age. The tourist's own 
value system will obviously affect which dimension has the most 
1
 The data that are reported in this study are a subset of the data that 
were originally collected for a different purpose by Toon Gillessen when 
working on his masters thesis. Cillessen's research was aimed to examine the 
cognitive requirements of the quantitative rating-scale methodology. (See 
Chapter VII for a report of that research). 
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influence on how much money she offers for the coins. For example, 
someone with the value system of a coin collector might be willing 
to pay much more for the coins than another person who only lakes 
the exchange rate into account. Similarly, to take an example from 
the area of moral judgment, judging the moral reprchensibility of a 
harmful act obviously depends on one's judgments of how much hann 
was caused and the extent to which the actor was responsible for 
causing harm. These factors need not be judged equally important, 
however. The importance assigned to outcome severity and causal 
responsibility are thus part of the moral value system that the 
child brings to bear on the task. Although the distinction between 
interpretative processes and processes related to children's domain-
specific value systems is rather general, this study will be focussed 
on one particular domain of social-cognitive investigation, i.e., that 
of moral judgment. 
The distinction between the interpretation of manipulated factors 
and the importance assigned to those factors has always played a 
role in research on moral judgment as indicated by the following 
citation from Piaget (1932/1977, p. 149): "...all the subjects whose 
answers we have quoted understood the intentions that entered into 
the matter. It is not from lack of psychological penetration that 
they evaluated lies according to the criterion of objective respon-
sibility; it is because intention does not seem to count from the 
point of view of morality itself." In fact, in Piagetian-bascd moral 
judgment research, children's judgments have been shown to reflect 
differences in how stimulus material was interpreted, especially with 
respect to manipulations of Intentionality2 (Grucneich, 1982; Sedlak, 
1979). Differences in Intentionality use when making moral judgments 
were therefore ascribed to differential interpretation of stimulus 
material, rather than to moral value system differences (Grueneich, 
1982; Sedlak, 1979). 
Findings that stress the role of interpretative processes in mak-
ing moral judgments confront the Piagetian-based research with a 
serious problem. Obviously, whether and how children interpret 
2
 In Chapters IV, V and VII a distinction is made between manipulated 
dimensions of responsibility and the corresponding subjective dimensions in 
terms of which the respondents interpret the responsibility information. To 
indicate typographically whether reference is made to a manipulated dimension 
or to the corresponding subjective dimension, capitals will be used in the 
former and lower case characters in the latter case. (E.g. "Intentionality" 
refers to the dimension as manipulated and "intentionality" to the subjective 
dimension that underlies children's estimates of the extent to which a 
perpetrator caused harm intentionally.) 
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stimulus material in the way desired by the researcher depends as 
much on the letter's more or less arbitrary decisions about how to 
present the material, as on stable child characteristics. Consequently, 
to the extent that moral judgments depend on the interpretation of 
stimulus material, these judgments will also reflect the arbitrary 
decisions that the investigator made when devising that material. 
This line of reasoning ultimately forces one to conclude that moral 
judgment studies can only be expected to yield results that have 
limited value. That is, since the results depend on arbitrary charac-
teristics of stimulus material, they cannot be expected to generalize 
to other operationalizations of the same independent variables, let 
alone to real life events. 
In our view, the way out of this impasse is to recognize that 
interpretative processes affect moral judgments, but that they are 
not necessarily the only determinant of such judgments. That is, 
research should return to the study of children's moral value system 
while taking into account the effect that interpretative processes 
have on moral judgments. 
Now, how can the importance that children assign to manipulated 
factors when making moral judgments be isolated from their inter-
pretation of the relevant information? One way to do this is to 
compare the effect that a manipulated factor has on moral judg-
ments with the effect that the factor has on a measure that reflects 
the interpretation of the relevant information. For example, Costan-
zo and Dix (1983) found that a manipulation of Intentionality did 
not affect young children's judgments of naughtiness, although it 
did affect their judgments of intentionality. Costanzo and Dix con-
cluded that these children intcrpreled the Intentionality information 
correctly, but that they apparently did not consider Intentionality 
to be important for making moral judgments. 
There is nevertheless a problem with Costanzo and Dix's ap-
proach. They used statistical significance as a criterion for deter-
mining whether Intentionality affected interpretation versus moral 
judgments. Obviously, the difference between a significant Inten-
tionality manipulation effect on an intentionality interpretation 
measure and a nonsignificant Intentionality manipulation effect on 
naughtiness is not necessarily a statistically reliable difference in 
itself. Therefore, both types of measures were included in a single 
analysis in the present study. In this way manipulated dimension 
effects on interpretation measures could be compared directly with 
the same effects on moral judgments. 
The following study fits the Piagetian tradition, with some mod-
ifications. The concept of Intentionality as used in the Piagetian 
tradition is rather vague in that it contains elements of at least 
three separable dimensions of personal responsibility, i.e., Avoidabi-
lily (could the harm have been avoided); Intentionality proper (did 
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the actor try to cause the harm) and Motive Acceptability (was the 
harm caused in the context of good or bad motives) (Ferguson & 
Rule, 1983; Grueneich, 1982; Rule & Ferguson, 1984). Therefore, in 
this study we examined the effects of these three dimensions of 
responsibility on children's moral judgments while keeping harm 
severity constant. 
The aims of the study were threefold. First, we examined the 
extent to which individual differences in information interpretation 
would be reflected in children's moral judgments. Second, we ex­
amined whether dimension interpretation did or did not fully predict 
dimension use for those children who interpreted the responsibility 
information appropriately. The finding that dimension use cannot 
fully be predicted from dimension interpretation would support the 
idea that dimension use should be understood as a function of 
interpretation as well as the assignment of importance. Finally, we 
examined whether there were individual differences among children 
in terms of how much importance they assigned to each of the 
three dimensions of responsibility. 
To address these issues, 5-ІО-9 year old children were presented 
with eight hypothetical events in which a perpetrator caused harm 
to another person's property. These eight events were the factorial 
combinations of the Avoidability, Intcntionalily and Motive Accep­
tability dimensions. To examine children's interpretation of the 
events, they were asked to judge each event in terms of the extent 
to which the harm was avoidable, intentional and caused in the 
context of good motives. To measure their moral evaluations of the 
perpetrator's behavior, children were asked how naughty they con­
sidered the perpetrator to be. For all judgments a 7-point rating 
scale was used. 
In line with the aims of the study, the data analyses were focus-
sed primarily on individual differences among children rather than 
on differences among age groups. We first used cluster analysis to 
sort children into groups that were more or less homogeneous with 
respect to information interpretation, regardless of age. Subsequent­
ly, whether these interpretation-based groups also differed in terms 
of the naughtiness ratings that they gave was examined. Finally, we 
then determined whether age was an important factor distinguishing 
these groups. 
To examine the assignment of importance, data-analytical techni­
ques were needed that would reveal whether there were any sys­
tematic discrepancies between the pattern of naughtiness ratings to 
be expected on the basis of interpretation measures (when ignoring 
dimension importance), and children's actual naughtiness ratings. 
Any systematic discrepancies between these interpretation-based 
dimension use predictions and actual dimension use would indicate 
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that importance should not be ignored and that the concept of 
importance docs add to our understanding of the data. 
Imagine, for example, an experiment in which the dimension of 
Avoidability was manipulated successfully in that respondents inter­
preted the harmful event representing the avoidable level of the 
Avoidability dimension as being very much more avoidable than the 
event representing the unavoidable level of the dimension. Imagine 
also that the manipulation of Motive Acceptability was less success­
ful in that, even though respondents recognized the difference 
between the events representing the good motive versus the bad 
motive levels of the Motive Acceptability dimension, they did not 
interpret these events as being very far apart in terms of their 
subjective "motive acceptability scale". In this example the inter­
pretation-based predictions of naughtiness imply that Avoidability 
will have a relatively large effect on the respondents' judgments of 
naughtiness, whereas Motive Acceptability will have a relatively 
small effect. 
Now, imagine further that Avoidability actually appeared to 
affect naughtiness quite strongly, whereas Motive Acceptability did 
not. In this case the interpretation-based predictions of naughtiness 
appeared to be accurate. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the 
concept of dimension importance is not needed to explain the nature 
of the dimensions' effects on judgments of naughtiness. 
Alternatively, imagine that the reverse would be the case, i.e., 
that Motive Acceptability appeared to affect naughtiness quite 
strongly, whereas Avoidability did not. This would mean that there 
were systematic discrepancies between the interpretation-based 
predictions of naughtiness and the respondents actual judgments of 
naughtiness. To explain the discrepancies in this example, one can 
only assume that respondents assigned relatively more importance to 
Motive Acceptability, whereas they assigned relatively less impor­
tance to Avoidability when judging naughtiness. 
In line with the example presented above, interpretation-based 
predictions of dimension use were obtained by combining the three 
dimension interpretation measures while giving equal weight to each 
measure. That is, the arithmetic means of the avoidability, inten­
tionality and motive acceptability interpretation ratings were used 
as the interpretation-based predictions of naughtiness for each 
story. (These mean interpretation scores will be referred to as 
"Interpretation-based Dimension Use Predictions" or IDUP). 
To compare the interpretation-based predictions of naughtiness 
(IDUP) with actual naughtiness ratings, both the IDUP scores and 
the actual naughtiness ratings were defined as two levels of a 
Measure factor in a 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 (Motive 
Acceptability) χ 2 (Measure) analysis of variance. Reliable discrepan­
cies between the interpretation-based predictions of naughtiness and 
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actual naughtiness ratings (indicating that actual dimension use 
when judging naughtiness could not fully be predicted from dimen­
sion interpretation and thereby that the concept of dimension impor­
tance is necessary to explain the nature of the dimensions' effects 
on naughtiness) will be revealed in this analysis as Dimension χ 
Measure interactions. The question of dimension importance is now 
reduced to the question regarding which Dimension χ Measure inter­
actions will or will not occur in this analysis. 
Since assigned importance to dimensions can only be inferred 
from comparing two sets of data (i.e., interpretation- and naughti­
ness ratings) to each other, it is important that both sets of data 
contain as little random variation as possible. Therefore, all meas­
ures in the present study were taken twice and all analyses were 
carried out on the means of both replications. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Twelve children (6 boys, 6 girls) from each of the grades kindergar­
ten (M = 5-ll, range 5-4 to 6-3), first grade (N1 = 6-11, range 6-6 to 
7-1) and third grade (M = 8-10, range 8-1 to 10-2) participated. The 
children came from lower- and middle-class backgrounds. 
Materials 
For each of two themes, eight stimulus stories were composed 
based on the factorial combination of the two levels of each of the 
dimensions Avoidability, Motive Acceptability and Intentionalily. In 
each story, one boy (the transgressor) damaged another boy's (the 
victim's) property. In the "castle" theme, Harry ruined Wim's castle 
and, in the "robot" theme, Klaas broke Piet's robot. Each story 
began with an introduction of the two characters, what they were 
doing, and what happened to the victim's property (sec Table 4.1). 
In each story, information was then given about the events that led 
to the property being damaged, including the transgressor's motives, 
his ability to avoid the property damage, and intentions to produce 
the damage. 
Each story was presented orally and was accompanied by nine 
cartoon-like illustrations designed to clarify the text. The illustra­
tions were presented in an upright wooden box (12x40cm). Four 
introduction illustrations were visible throughout the story presenta­
tion. The five remaining illustrations were hidden behind doors 
which could be opened to reveal them at the text-appropriate time. 
Three of the five remaining illustrations depicted Motive Accep­
tability information, transition information, and Avoidability informa­
tion, respectively. Finally, two illustrations depicted Intentionalily 
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Table 4.1 
Stories Used to Represent the Eight Motive Acceptability χ 
Intcnlionality χ Avoidability Combinations 
for the Castle Theme 
AU si or ics were preceded by the following introduction This is a story about two 
boys, Harrv and Wim (1)" Look, here you can sec that Wim has built a casi le made 
out of blocks It's a rcaJlv prcltv castle, but it's not finished yet (2) Now, Wim has lo 
go home to cat his lunch (Э) When Wim comes back from eating his lunch he brings 
some other boys with him so that ibey can see his pretty castle But, what has 
happened7 Wun's castle is completely ruined, and Harry is the one who ruined it' (4) 
And, now I m going lo tell you how that happened' 
Good Afouves/UnavouiablefUFuntatíumal 
[АМ] Ь Harry saw Wim's casüe and he 
thought "Wim would really like it if I 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
castle, so that his castle can get even 
bigger" Harry wanted to help Wim Harry 
wanted to do something that Wim would 
like Harry wanted to be nice (5) Then, 
Harry walked over to Wims castle (6) 
(UAj But then, suddenly, a great big 
strong dog came and he jumped up against 
Harry really hard, so that Harry couldn I 
stay standing up Harry couldn t help U 
it was the dogs fault (7) 
[UI) Harrv fell He fell righi on lop of 
Wim s castle and the castle was completrly 
ruined (8) Harry was very shocked when 
he saw the ruined castle, since it was an 
dccideni and he didn t mean it (9) 
Good moüvcslAvouiabUIUnmtentwnui* 
[AM] Harrv saw Wim s casi le and he 
thought "Wim would reali) like it if I 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
cesile so that his castle can get even 
bigger" Harr> wanted to help Wim Harry 
wanted lo do something that Wim would 
hke Harn wanted to be nice (S) Then, 
Harry walked over to Wim s castle (6) 
[A] Bui, then, Harry was walking too fast, 
he was not paving any attention to where 
he was walking or where he pul hts feet 
down and he walked right mio Wim's 
castle So, Harry could help tt He 
could've paid more attention (14) 
[UI] Harry fell He fell nght on lop of 
Wims casüe and the castle was completely 
mined (8) Harry was very shocked when 
he saw the rained 
castle, since it was an acadent and 
be didn't mean it (9) 
Bad MoOves/UnavouLible/UnmíenuOfUÜ 
[UM] Harry saw Wun's castle and he 
thought "Wim would really hate it if I 
threw sand all over his castle", since 
Harry wanted to do something that would 
bug Wim Harry wanted to do something 
that Wim really hales Harrv wanted to be 
mean (10) Then, Harry walked over to 
Wim's castle (6) 
[UA[ But, then, suddenly, a great big 
strong dog came and he jumped up against 
Harry really hard, so that Harry couldn ι 
slay standing up Hdrry couldn t help it, 
it was the dogs fault (7) 
[UI] Harrv fell He fell right on top of 
Wims castle and the castle was completely 
ruined (8) Harry was very shocked when 
he saw the ruined castle, since it was an 
accident and he didn I mean it (9) 
Bad MotivtsiAvotdablelUmfitentionai 
[UM] Harry saw Wims caslle and he 
thought "Wim would really hate it if I 
threw sand all over his casi le", since 
Harrv wanted to do something that would 
bug Wim Harry wanlcd lo do something 
thai Wim would really hate Harry wanted 
lo be mean ()0) Then, Harry walked over 
lo Wims castle (6) 
[A] But, then Harry was walking too fast, 
he was not paying any attention to where 
he was walking or where he put his feet 
down and he walked nght mio Wim's 
caslle So, Harry could help it He 
could've paid more allenlion (14) 
[UI] Harry fell He fell right on top of 
Wim's caslle and the caslle was completely 
ruined (8) Harry was very shocked when 
he saw the niiaed caslle, since il was an 
acadcnl and he didn't mean it (9) 
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Tabic 4.1 (Continued) 
Good Moùves/Unavoidable/Jníeníutnal^ 
[AM| Harn sa* NVim s castle and he 
thought "Vvim would reallv like il if I 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
castle, so thai hts castle can get even 
bigger" Harry wanted ю help Wim Нагг 
wanted to do something that Wim would 
like Harry wanted to be nice (S) Then, 
Harry walked over to Wim's castle (6) 
|UA] But, then, suddenly it started 
raining really hard It was really windy 
and it was raining really hard Harry's 
mother came out of the house and she 
shouted at Harry "You'd better bring all 
of those blocks inside right now, or 
vou re going to get i t r Harry could bring 
(he blocks inside only if he ruined Wim'ε 
castle So, he had to He couldn't help 
it, his mother made him do il (11) 
11] Harrv wanted just to lake the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work So, he 
started pushing the castle reallv hard 
Harry pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was trying to break the castle (12) He 
kept on pushing long enough until the 
castle was complclcl) ruined (13) 
Good MoüvtslAvoidabWIniaiiional 
|AM] Harry was thinking "Wim would 
reallv like it if I help him", since Harrv 
reallv wanted to help Wim Harry wanted 
to do something that W im would reallv 
like Harry wanted lo be nice (15) 
[A] So, Harry thought about the things he 
could do with the castle There were lots 
and lots of different things that he could 
do with the castle He thought about this 
and then he made a choice about what he 
would do So, Η arry could help iL, since 
he was the one who made up his mind 
about what would happen with the casde 
(16) Harry thought "I think that Wim is 
already busy with ruining his casüe. So 
I'll help him nun iL 
[I] Harry wanted just to lake the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work. So, be 
started pushing the castle really hard. 
Налу pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was trying to break the castle (12) He 
kept on pushing long enough until the 
castle was completely ruined (13) 
Bad MoüvcsfUnavotdabtefJnientumal 
[UM] Harrv saw Wim s castle and he 
thought "Wim would reallv hale it if 1 
threw sand all over his castle", since 
Harry wanlcd to do something that would 
bug Wim Harrv wanted to do something 
that Wim would really hale Harry wanlcd 
to be mean (10) Then, Harry walked over 
to Wim's casllc (6) 
|UA] But, then, suddenly it starled 
raining really hard It was really windy 
and к was raining really hard Harry's 
mother came out of the house and she 
shouted at Harry "You'd better bring all 
of those blocks mside nghl now, or 
you're going to gel it'" Harry could bnng 
the blocks inside only if he ruined Wim's 
castle So, he had to He couldn't help 
il bis mother made him do it (11) 
[I] Harry wanlcd just to take the blocks 
apart, bul lhai didn't work So, he 
started pushing the castle really hard 
H d m pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was Irying lo break the casllc (12) He 
kepi on pushing long enough until the 
casllc was completely ruined (13) 
Bad Moùvts/Avotdable/Inlenùonal 
[UMI Harrv was thinking "Wim will be 
prettv upset if I bug him", since Harry 
wanlcd lo bug Wim Harry wanlcd to do 
somUhmg that Wim really hales Harry 
wanted to be mean (17) 
[A] So, Harrv thought about the things he 
could do with the castle There were lots 
and lois of different things that he could 
do with the castle He thought about this 
and then he made a choice about what he 
would do So, Harry could help it, since 
he was the one who made up his mind 
about what would happen with the castle 
(16) 
\X\ Harry wanted just to take the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work. So, he 
started pushing the castle really hard. 
Harry pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was trying to break the castle (12) He 
kept on pushing long enough untd the 
castle was completely ruined (13) 
* Numbers in parentheses refer to pictures illustrating the particular 
part of the story. Detailed descriptions of the pictures can be obtained from 
the first author. 
AM^acceptable motives, UM-unacceptable motives, UA-unavoidable, 
Α-avoidable, Ul-unintentional, 1-intentional. 
Consistent with the attributional approach, unavoidable versus avoidable 
harm that was unintended was operationalized as the absence versus presence 
of foreseeability. In contrast, unavoidable versus avoidable harm that was 
intended was operationalized as the absence versus presence of freedom of 
choice. 
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information. With one exception, the illustrations depicting Inten-
tionalily and Motive Acceptability were identical across the eight 
stories within a theme. The exception was that the pictures il­
lustrating Motive Acceptability at the avoidablc-and-intentional 
level of both other dimensions differed slightly from the pictures 
illustrating Motive Acceptability at the remaining levels of Avoidab­
ility χ Intenlionality. For Avoidability two different illustrations for 
each level were needed for each theme, depending on the level of 
Inlentionality with which it was to be combined (see Table 4.1). 
Dependent Measures 
To assess children's interpretation of the dimension information, 
they were asked to rate on a 7-point scale how nice the transgres­
sor wanted to be (motive acceptability), how much he could help it 
that the property was damaged (avoidability), and how much he had 
tried to damage the property (intenlionality). To assess children's 
moral evaluations of the transgressor's behavior, they were asked 
to rate how naughty the transgressor was in ruining the victim's 
property3. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually by a male or a female experimenter 
in a quiet location on the schoolgrounds. Each child participated in 
several sessions (M = 6.9, range 6.0 to 9.0), each of which lasted 
approximately 20 min. The average inter-session interval was 4.2 
days with a range of 1.6 to 7.8 days. All children were enthusiastic 
about participating in the study and remained so throughout its 
entire course. 
The first session always began with a rating scale training and 
practice trials. The rating scale consisted of seven size-graduated 
vertical rectangles that were drawn on a piece of white cardboard 
(21x30cm). The experimenter began the training by pointing to each 
rectangle and verbalizing the appropriate label (not at all, a very 
little bit, a little bit, a bit, a lot, a whole lot, and a very whole 
lot). The experimenter then explained how the scale could be used, 
using as an example how scary different animals arc (the animals 
used were lambs, mice, big dogs, lions and crocodiles). The child 
was then asked to use the scale to show how strong different 
people arc (babies, big kids, old ladies, fathers, policemen and 
** In addition to the measures that are described here, children also 
made paired comparisons and pairwise ratings. These measures were used to 
examine the cognitive requirements of the rating scale methodology (see 
footnote 1). 
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giants). The scale training continued until the child appropriately 
discriminated his or her ratings according to the presented stimuli. 
After the scale training, children completed four practice trials 
which were meant to show them that the rating scale could also be 
used to indicate how naughty a person is. Four stories were rated 
by children. These stories have been successfully used in other 
research (Ferguson, Olthof, Luiten, & Rule, 1984) and were based on 
Hcider's (1958) continuum of personal responsibility. No child had 
problems with these naughtiness ratings. 
Children then made their interpretation and moral evaluation 
judgments. A wooden box was placed in an upright position on a 
table at a comfortable viewing distance from the child. The ex-
perimenter began by reading the introduction out loud and pointing 
to the introductory illustrations, which were the same for all stories. 
The experimenter then opened each door of the box and verbalized 
the corresponding text. 
To control for presentation order effects, the order of presenting 
the M(otive acceptability), A(voidability) and I(nlentionality) infor-
mation was varied so that the child received each type of informa-
tion equally often in the first, second and third position. This was 
accomplished by opening the doors that covered each type of infor-
mation in three different orders (i.e., MAI, AIM or IMA). In the 
last two orders small additions to the stories were necessary to 
ensure that the transitions between the different types of dimension 
information were natural. 
Children received the eight stories that represented all combina-
tions of the three responsibility dimensions with each of both story 
themes, the one story theme thus serving as the other's replication. 
The order of presenting both story themes was counterbalanced. 
Results 
Predicting Moral Judgments from Interpretation 
To examine whether there were interpretation-based differences 
among children when judging naughtiness, we first used cluster 
analysis to sort children into more or less homogeneous groups with 
respect to how they interpreted the dimension information. Second, 
analysis of variance was used to examine whether the groups also 
differed from each other in terms of naughtiness judgments. 
As a first step, the previously-discussed interpretation-based 
dimension use predictions (IDUP) were computed for all children. 
This was done by adding children's avoidability, intentionality and 
motive acceptability judgments for each of the eight stories and 
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dividing the sum by three.4 Subsequently, the IDUP scores for the 
eight stories were used as the variables in a cluster analysis with 
the individual children as cases. Thus, children were sorted on the 
basis of how they interpreted the eight stories in terms of avoidabi-
lity, inlentionality and motive acceptability.5 
The cluster analysis was carried out twice using two different 
methods, i.e., Ward's method and the Group Average method. In both 
cases, squared Euclidian distance was used as the (dis)similarity 
coefficient. The analysis using Ward's method yielded a four-cluster 
grouping. The same four clusters also resulted from the Group 
Average method, but this method also yielded some small clusters 
containing only one or two children. Because of its greater simplic­
ity, further analyses were based on the Ward's method's output. 
For each of the four IDUP clusters that were produced by Ward's 
method, the pattern of Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive Ac­
ceptability effects was examined by carrying out a 2 (Avoidability) 
χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) within-subjects anal­
ysis of variance on the cluster group's transformed IDUP scores. 
The results of these analyses, together with graphical representa­
tions of the IDUP scores are presented in the left-hand panel of 
Figure 4.1. This way of presenting the data was chosen to facilitate 
visual comparisons among the IDUP and the actual naughtiness 
rating patterns. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1 (left panel), for children in cluster 
1 none of the main effects of the three dimensions reached sig­
nificance, indicating that these children did not interpret the dimen­
sion information appropriately. As was indicated by the significant 
main effects of Avoidability and Motive Acceptability for cluster 2, 
children in this cluster interpreted the Motive Acceptability and 
Avoidability information appropriately, but not the Intentionality 
4
 Note, that since all ratings were given twice, children's IDUP scores 
consisted of the average of six independent ratings for each story. 
3
 To eliminate the effect of some children's tendency to use only a 
particular part of the response scale on the resulting clustering, the data 
were transformed to exclude this effect. Specifically, each child's IDUP score 
for each of the eight stories was transformed so that the midpoint of the 
scale range used by the child was shifted towards the midpoint of the original 
7-point scale. Thus, the reported clustering was only influenced by (1) the 
particular distinctions that children made among the stories and (2) the 
magnitude of these distinctions. To facilitate the visual comparison of 
children's IDUP scores and their actual naughtiness ratings (see Figure 4.1), 
the same transformation was also carried out on children's naughtiness ratings. 
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information. Finally, clusters 3 and 4 were similar in that the main 
effects of all three manipulated dimensions reached significance, 
indicating that children in these clusters interpreted the dimension 
information appropriately. Clusters 3 and 4 differed in terms of the 
magnitude of dimension effects and the interactions among dimen­
sions. 
To examine whether the interpretation-based clusters would also 
differ in terms of the naughtiness judgments that children gave, we 
analyzed these judgments in a 4 (IDUP Cluster) χ 2 (Avoidability) χ 
2 (Intcntionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) mixed-design ANOVA 
with IDUP Cluster as the only bctwecn-subjecls factor. Since inter­
actions including IDUP Cluster and at least one dimension are most 
relevant for the purpose of testing the hypothesis, only these ef­
fects will be discussed. The analysis yielded significant interactions 
of IDUP Cluster with Motive Acceptability F(3,32) = 6.86, ρ = .001 and 
with Avoidability F(3,32) = 4.46, ρ = .01. These effects were further 
qualified in three three-way interactions, i.e., IDUP Cluster χ 
Avoidability χ Intcntionality F(3,32)=4.75, p<.01; IDUP Cluster χ 
Avoidability χ Motive Acceptability F(2,32) = 3.16, 2<.05, and IDUP 
Cluster χ Intcntionality χ Motive Acceptability F(2,32) = 4.76, p<.01. 
Clearly, these findings confirm our prediction that the interpreta­
tion-based clusters would not only differ in terms of dimension 
interpretation, but also in terms of dimension use when judging 
naughtiness. 
To further examine the nature of the differences between the 
IDUP Cluster groups' actual naughtiness ratings, additional 2 (Avoid­
ability) χ 2 (Intcntionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) completely 
within-subjects analyses of variance were carried out on each cluster 
group's actual naughtiness ratings. It should be noted that for the 
purpose of examining the extent to which dimension interpretation 
predicts dimension use, the precise nature of the dimension effects 
on naughtiness is not important. Rather, the important issue is the 
degree of correspondence between the actual naughtiness ratings 
and the interpretation-based predictions of naughtiness. 
The results of the additional analyses, together with graphical 
representations of the actual naughtiness ratings, are presented in 
the right-hand panel of Figure 4.1. As can be seen when visually 
comparing these graphs with the graphs representing the IDUP 
scores, there is a strong correspondence between the actual naughti­
ness ratings and the interpretation-based dimension use predictions. 
This observation is reinforced when comparing the naughtiness 
versus IDUP ANOVA effects for each cluster. For example, the 
cluster 1 children's lack of dimension use when judging naughtiness 
can be fully explained by their failure to correctly interpret the 
dimension-relevant information that was presented to them. Similarly, 
the cluster 2 children's lack of Intcntionality use can also be ex 
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Figure 4.1. Interpretation-based dimension use predictions (IDUP) and actual 
naughtiness ratings for the IDUP clusters. For each cluster group the rating 
scale is represented on the X axis and the levels of aggregation are represen-
ted on the Y axis (G= general mean score across all stories; M- mean scores 
for acceptable motive [broken line] versus unacceptable motive [solid line] 
stories; I- mean scores for the unintentional [broken lines] versus intentional 
[solid lines] stories at each level of Motive Acceptability; A» mean scores for 
the unavoidable [broken lines] versus avoidable [solid lines] stories at each 
level of Motive Acceptability χ Intentionality). The size of the angle between 
broken versus solid lines reflects the magnitude of a dimension effect. Note, 
that an angle consisting of a right-hand broken line and a left-hand solid line 
represents a reversal of the desired effect for the dimension. 
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plained by their failure lo correctly inlerprcl the Inlentionality 
information. These data support our first hypothesis that the way 
in which children interpret the dimension information affects their 
use of that information when judging naughtiness. 
To determine whether the interpretation-based clustering depen­
ded on children's age, we examined the distribution of children 
across grade levels for each IDUP cluster. The numbers of kinder­
garten, grade 1 and grade 3 children for each cluster are presented 
in the graphs of the left-hand panel of Figure 4.1. The relation 
between the clustering and grade level was assessed by carrying out 
an IDUP Cluster χ Grade Level Chi square analysis. Since clusters 3 
and 4 were similar in that the main effects of all three dimensions 
reached significance, these clusters were for the purpose of this 
analysis combined into one group. The analysis revealed that IDUP 
cluster and Grade Level were associated, X?(4) = 15.07, p<.01. As can 
be seen when inspecting the numbers of children in each cluster 
(see Figure 4.1), this association is partially due to the fact cluster 
1 consisted primarily of kindergarten-age children, whereas clusters 
3 and 4 consisted primarily of grade I and grade 3 children. Since 
children in the latter two clusters discriminated appropriately among 
the manipulated levels of all three dimensions, whereas the cluster 
1 children did not, it can be concluded that more kindergarten-age 
children than older children had difficulties in interpreting the 
dimension-relevant information. 
Dimension Importance 
Only children who interpreted the information concerning a dimen­
sion appropriately can be expected to assign importance to that 
dimension when judging naughtiness. Since only children in clusters 
3 and 4 appropriately interpreted the information concerning all 
three dimensions, it was possible with only these children to ex­
amine the importance assigned to each of the dimensions. The focus 
here is on whether dimension use could be fiilly predicted from 
dimension interpretation for these children as a group, and without 
regard for individual differences among children. Accordingly, for 
children in the IDUP clusters 3 and 4, the IDUP and actual naughti­
ness ratings were compared to each other by carrying out a 2 
(Avoidabilily) χ 2 (Inlentionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) χ 2 
(Measure: IDUP vs. actual naughtiness ratings) completely within-
subjects analysis of variance. As pointed out in the introduction, 
the occurrence of Dimension χ Measure interactions in this type of 
analysis can be used to make inferences about the importance as­
signed to dimensions. 
The analysis yielded a significant Inlentionality χ Measure inter­
action, F(l,18)=8.05, 2<.05. In addition, a Motive Acceptability χ 
Inlentionality χ Measure interaction approached significance 
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F(l,18) = 3.73, ρ = .07. As can be seen when inspecting the pairs of 
graphs for cluster groups 3 and 4 in Figure 4.1, the interactions 
were due to the fact that Inlentionality had only a small effect on 
children's actual judgments of naughtiness when compared to the 
Inlentionality effect on children's I DU Ρ scores. This was especially 
true when the perpetrator of harm had bad motives. Thus, children 
hardly used Inlentionality for judging naughtiness even though they 
interpreted the Inlentionality information appropriately. Children 
apparently considered the dclibcrateness with which the harm was 
caused to be relatively unimportant. 
Since the children in cluster 2 did not interpret the Inlen­
tionality information appropriately, the importance that they assigned 
to the other two dimensions was examined in a separate analysis. 
Specifically, for the cluster 2 children a 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Motive 
Acceptability) χ 2 (Measure) completely-within-subjects analysis of 
variance was carried out, with the ratings being collapsed across 
both levels of the Inlentionality dimension. This analysis did not 
yield any significant Dimension χ Measure interactions, indicating 
that there is no evidence that cluster 2 children assigned differen­
tial importance to the Avoidability versus Motive Acceptability 
dimensions. 
For children as a group, the Inlentionality χ Measure effect 
discussed above was the only instance of a correctly interpreted 
distinction between manipulated levels of a dimension that was 
considered to be unimportant for judging naughtiness. It might be, 
however, that the group level analysis is masking individual differen­
ces among children in terms of what they considered to be impor­
tant for making moral judgments. This issue will be addressed in 
the next section. 
Individual Differences in the Assignment of Importance 
The aim of this section is to examine individual children's rating 
patterns in terms of how important they considered each of the 
manipulated dimensions to be for judging naughtiness. It should be 
noted that since no established methods are available for doing 
this, the analyses in this section are necessarily exploratory. 
Inferring the importance that a child assigned to dimensions only 
makes sense if the child appropriately interpreted the information 
concerning those dimensions. The appropriateness of these inter­
pretations can be inferred from the extent to which each dimension 
affected the child's IDUP scores. Accordingly, a criterion is needed 
to decide whether the negative-minus-positivc-levcl difference score 
for a dimension on IDUP reflects an appropriate discrimination. To 
include as many children as possible in the subsequent analyses, we 
asked what would be the most liberal criterion possible, provided 
that it ensures that the child interpreted the dimension information 
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appropriately to at least some extent. Our answer to this question 
was that the child should make an appropriate IDUP discrimination 
of at least one scale point for at least one of the four story pairs 
that differ in terms of the particular dimension, without that dis-
crimination being overruled by equally large or larger inappropriate 
discriminations for the other three story pairs. Accordingly, it was 
determined for each individual child whether the average negative-
minus-positive-lcvel difference scores for IDUP exceeded .25 scale 
point for each of the dimensions. Only when this was the case the 
child was considered to have interpreted the information concerning 
all three dimensions appropriately. 
As was true for interpretation, individual differences in assigned 
importance can be examined using cluster analysis, provided that 
quantitative indices of assigned importance arc available. For each 
dimension, such an index should reflect how the dimension's effect 
on naughtiness compares to the dimension's effect on IDUP. Accord-
ingly, in addition to the difference scores that had already been 
computed for IDUP, we also computed for each individual child the 
negative-minus-positive-lcvcl difference scores of each dimension 
for naughtiness. Now, if the naughtiness difference score for a 
particular dimension is larger than the IDUP difference score, one 
can infer that the child considered that dimension to be relatively 
important for judging naughtiness. If, in contrast, the naughtiness 
difference is smaller than the IDUP difference, it can be inferred 
that the child considered that dimension to be relatively unimpor-
tant. In line with this reasoning, ratio scores were computed by 
dividing each child's naughtiness difference score for a dimension 
by her IDUP difference score for that same dimension. These ratio 
scores were then assumed to reflect the importance that children 
assigned to each of the dimensions when judging naughtiness. 
Accordingly, a cluster analysis was carried out using the naughti-
ness-discrimination/IDUP-discriminalion ratio scores for the three 
dimensions as the variables. All children for whom the IDUP 
discrimination for each of the three dimensions was at least .25 
scale points served as the cases in this analysis (n = 16). None of the 
kindergarten-age children satisfied this criterion, thus leaving only 
grade 1 and grade 3 children for inclusion in the cluster analysis.6 
* Apart from the cluster analysis in which children were only included 
if they had appropriately interpreted all three dimensions, we also carried out 
an analysis per dimension in which children were included if they had 
appropriately interpreted that particular dimension. Inclusion in the latter 
analysis ranged from 22 for Intentionality to 31 for Motive Acceptability. The 
results were fully consistent with those reported in the text. 
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As before, the analysis was carried out twice using Ward's 
method and the Group Average method, in both cases with squared 
Euclidian distance as the (dis)similarity coefficient. Both analyses 
yielded similar results in that the same two clusters appeared in 
the output of both methods. In addition, both methods yielded one 
other separate cluster that contained only one child. The only 
difference between the results of both methods was that the Group 
Average method placed two children who were included in one of 
the main clusters in the Ward's method's results, in a small separate 
cluster. Further analyses were based on the Ward's method's results 
because of their greater simplicity. 
To examine the nature of importance-related differences between 
the two largest importance clusters, 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Inten-
tionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) χ 2 (Measure: IDUP vs. actual 
naughtiness) completely within-subjccls analyses of variance were 
carried out for each of these clusters. Note that since the cluster 
analysis was directed at maximizing differences among clusters in 
terms of IDUP-naughtincss discrepancies, different types of Dimen­
sion χ Measure interactions for the two clusters are to be expected. 
Accordingly, the analyses of variance are not aimed to assess 
whether the clusters differed in terms of which Dimension χ Meas­
ure interactions occur, but only to facilitate the description of the 
nature of such differences. 
Graphical representations of the data and an overview of sig­
nificant Dimension χ Measure interactions for each importance 
cluster are presented in Figure 4.2. Inspection of Figure 4.2 reveals 
that the IDUP rating patterns of the two importance clusters (sec 
the left-hand graphs) are virtually identical for both clusters. Thus, 
any differences between the cluster group's naughtiness rating 
patterns cannot be attributed to differential interpretation of the 
responsibility information. Consequently, such differences can safely 
be interpreted in terms of differential assignment of importance to 
dimensions. 
What is the nature of those importance related differences bet­
ween the clusters? As pointed out before, the importance that 
children within a cluster group assign to the dimensions can be 
inferred from the pattern of significant Dimension χ Type of Meas­
ure interactions. For importance cluster 1 (see Figure 4.2, upper 
panel), all three dimensions interacted significantly with the Measure 
factor. Comparing the IDUP- versus the actual naughtiness graphs 
for this cluster reveals that the cluster 1 children's Motive Accep­
tability use when rating naughtiness was larger than what could be 
predicted on the basis of their Motive Acceptability discrimination 
when giving the interpretation ratings. In contrast, Intcntionality 
and Avoidability use when rating naughtiness was smaller than the 
Intcntionality and Avoidability discriminations for the interpretation 
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ratings. This pattern of ratings indicates that cluster 1 children 
assigned relatively more importance to Motive Acceptability and 
that they considered both other dimensions to be relatively unimpor­
tant. As indicated by the significant Motive Acceptability χ Intcn-
tionality χ Measure interaction, Inlcnlionality in particular was 
considered to be unimportant in the case that the perpetrator of 
harm had bad molives in the context of causing the harm. (It should 
be noted that this particular Intentionality discrimination in the 
cluster 1 children's naughtiness graph represents a reversal of the 
appropriate Intentionality effect). 
For cluster 2 children there was a significant Motive Accep­
tability χ Measure interaction. In addition, an Avoidability χ Meas­
ure effect approached significance. As can be seen when comparing 
the IDUP and naughtiness graphs for cluster 2, the interactions 
indicate that cluster 2 children's Motive Acceptability use when 
rating naughtiness was smaller than what could be predicted on the 
basis of their Motive Acceptability discrimination when giving the 
interpretation ratings. In contrast, Avoidability use for judging 
naughtiness tended to be larger than the Avoidability discrimination 
for interpretation. This pattern of ratings indicates that cluster 2 
children assigned relatively little importance to Motive Acceptability 
and that they assigned relatively more importance to Avoidability. 
It can be concluded that the differences between cluster 1 and 
cluster 2 children's naughtiness rating patterns (see the right-hand 
graphs in Figure 4.2) arc due to the fact that cluster 1 children 
considered Motive Acceptability to be relatively important and 
Avoidability to be relatively unimportant for judging naughtiness, 
while the reverse was true for cluster 2 children. 
The numbers of grade 1 and grade 3 children in the two impor­
tance based clusters arc presented in the left-hand graphs of Figure 
4.2. An Importance Cluster χ Grade Level Chi square analysis (using 
Yates' correction for continuity) did not yield a significant Chi 
square coefficient, indicating that these data give no reason to 
assume that the assignment of importance to dimensions was related 
to children's age. However, this lack of statistical significance 
should be interpreted cautiously because of the very small number 
of children involved. 
Discussion 
Our first goal was to replicate Sedlak's (1979) finding that age-
related differences in how children interpreted information about a 
perpetrator's responsibility for causing harm affected their moral 
evaluations of the perpetrator's behavior. This goal was successfully 
reached, in that children's age-related differential interpretations of 
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Figure A.2. Interpretation-based dimension use predictions (IDUP) and actual 
dimension use (naughtiness ratings) for each of the importance clusters. 
For each cluster group the rating scale is represented on the X axis and 
the levels of aggregation are represented on the Y axis (G- general mean score 
across all stories; M- mean scores for acceptable motive [broken line] versus 
unacceptable motive [solid line] stories; I- mean scores for the unintentional 
[broken lines] versus intentional [solid lines] stories at each level of Motive 
Acceptability; A- mean scores for the unavoidable [broken lines] versus avoid­
able [solid lines] stories at each level of Motive Acceptability χ Intentionality). 
The size of the angle between broken versus solid lines reflects the magnitude 
of a dimension effect. Note, that an angle consisting of a right-hand broken 
line and a left-hand solid line represents a reversal of the desired effect for 
the dimension. 
For all F's, except one, E< . 0 5 . The Avoidability effect for cluster 2 
approached significance (2<.10). 
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responsibility information predicted quite well their use of that 
information when judging naughtiness. Specifically, kindergarten-age 
children who had difficulties interpreting the Avoidabilily, Inlen-
tionality and Motive Acceptability information also did not use 
these dimensions when judging naughtiness. Furthermore, differences 
in terms of dimension interpretation among the remaining children 
were accompanied by parallel differences among these children in 
terms of dimension use when judging naughtiness. 
Gruencich (1982) suggested that understanding of manipulated 
information can be ruled out as an explanatory factor when studying 
the effects of manipulated dimensions on children's evaluative judg-
ments by ensuring that all children arc able to distinguish ap-
propriately among the levels of the manipulated factors. Our data 
imply that even among children who are perfectly able to make the 
relevant distinctions (i.e. the IDUP-clustcr 3 and 4 children), there 
may still be interpretation-related differences when giving evaluative 
judgments. This is so, because even children who are all able to 
make the relevant distinctions can still differ from each other in 
terms of the magnitudes of the distinctions that they make. The 
present data show that such differences in interpretation can subse-
quently affect children's moral judgments. 
The study's second aim was to examine how much importance 
children as a group assigned to each of the three dimensions of 
responsibility. The data showed that although dimension interpreta-
tion predicted dimension use for judging naughtiness to a large 
extent, the naughtiness pattern was not fully predictable from 
interpretation. Specifically, children as a group didn't appear to 
base their naughtiness judgments on Intentionality to a very great 
extent, even though they distinguished appropriately between the 
levels of Intentionality when giving the interpretation judgments. 
This was especially true when the perpetrator had bad motives. 
Apparently, children considered the intentionality of the perpetrator 
to be unimportant for judging naughtiness once they knew that he 
had bad motives. 
In a sense, this finding is ironic given the prominent role that 
the concept of intent has played in the research based on Piaget's 
(1932) intent-outcome paradigm. The very dimension that gave its 
name to this paradigm now appears to be less important than two 
other aspects of responsibility, i.e. Avoidability and Motive Accep-
tability. This finding is, however, not as surprising as it might 
seem if one realizes that Piaget's concept of intent also included 
our concept of Motive Acceptability. In our study, Motive Accep-
tability was, of course, the dimension that overruled Intentionality 
so completely that some children considered Intentionality to be of 
almost no importance. That is, even when children were aware that 
the perpetrator caused harm unintentionally, they considered this 
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information to be unimportant in the light of the also available 
knowledge about the perpetrator's bad motives. As such, our findings 
indicate that research on children's moral judgments should focus 
in the first place on children's inferences of why a perpetrator 
behaved as he did in the context of causing harm, rather than on 
their inferences of whether the perpetrator intended to reach the 
harmful outcome. 
The exploratory analyses regarding individual differences in the 
assignment of importance imply that treating children as a group 
can be misleading. Specifically, the analysis at the group level 
revealed no differences between Avoidabilily and Motive Accep-
tability in terms of the importance assigned to these dimensions. 
The importance-based cluster analysis showed, however, that one 
group of children assigned relatively more importance to Motive 
Acceptability when compared to Avoidability, whereas the reverse 
was the case for another group of children. These findings imply 
that different patterns of importance assignment exist among five-
to-eight year-old children. In the present study no evidence was 
found that importance assignment was related to children's age. 
Note, however, that only grade 1 and grade 3 children were included 
in the importance-based cluster analysis and that the total number 
of children in this analysis was small. Future research with a larger 
group of children that also spans a wider age range might very 
well reveal age-related differences in the assignment of importance. 
At this point a word of caution should be noted. Obviously, the 
data on which inferences about individual children's assignment of 
importance were based are only as valid as is the method that 
generated them. Since, in the present study, importance was opera-
tionally defined as the discrepancy between two sets of ratings and 
no specific patterns of importance assignment were predicted, the 
method runs the risk of capitalizing on chance. That is, the dis-
crepancy between interpretation-based predicted- and actual dimen-
sion use when judging naughtiness may to some extent have included 
chance variation, which subsequently also may have affected the 
results of the cluster analysis. In our view, this problem is not as 
severe as it could have been, since both sets of data consisted of 
the means of several replications, which undoubtedly excluded some 
random variance from the data. Nevertheless, although the method 
holds promise for making the interpretation versus importance dis-
tinction, it should be independently validated. 
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Chapter V 
Effects of Person-Based Expectations and Account 
Source on Children's Aggression-Related Judgments1 
In social-cognitive theories of aggression, aggressive behavior is 
seen as the aggressor's behavioral reaction lo a situation that she 
has perceived as asking for an aggressive response (Dodge, 1980; 
Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Mummcndcy, Linncweber, & Löschpcr, 1984; 
Rule & Ferguson, 1984). Accordingly, social-cognitive theorists of 
aggression assume that aggressive behavior can be explained in 
terms of the cognitive processes underlying the aggressor's percep-
tions of the victim's earlier behavior. In all social-cognitive models 
of aggression, an important candidate for such a cognitive process 
is the aggressor's attribution of responsibility to the victim for 
having caused harm. In the studies described in Chapters III and IV 
it has already been shown that children differentiate their moral-
and anger-related judgments of a perpetrator B's harmful behavior 
in terms of one or more of three dimensions of personal respon-
sibility, i.e., Avoidability (could В have avoided that the harm oc­
curred), Intenlionalily (did В try to cause the harm) and Motive 
Acceptability (were B's motives good or bad when causing the harm). 
One aim of the present study was to examine whether the same 
would also be true for children's estimates of their behavioral 
reactions to a perpetrator of harm. Therefore, children were not 
only asked to judge harmful incidents in terms of naughtiness and 
anger, but also to indicate how they would retaliate to the per­
petrator of harm. 
In addition, the experiments reported in this chapter elaborated 
further on the previously reported studies in two ways. First, in 
the study reported in chapter III it was found that children who 
used the dimensions of responsibility when judging naughtiness, 
generally gave lower judgments of anger than children not using 
the dimensions. This finding was taken as evidence that children's 
ability to use information about personal responsibility has in many 
situations a moderating effect on otherwise high degrees of anger. 
Accordingly, one of the hypotheses to be tested in this study was 
that children initially would display high degrees of anger and 
aggression upon learning that harm has been caused to them, but 
1
 This study is partially based on the research that was carried out by 
Stelly Hoeben as a masters thesis project. The text of the chapter is identical 
to that of an unpublished manuscript authored by Tjeert Olthof, Tamara J. 
Ferguson, Stelly Hoeben, and Annemieke Luiten. 
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that their responses would lower as soon as they received informa­
tion about the perpetrator's (diminished) responsibility for causing 
the harm (sec Zillman & Cantor, 1976). 
Second, in the studies described in Chapters III and IV, and as 
is true for virtually all previous research in this area, the stimulus 
material consisted of objectively presented information about harmful 
events caused by some unknown hypothetical perpetrator. This is 
quite unlike many real-life events where, more often than not, we 
know the person who caused harm to us and equally often, first 
hand information about what actually happened can only be provided 
by the perpetrator himself. That is, we are likely to have expecta­
tions concerning the perpetrator's behavior towards us and we 
might sometimes doubt the vcridicality of the perpetrator's account 
of what happened. Accordingly, in the experiments to be reported 
here, the ecological validity of the basic paradigm of the studies in 
the previous chapters was enhanced by adding contextual informa­
tion. Specifically, in experiments 1 and 2 respondents were given 
information about the perpetrator's past behavior to induce a low 
versus high expectation of future aggressiveness. In experiment 2 
we also manipulated the belief-worthiness of the information about 
the perpetrator's behavior by having (in one condition) the per­
petrator himself tell what had happened. 
A further issue that was addressed in experiments 1 and 2 is 
how Expectation and Account Source affect the attribution of res­
ponsibility towards a perpetrator of harm. According to Ferguson 
and Rule (1983), three steps can be distinguished in the processing 
of information about an aggression-eliciting event (see also Chapter 
IV). Assume for the sake of discussion that a person A (the future 
aggressor) has perceived some behavior of another person В (the 
future victim) as harmful. Thus, in A's eyes, В is a perpetrator of 
harm. Now, A first interprets the behavior of В in terms of the 
three dimensions of personal responsibility (Ferguson & Rule, 1983). 
Second, A attributes some degree of blame to B. Depending on how 
much blame is attributed, A may get angry as well. When attributing 
blame to B, A has implicitly assigned a degree of importance to 
each of the dimensions of responsibility. That is, A might have 
weighted one dimension more heavily for attributing blame than 
another dimension. Finally, unless inhibitory factors prevent A's 
further actions, A's attribution of blame and the resulting anger is 
the basis for an aggressive retaliation against B. Accordingly, the 
third issue to be addressed in this chapter is whether a per­
son-based expectation of aggressiveness about a perpetrator В and 
the source of the information about B's harmful behavior affect the 
way in which children interpret and assign importance to information 
regarding B's responsibility for causing the harm. 
62 
Person-based expectations about a person's aggressiveness are 
known to influence children's interpretation of that person's subse­
quent behavior (Dodge, 1980; Ferguson, Olthof, Luiten, & Rule, 
1984). This effect occurs especially if the available information 
about the person's subsequent behavior is ambiguous. For example, 
Dodge (1980) presented children with hypothetical events in which 
either a reputedly aggressive or a nonagressive classmate caused 
damage to some properly of the respondent. It was deliberately left 
unclear whether the classmate intended to cause the damage. When 
subsequently estimating the extent to which the classmate had 
hostile intentions when ruining their property, children attributed 
more hostile intentions to the reputedly aggressive classmate than 
to the nonaggressive classmate. Thus, children's expectations af­
fected how they interpreted the classmate's behavior. 
Previous research is unclear however, about whether a person A's 
negative person-based expectation about В can also influence the 
importance that A assigns to aspects of B's behavior (as it was 
interpreted by A). Intuitively, it seems that this might happen when 
the information about that behavior is (a) of an evaluatively positive 
nature and (b) un ambiguous and therefore not open to differential 
interpretation. An example from the courtroom might clarify this. 
Consider the strategies that a prosecutor might follow to counter a 
defense attorney's argument in which she ascribes a variety of 
favorable characteristics to the defendant. First, the prosecutor 
might argue that the argument is untrue. (In the present terms: 
"The prosecutor might interpret the situation differently from the 
defense attorney"). Second, if the prosecutor has to accept the 
truth of the argument, she might still argue that the argument is 
irrelevant for the issue at stake, i.e., whether the defendant is 
guilty. ("The prosecutor might attach no importance to the attor­
ney's argument"). 
Analogously, we hypothesize that even in cases were there can 
be no doubt about the truth of the evaluatively positive information, 
a negative person-based expectation might still affect the importance 
assigned to such information. This hypothesis implies that even in 
cases where a perceiver A is fully aware of the evaluatively positive 
aspects of B's behavior, A might still not take that information 
into account when evaluating B's behavior. 
Unlike the Expectation manipulation, the Account Source manip­
ulation can be expected to affect the interpretation of dimension 
information, even when that information is explicit and unambiguous. 
This is so, because when the perpetrator himself presents evaluative­
ly positive information about his harmful behavior, this information 
is likely to be considered untrue, the explicitness and unambiguily 
of the information notwithstanding. Specifically, children might 
suspect that the perpetrator of harm provides information about his 
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good motives and about the unavoidability and unintcnlionality of 
the harm only to escape negative evaluative judgments. Thus, to 
the extent that children lake into account the possibility that the 
perpetrator tries to give a favorable impression of himself, they 
can be expected to disbelieve the cvaluativcly positive information 
in the stories. This would cause both a more negative interpretation 
of the harmful event and higher naughtiness and anger judgments 
than when the source of the account had been objective and trust-
worthy. 
To test the above ideas, two experiments were carried out with 
5-to-ll year-old children. In the first experiment we first induced 
a person-based expectation about a boy of the respondents' own 
age by presenting them information about how the boy behaved 
towards other children. Half of the children were informed that the 
boy hit several other children in various different contexts. The 
other children received information conveying that the boy helped 
other children in various situations. Such a manipulation has been 
shown to invoke a strong person-based expectation about the actor 
in both adults (Kelley, 1967) and children from five years onwards 
(Ferguson, Olthof, Luiten, & Rule, 1984). In subsequent sessions all 
children heard stories in which the same boy became a perpetrator 
of harm in that he ruined another boy's property. The stories varied 
in terms of the three dimensions of personal responsibility discussed 
above. The information about Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive 
Acceptability was presented as unambiguously as possible. To assess 
their interpretation of the personal responsibility information, chil-
dren had to judge each harmful event in terms of how avoidable 
and how intentional the harm was and in terms of the extent to 
which the perpetrator's motives in the context of causing the harm 
were acceptable. Subsequently, children judged how naughty they 
considered the perpetrator to be, how angry they themselves would 
get as a victim, and what they would do to retaliate. 
Since the personal responsibility information was presented unam-
biguously, it was predicted that the negative Expectation would not 
so much influence the interpretation of the evaluatively positive 
dimension information, but rather the importance assigned to that 
information. That is, Expectation was predicted to influence dimen-
sion use (i.e., the dimensions' effects on naughtiness and anger) in 
a way that cannot be predicted from any effects of Expectation on 
dimension interpretation (i.e., the dimensions' effects on the respon-
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dents' judgments of avoidability, intentionality and motive accep-
tability).2 
In a second experiment we assessed whether children's 
interpretation of cvaluatively positive dimension information would 
be affected when the source of the account about the harmful 
event was subjective and possibly biased instead of objective and 
neutral. Specifically, a new group of children received the same 
treatment as was given to the children in experiment 1, except that 
the experiment 2 children were led to believe that the personal 
responsibility information was presented to them by a person who 
might be expected to give a positively biased account of what had 
happened, i.e., the perpetrator himself. Subsequently, the judgments 
of children who received this treatment were compared with those 
of a comparable group of experiment 1 children who had received 
an objective (i.e., experimenter-provided) account of the harmful 
event. It was predicted that children in the subjective Account 
Source condition would give more negative interpretation- and 
aggression-related judgments of the stories containing evaluativcly 
positive information than children in the objective condition. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Twenty-four children (12 boys and 12 girls) from each of four 
grade levels participated. Grade levels were kindergarten (mean age 
5 years 11 months), first grade (mean age 6 years 11 months), 
second grade (mean age 7 years 11 months) and fifth grade (mean 
age 10 years 9 months). Children were selected from three different 
schools in a small town near Nijmegen, the Netherlands. An equal 
number of boys and girls from each grade level was randomly as-
2
 In Chapters IV, V and VII a distinction is made between manipulated 
dimensions of responsibility and the corresponding subjective dimensions in 
terms of which the respondents interpret the responsibility information. To 
indicate typographically whether reference is made to a manipulated dimension 
or to the corresponding subjective dimension, capitals will be used in the 
former and lower case characters in the latter case. (E.g. "Intentionality" 
refers to the dimension as manipulated and "intentionality" to the subjective 
dimension that underlies children's estimates of the extent to which a 
perpetrator caused harm intentionally.) 
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signed to the high- or the low expectation of aggressiveness condi-
tions. 
Expectation Manipulation 
To invoke a high versus a low aggressiveness expectation about the 
perpetrator of harm, children received one of two stories about a 
boy of their own age. To invoke a high expectation of aggressive-
ness, children received information based on Kellcy's (1967) attribu-
lional criteria of consistency and distinctiveness. Specifically, the 
boy hit a recipient in three different situations (high consistency) 
and in addition, he also hit one of three other recipients in each 
of these three situations (low distinctiveness). The three situations 
were: a school-playground, a recreation park, and an ice-skating 
rink. The high consistency and low distinctiveness information was 
chosen so that strong person-based expectancies could be formed 
even by young children (Ferguson, Olthof, Luiten, & Rule, 1984). In 
the low aggressiveness condition the information was identical, 
except that the perpetrator lent his possessions (marbles, a bike, or 
skates) to the recipients in each of the situations. In addition to 
the verbal presentation of the expectation information, children 
were shown colored illustrations that depicted the situations as well 
as each of the boy's interactions with a recipient. 
Personal Responsibility Manipulations 
For each of two themes, eight stimulus stories were composed 
based on the factorial combinalion of the two levels of each of the 
dimensions Avoidability, Motive Acceptability, and Intentionality. In 
each story, the boy about whom children had already formed a 
person-based expectation (the transgressor) damaged another boy's 
(the victim's) property. In the "castle" theme, Henk ruined Wim's 
castle and, in the "robot" theme, Klaas broke Piet's robot. Half of 
the children received the robot story theme and the other children 
received the castle theme. Story theme was counterbalanced with 
Expectation. 
Each story began with an introduction of the two characters, 
what they were doing, and what happened to the victim's property 
(see Table 5.1). In each story, information was then given about 
the events that led to the property being damaged, including the 
transgressor's motives, his ability to avoid the property damage, 
and intentions to produce the damage. Each story was presented 
orally and was accompanied by nine cartoon-like illustrations desig-
ned to clarify the text. The illustrations were presented in an 
upright wooden box (12x40cm). Four introduction illustrations were 
visible throughout the story presentation. The five remaining il-
lustrations were hidden behind doors which could be opened to 
reveal them at the text-appropriate time. Three of the five 
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Table 5.1 
Stones Used to Represent the Eight Motive Acceptability χ 
Intenlionality χ Avoidability Combinations 
for the Castle Theme 
All Moncs were preceded by Ihe following mlroduclion. This is a slory about two 
boys, Henk and Wim Hcnk and Wim live al [name of Ihc (own where ihe child's school 
was localcd] Wim lives next-door to Hcnk (1)" One day Hcnk and Wim are playing in 
the yard Hcnk has taken his blocks with him and Wim has taken all kinds of things 
with him, because they are both going lo budd a big castle. Look, here you can see 
the castle thai Wim has built (2) Nowt Wim has to go home lo cal his lunch. His 
castle is going to be really nice, but it is not Finished yet (3). Henk continues to play 
on his own. When Wim comes back from eating his lunch, he bnngs another boy with 
him He wants to show the other boy how pretty his castle has become already, bui he 
can'l do that anymore. His castle is completely ruined, and Hcnk is the one who ruined 
it (4)\ 
Good Modves/Unavoùiable/UniniaUioniil 
[АМ]Ь Henk saw Wim's caslle and he 
thought "Wim would really like it if I 
weni and fetched some more blocks for his 
caslle, so that his casi le can get even 
bigger" Hcnk wanted to help Wim. He 
wanted to do something that Wtm would 
really tike. He wanted to be nice (5)"* 
Then, he walked over to Wim's castle (6) 
|UA] But, then, suddenly, a great big dog 
came and he jumped up against Hcnk really 
hard, so that he couldn't stay standing 
up He couldn't help il; it w a<; the dog's 
fault (7). 
[U] He fell He fell right on lop of 
Wim's castle and the caslle was completely 
ruined (8) Henk was very shocked when 
he saw the ruined castle, since it was an 
accident and he didn't mean it (9). 
Good motives ¡AvoidableiUnmiennonal^ 
[AM] Henk saw Wim's castle and he 
thought. "Wim would really like it if I 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
caslle, so that his castle can get even 
bigger". Hcnk wanted to help Wim He 
wanted to do something that Wim would 
really like. He wanted to be nice (5) 
Then, he walked over to Wim's caslle (6). 
(A] But, then, he was walking too fast, 
he was not paying any attention to where 
he was walking or where he put his feet 
down and be walked right into Wim's 
caslle. So, he could help it. He could've 
paid more atlcntion (14). 
[UI] He felL He fell right on top of 
Wim's castle and the caslle was completely 
mined (8). Henk was very shocked when 
be saw the ruined castle, since il was an 
accident and he didn't mean it (9). 
Bad MofivafUnavoùiabUfUninienîional 
[UM] Henk saw Wim's castle and he 
thought "Wim would really hate il if I 
threw sand all over his caslle", since Henk 
wanted to do something that would bug 
Wim Hcnk wanted to do something that 
Wim would reali}1 hate. He wanted to be 
mean (10). Then, he walked over to Wim's 
caslle (6) 
[UA] But, (hen, suddenly, a great big dog 
came and he jumped up against Hcnk really 
hard, so that he couldn't slay standing 
up He couldn't help il, il was the dog's 
fault (7). 
[UI] He fell He fell right on lop of 
Wim's caslle and the castle was complelely 
ruined (8) Hcnk was very shocked when 
he saw the ruined caslle, since it was an 
accident and he didn't mean it (9). 
Bad MotivtslAvoidabWUnintentionnl 
[UM] Henk saw Wim's caslle and he 
thought "Wim would really hale it if I 
threw sand all over his castle", since Henk 
wanted to do something that would bug 
Wim Hcnk wanted to do something that 
Wim would really hate. He wanted to be 
mean (10). Then, he walked over to Wim's 
caslle (6). 
[A] But, then. Henk was walking loo fast, 
he was nol paying any atlcntion to where 
he was walking or where he put his feet 
down and he walked righi into Wim's 
castle. So, he could help iL He could've 
paid more attention (14). 
[UI] He fell He fell right on top of 
Wim's caslle and the castle was completely 
ruined (8) Henk was very shocked when 
he saw the mined caslle, since it was an 
accident and he didn't mean it (9). 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
dood MoüvesfUruivoidabUfInleniionnF 
[AMJ Henk Sdv. Wim & Gasile and hc 
thought "Wim would real К like и if I 
went and fetched some more blocks Co* his 
casllc so thai his castle can gel even 
bigger' Henk wanled lo help Wim Не 
ТА anted (о do something that Wim would 
rcallv like He Wdntcd lo be nice (5) 
Then, he walked over to Wira4 casllc (6) 
|UA] But, Ihcn, suddenly н started 
raining really bard II was rcallv wind ν 
and it was raining rcallv hard Henk's . 
mother came out of the house and she 
shouted at Hcnk "You'd better bring all of 
those blocks inside right now, or you re 
going to get it'" Hcnk could bring the 
blocks inside onlv if be ruined Wim s 
castle So, hc had lo He couldn't help 
it, his mother made him do it (11) 
{I] Hc wanted just to take the blocks 
apart but (hat didn ι work bo, hc star 
ted pushing the castle rcallv hard He 
pushed and pushed hard, because hc was 
Irving to break ihc castle (12) He kepi 
on pushing long enough until (he cesile 
was complctelv ruined (Π) 
Good Motives I Avoidable Iinientionai 
[AM] When Hcnk saw Wim s castle hc 
wanted to help Wim Hc wanted to do 
something thai Wim would rcallv like He 
wanted to be nice (15) 
[A] So, he thought about (hc things hc 
could do Then he thought of somelhmc 
"Wim is staving awa) quite long I figure 
he doesn't want to play with the castle 
anymore Shall I start ruining the caille 
for Wim or shall I wait till Wim comes 
back7" Hc thought it over and he chose to 
nun the castle before Wim would come 
back So, hc could help it, since he was 
the one who made up his mind about what 
would happen with the castle (16) Then, 
he wallted over lo Wim's castle (6) 
[IJ Hcnk wanted just to take the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work So, he star­
ted pushing the castle really hard He 
pushed and pushed hard, because he was 
trying to break the castle (12) He kepi 
on pushing long enough until the castle 
was completely ruined (13) 
Bad MoüvtsfUnavouiabttllnXaUiOnal 
[UM] Hcnk sau W im's casllc and he 
thought "W im would reali) hate и if I 
Ihre« sand all over his casllc", since Hcnk 
wanted to do something thai would bug 
Wim Hcnk wanted to do something that 
Wim would really hate He wanted to be 
mean (10) Then, he walked over lo Wim's 
casi le (6) 
IUA] Bui, then, suddenly il starled 
raining rcallv hard It was really windv 
and it was raining really hard Henk's 
mother came out of the house and she 
shouted at Hcnk Λ ou d better bnng all of 
those blocks inside right now, or you're 
going ю get il'n Hcnk could bring ihc 
blocks inside onlv if he ruined Wim's 
casllc So, he had to He couldn't help 
il, his mother made him do it (11) 
[I] He wanted just to take the blocks 
apart, but (hat didn ι work So he star 
ltd pushing the casllc real h hard He 
pushed and pushed hard, because hc was 
imng io break ihc casllc (12) He kepi 
on pushing long enough unni the castle 
was compiei e К ruined (13) 
Bad MotivesJAvoidnbie/InienùonaJ 
[UM] When Hcnk saw Wims castle, he 
wanled lo do something lhai would bug 
Wim He wanted lo do sonici hing lhat Wim 
rcallv real К hate Hc warned io be mean 
[A] So, Hcnk thought about the things he 
could do Then hc thought of somelhing 
"Shall I throw lots of sand on Wim's castle 
or shall I ruin ihe castle*7" Hc thought it 
over and hc chose lo ruin the castle So, 
Henk could help it, since he was the one 
who made up his mind about what would 
happen with the castle (16) Then, Hcnk 
walked over to Wim's castle (6) 
(IJ Henk wanted just to lake Ihe blocks 
apart, but that didn't work So, he star­
ted pushing the castle really hard He 
pushed and pushed hard, because he was 
trying to break the castle (12) He kept 
on pushing long enough until the castle 
was completely ruined (13) 
m
 Numbers in parentheses refer to pictures illustrating the particular 
part of the story. Detailed descriptions of the pictures can be obtained from 
the first author. 
ь
 AM-acceptable motives, UM-unacceptable motives, UA-unavoidable, 
A-avoidable, Ul-unintentional, I-intentional. 
β
 Consistent with the attributional approach, unavoidable versus avoidable 
harm that was unintended was operatlonallzed as the absence versus presence 
of foreseeability. In contrast, unavoidable versus avoidable harm that was 
intended was operationalized as the absence versus presence of freedom of 
choice· 
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remaining illustrations depicted Motive Acceptability information, 
transition information, and Avoidability information, respectively. 
Finally, two illustrations depicted Intentionality information. With 
one exception, the illustrations depicting Intentionality and Motive 
Acceptability were identical across the eight stories within a theme. 
The exception was that the pictures illustrating Motive Acceptability 
at the avoidable-and-intcntional level of both other dimensions 
differed slightly from the pictures illustrating Motive Acceptability 
at the remaining levels of Avoidability χ Intentionality. For Avoidab­
ility two different illustrations for each level were needed for each 
theme, depending on the level of Intentionality with which it was 
to be combined (see Table 5.1). 
Procedure and Dependent Measures 
Children were tested individually by one of three female ex­
perimenters in a quiet location on the schoolgrounds. Each child 
participated in three or four sessions, each of which lasted ap­
proximately 20 min. The sessions occurred on different days within 
a two-week period. 
The first session began with a rating scale training. The rating 
scale consisted of seven size-graduated vertical rectangles that were 
drawn on a piece of white cardboard (21x30cm). The experimenter 
began the training by pointing to each rectangle and verbalizing the 
appropriate label (not at all, a very little bit, a little bit, a bit, a 
lot, a whole lot, and a very whole lot). For the kindergarten and 
first-grade children, the experimenter then explained how the scale 
could be used, using as an example how scary different animals are 
(the animals used were lambs, mice, big dogs, lions and crocodiles). 
Older children received a briefer version of the scale training. 
To check scale comprehension, children were asked to rale how 
strong several people were (including a giant, a policeman, a father, 
a big child, an old lady, a small child, and a baby). To see whether 
children of different grade levels differed in their ability to use 
the rating scale, we conducted a 4 (Grade Level) χ 7 (Persons 
rated) mixed-design analysis of variance on children's strength 
ratings. The main effect of the Persons factor F(6,87) = 233.69, p<.01, 
was significant, but there were no significant effects including 
Grade Level. Moreover, the rank order of the presented examples in 
terms of estimated strength was identical for all grade levels. Thus, 
there were no statistically reliable differences among the four age 
groups in terms of their ability to use the 7-point rating scale. 
Following scale training, children received the Expectation infor­
mation. To assess whether positive versus negative person-based 
expectations of the actor had been formed, children rated the actor 
on the 7-point rating scale in terms of how mean and how nice 
they thought him to be. 
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In the second session children first made naughtiness, anger and 
retaliation judgments regarding two anchor stories with actors who 
did not occur elsewhere in the experiment. The anchor stories were 
designed to elicit use of each extreme of the 7-point naughtiness-, 
anger- and retaliation scales that were used in the study. They 
served to give the child an indication of the range of variation in 
the stories that were to be judged and to familiarize the child with 
the naughtiness-, anger-and retaliation rating procedure. In one 
anchor story, a boy actively ruined another boy's hand-made car 
and threw the pieces in a ditch. In the other anchor story, in 
contrast, the actor made the other boy's car even more attractive 
by attaching his own toy horn and some flags to it. The order of 
presenting the negative and the positive anchor story was counter-
balanced with Expectation. After presenting each story the child 
was asked the following questions: (1) "How naughty do you think 
— (perpetrator's name) is because of what he did in this story?" 
(2) Imagine that you were — (victim's name). How angry would 
you then be at — (perpetrator's name) because of what he did in 
this story? (3) Imagine that you were — (victim's name). What 
would you do against — (perpetrator's name) because of what he 
did in this story? Children used the 7-point rating scale to answer 
the naughtiness and anger questions. To answer the retaliation 
question, a similar 7-point scale was used, except that each alterna-
tive of this scale was labelled pictorially with one of the following 
retaliatory actions: (1) to do nothing at all; (2) to tell the per-
petrator that he did wrong; (3) to shout at the perpetrator; (4) to 
stick out one's tongue; (5) to hit the perpetrator at his shoulder; 
(6) to hit the perpetrator at the face; (7) to bloody the per-
petrator's nose. These alternatives were chosen on the basis of 
pilot research in which children ordered different counteractions in 
terms of retaliatory severity. The mean ratings on these scales for 
the positive versus the negative anchor stories were 1.15 versus 
6.49 for naughtiness, 1.17 versus 6.52 for anger, and 1.05 versus 
5.16 for retaliation. 
After presenting the anchor stories, the eight causal respon-
sibility manipulation stories were presented in one of eight orders. 
The orders were constructed on the basis of a randomly chosen 
sequence of stories by subsequently shifting the stories one position 
until each story appeared equally often in each presentation order 
position. The resulting story presentation orders 1, 3, 6, and 8 were 
used for the high aggressiveness Expectation condition, whereas the 
remaining orders were used for the low aggressiveness Expectation 
condition. 
When presenting the first of the eight personal responsibility 
stories, the experimenter paused immediately after having presented 
the introductory information where the victim discovers that the 
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perpetrator ruined his robot (castle). Thus, up to this point the child 
had only received the introductory information with its accompany­
ing pictures (1-4), without any information about how the per­
petrator had ruined the robot (castle). At this point the ex­
perimenter asked the naughtiness, anger, and retaliation questions 
listed above. 
After having asked these questions the experimenter said: "Now 
I'll tell you how it happened that the robot (castle) got ruined". 
She then presented the responsibility information of the first story 
while opening the covers of the story presentation box to illustrate 
each part of the story that she was telling. The order of presenting 
the M(otive acceptability), A(voidability) and I(nlcntionality) infor­
mation was varied so that each child received the information in 
one of three dimension orders. This was accomplished by opening 
the doors that covered each type of information in three different 
orders (i.e., MAI, AIM, or IMA). In the last two orders small addi­
tions to the stories were necessary to ensure that the transitions 
between the different types of dimension information were natural. 
Dimension order was counterbalanced with Expectation and sex of 
respondent. Finally, following each story, a standardized summary 
was given of the level of Motive Acceptability, Avoidability, and 
Intcntionalily represented in the story by repeating appropriate 
phrases from the story. 
To check children's memory and to ensure that they paid atten­
tion to all the information presented, the following procedure was 
followed: After presenting each story the experimenter asked the 
child to retell the story. When the child omitted the information 
relevant for a particular dimension, a probe question was asked, 
c.g, "Did (actor's name) want to be nice or mean?" When the child 
mentioned the wrong level for a dimension (e.g. intentional instead 
of unintentional), such an error was not corrected since it could 
have been due to the influence of the Expectation manipulation on 
dimension interpretation. A Grade Level χ Expectation completely 
between-subjects Analysis of variance on the number of correctly 
retold dimensions revealed, however, that Expectation did not affect 
retelling, but that Grade Level did, F(3,88) = 4.13. The number of 
correctly retold dimensions (out of 24, being the product of 8 
stories χ 3 dimensions) was 22.5, 22.8, 23.3 and 23.7 for kindergar­
ten, grade 1, grade 2, and grade 5 respectively. A subsequent anal­
ysis with Tukey's HSD test revealed that the grade 5 children 
correctly recollected a significantly larger number of dimensions 
than the kindergarten-age children. Note, however, that even though 
kindergarten-age children's performance was significantly worse 
than grade 5 children's performance, their recollections were still 
close to being perfect. 
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After having presented a complete story, the experimenter again 
asked the naughtiness, anger and retaliation questions that were 
listed above. In addition, to assess children's interpretation of the 
M, A, and I information, children were asked the following ques­
tions: (4) "How nice/mean (depending on whether the actor had 
good or bad motives) did — (perpetrator's name) want to be in 
this story?" (5) "How much could — (perpetrator's name) help 
ruining the robot (castle)?" (6) "How much did — (perpetrator's 
name) try to ruin the robot (castle)?" Children answered these 
questions using the 7-point rating scale. The order of asking ques­
tions (4), (5) and (6) parallelled the order of presenting the M, A 
and I dimensions within stories. 
After telling the first of the eight stories, the experimenter said 
that she would tell the story again, but that things would be going 
somewhat differently in the new version of the story. This was 
meant to make clear to the child that an alternative version of the 
same harmful event would be presented and not still another in­
stance of harm-doing. The experimenter stressed this point again 
before presenting each of the remaining stories. With all subsequent 
stories, the experimenter proceeded immediately to the personal 
responsibility information after having presented the introductory 
information, without pausing to ask the naughtiness, anger, and 
retaliations questions. 
It might be argued that notwithstanding our efforts to assure 
that children perceived the stories as being independent from each 
other, they might have formed a negative expectation about the 
perpetrator only on the basis of hearing eight times (i.e., in each 
personal responsibility story) that the perpetrator caused harm. 
Specifically, children might form an increasingly negative expectation 
during the course of hearing all eight stories, which might subse­
quently lead them judge the later presented stories more negatively 
than the stories presented earlier. 
To test this possibility, three separate 4 (Grade Level) χ 8 (Pre­
sentation Position) mixed-design analyses of variance were carried 
out on children's naughtiness, anger, and retaliation ratings of the 
stories in each presentation order position. Since all stories occurred 
equally often in each presentation order position, a significant 
effect of Presentation Position would indicate that the repeated 
presentation of harmful events as such affected children's ratings. 
None of the analyses yielded a significant effect including Presenta­
tion Position (all p's >.10). It can be concluded that children per­
ceived the eight responsibility stories sufficiently independent of 
each other so as to not form a person-based expectation based only 
on hearing these stories. 
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
To assess whether the Expectation manipulation had been successful, 
the ratings that children made in the Expectation manipulation 
session of how mean and how nice they thought the actor to be 
were analyzed in two separate 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Expectation) 
between-subjects analyses of variance. The effects of Expectation 
were significant both for judgments of niceness F(l,86) = 310.39, 
p<.001 and for meanness F(l,86) = 831.12, p<.001. The mean ratings of 
niceness for the low versus the high aggressiveness Expectation 
condition were 6.13 versus 1.31, respectively. The mean ratings of 
meanness were 1.28 versus 6.50 for the low versus the high aggres­
siveness Expectation condition, respectively. Clearly, the Expectation 
manipulation was successful in giving children a positive versus a 
negative impression of the actor. 
We also examined whether children's interpretation ratings were 
appropriately differentiated among the levels of each manipulated 
dimension. The effects of the three dimensions on the interpretation 
measures of perceived avoidability, intcntionality, and motive accep­
tability3 were examined in a 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Intcntionality) χ 
2 (Motive Acceptability) χ 3 (Interpretation Measure) within-subjects 
analysis of variance. When differentiation would be perfect, one 
would expect interactions between each of the three manipulated 
dimensions and the Interpretation Measure factor, indicating that 
each of the manipulated dimensions affected only its corresponding 
interpretation measure and not the other two. 
The analysis revealed interactions of Avoidability χ Interpretation 
Measure F(2,92) = 24.57, p<.001, Intcntionality χ Interpretation Measure 
F(2,92) = 69.39, p<.001 and Motive Acceptability χ Interpretation 
Measure F(2,92) = 36.61, p<.001. The means reflecting each of these 
interactions are presented in Table 5.2."* 
3
 The motive acceptability interpretation measure consisted of children's 
ratings of how mean the perpetrator wanted to be in the bad motive stories 
and of their reversed ratings of how nice the actor wanted to be in the good 
motive stories (8 minus r, where r is the child's niceness rating on the 7-point 
scale). 
* This analysis was also carried out for each grade level separately. All 
Dimension χ Measure interactions were significant for each grade level. 
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Table 5.2 
ElTccts of Avoidability, Intcnlionalily, and Motive Acceptability 
on Ratings of Subjectively Perceived avoidability, 
intcnlionalily, and motive acceptability 
subjective dimensions 
manipulated 
dircensions 
unavoidable 
avoidable 
unintentional 
intentional 
good irati ves 
bad motives 
avoidability 
2.50 
(1.75) 
4.25 
3.74 
( -73) 
4.47 
3.97 
( -48) 
4.45 
intcnlionalily 
2.97 
( -76) 
3.73 
2.70 
(2.78) 
5.48 
3.82 
( -52) 
4.34 
irative 
2.85 
(1.01) 
3.86 
3.45 
(1.22) 
4.67 
2.73 
(2.71) 
5.44 
Note - The evaluatively-negative-minus-evaluatively-positive difference 
scores for each dimension are put in parentheses to facilitate the interpreta-
tion of the table. 
As can be seen in Table 5.2, each of the manipulated dimensions 
affected its own interpretation measure much more than any of the 
other interpretation measures. Similarly, each of the interpretation 
measures was affected more by its corresponding manipulated dimen-
sion than by any of the other dimensions. Thus, the data were 
generally consistent with the ideal pattern, indicating that subjects 
were able to appropriately differentiate between the levels of the 
three manipulated dimensions. 
Dependent Variables and Rationale for the Analysis Used 
To simplify the data analyses as much as possible, several measures 
were combined into aggregate scores. First, in the study described 
in Chapter HI it was found that the three dimensions of respon-
sibility affected children's naughtiness and anger ratings in highly 
similar ways. To see whether this result was replicated in the 
present study, naughtiness/anger Pearson product moment correla-
tions were computed across the eight stories for each individual 
child. For 81 of the 91 (out of 96) children for whom the corrcla-
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tion could be computed, the coefficient was statistically significant 
(p<.05 with η = 8) and the mean correlation across all children was 
.82. Accordingly, in all subsequent analyses the mean of children's 
naughtiness and anger ratings for each story was used as the depen­
dent variable reflecting dimension use. 
Second, the three interpretation measures (i.e., children's ratings 
in terms of avoidability, intcntionality and motive acceptability) 
were combined into one overall interpretation score. This was done 
by computing the average of the three interpretation ratings for 
each story. Note, that the resulting averaged interpretation scores 
jointly reflect how the stories are interpreted in terms of all three 
dimensions. Consequently, the averaged interpretation scores can be 
treated as predictors of the evaluative judgments (i.e., naughtiness 
and anger) in which children have to integrate information regarding 
all three dimensions. The averaged interpretation scores will ac­
curately predict children's evaluative judgments, provided that such 
evaluative judgments would depend only on how children interpreted 
the dimension information and not, for example, also on the impor­
tance assigned to dimensions. The averaged interpretation scores 
will further be referred to as "Inlerpretation-based-Dimension-
-Use-Prediction" scores (IDUP). 
By comparing children's interpretation-based predictions of 
dimension use with their actual dimension use for rating 
naughtiness/anger, inferences can be made about whether it was 
actually the case that dimension use depended only on dimension 
interpretation or also on the importance assigned to dimensions. 
Specifically, any reliable discrepancies between the 
interpretation-based predictions of dimension use versus actual 
dimension use indicate that dimension use does not only depend on 
dimension interpretation, but also on the importance that children 
assign to dimensions (see chapter IV). 
Presence versus Absence of Responsibility Information 
To examine the general effects of the availability of personal res­
ponsibility information, children's naughtiness/anger and retaliation 
judgments were averaged across all eight personal responsibility 
stories. The resulting means were compared to the judgments that 
children made after only hearing the introductory information of 
the first story. Specifically, we carried out a 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 
(Expectation) χ 2 (Before vs. after presenting the Responsibility 
Information) mixed-design analyses of variance with the Respon­
sibility Information factor as the only within-subjects factor on 
children's naughtiness/anger and retaliation judgments. The effect 
of the Responsibility Information factor was significant both for 
naughtiness/anger F(l,87) = 111.78, p<.001 and retaliation F(l,84)= 38.66, 
2<.001. The average naughtiness/anger and retaliation ratings before 
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versus after presenting the personal responsibility information were 
5.75 versus 4.02, and 4.37 versus 3.41, respectively. Thus, presenting 
the personal responsibility information generally led children to 
moderate their initially more severe judgments. 
These findings, based on comparisons within children, are consis­
tent with the conclusion that was reached in Chapter III on the 
basis of comparisons between children who did versus who did not 
use the dimensions as a basis for their judgments, i.e., that the 
more that children use information about a perpetrator's respon­
sibility for causing harm, the less they respond with anger against 
the perpetrator. 
These results are also relevant to the interpretation of one of 
the findings of Dodge (1980), i.e., that aggressive children differ 
from other children in that in ambiguous situations they more often 
infer malevolent motives in someone who caused harm to them. Our 
finding that judgments of anger and aggression were quite high in 
situations were no information about the perpetrator's responsibility 
was available at all, implies that the inference of bad motives may 
well be a default option for non-aggressive as well as for aggressive 
children when no responsibility information is available. The aggres­
sive children's habit of inferring bad motives in ambiguous situations 
can be interpreted as reflecting a tendency to stick conservatively 
to the default option in those situations where some, albeit am­
biguous, information is available. This interpretation implies a some­
what different characterization of aggressive children than was 
given by Dodge (1980). Specifically, Dodge portrayed aggressive 
children as being cognitively more active than other children, in 
that aggressive children were assumed to infer that a perpetrator 
has bad motives in cases where other children do not make such an 
inference. Our results imply that aggressive children are cognitively 
less active than other children, in that they stick to the default 
option of assuming bad motives in cases where other children use 
the available information to infer that the perpetrator caused harm 
unavoidably, u/iintentionally and in the context of good motives. 
In addition to these results, a main effect of Expectation was 
significant for naughtiness/anger F(l,87)=8.08, p<.05 and approached 
significance for retaliation F(l,84)=3.10, ρ = .08. Means for the positive 
versus negative Expectation condition were 4.58 versus 5.19 for 
naughtiness/anger and 3.64 versus 4.15 for retaliation, respectively. 
Thus, as could be expected on the basis of previous research (Fer­
guson, Olthof, Luiten, & Rule, 1984), children in the negative Expec­
tation condition generally tended to give more severe judgments 
than children in the positive Expectation condition. 
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Dimension Interpretation and Use. 
Children's interpretation (IDUP) and use (naughtiness/anger) ratings 
were analyzed in a 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Expectation) χ 2 (Avoidab-
ility) χ 2 (Intcntionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) χ 2 (Measure, 
IDUP vs. naughtiness/anger) mixed-design analysis of variance with 
the first two factors between-subjects. The results of this analysis 
will be discussed in two steps. First, the pattern of dimension main 
effects and Dimension χ Measure interactions will be discussed to 
examine whether dimension use could or could not fully be predicted 
from dimension interpretation (see Chapter IV). Second, in order to 
examine whether the Expectation manipulation affected dimension 
interpretation and/or dimension use, effects including Expectation 
will be discussed in the next subsection. 
The overall analysis revealed a significant effect of Avoidability 
F(l,86) = 142.10, p<.001. This effect was not further qualified by an 
Avoidability χ Measure interaction. The means of unavoidable versus 
avoidable stories that were predicted for naughtiness/anger on the 
basis of interpretation alone (IDUP) and children's actual naughti­
ness/anger ratings are presented in the top panel of Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Interpretation-based Dimension Use Predictions (IDUP) and Actual 
Dimension Use (Naughtiness/Anger) for each Dimension 
unavoidable 
avoidable 
unintentional 
intentional 
good motives 
bad motives 
Note - The evaluatively-negative-minus-evaluatively-positive difference 
scores for each dimension are put in parentheses to facilitate the interpreta­
tion of the table. 
interpretation 
(I DUP) 
3.31 
(1.07) 
4.38 
3.17 
(1.35) 
4.52 
3.01 
(1.67) 
4.68 
use 
(naught iness/angcr) 
3.52 
(1.04) 
4.56 
3.69 
( -70) 
4.39 
2.79 
(2.50) 
5.29 
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As can be seen in Table 5.3, the avoidable-minus-unavoidable dif­
ference for naughtiness/anger has about the same magnitude as the 
avoidable-minus-unavoidable difference for IDUP. Thus, Avoidability 
use when judging naughtiness and anger can be predicted fairly 
well by the interpretation judgments (IDUP). 
The main effect of Intentionality was also significant F(l,86) = 
101.38, 2<.001, but this effect was qualified by a significant Inten­
tionality χ Measure interaction F(l,86) =31.74, p<.001. The means 
reflecting this interaction are presented in Table 5.3 (middle panel). 
As can be seen in Table 5.3, the intentional-minus-uninlentional 
difference is smaller for naughtiness/anger than for IDUP. That is, 
children differentiated less between intentionally- versus uninten­
tionally caused harm when judging naughtiness and anger than one 
could have expected on the basis of their interpretation judgments 
alone. When compared to the effects obtained for Avoidability, the 
pattern of effects for Intentionality indicates that children attached 
relatively little importance to Intentionality. Finally, the analysis 
revealed a significant effect of Motive Acceptability F(l,86) = 257.04, 
g<.001, which was also qualified by a significant Motive Acceptability 
χ Measure interaction F(l,86) =45.18, p<.001. Inspection of Table 5.3 
(lower panel) reveals that the bad-minus-good-motive difference is 
larger for naughtiness/anger than for the IDUP scores. Thus, chil­
dren differentiated more between good and bad motives when judging 
naughtiness and anger than one could have expected on the basis 
of their interpretation judgments alone. When compared to the 
patterns of effects obtained for Avoidability and Intentionality, this 
pattern of effects indicates that children attached relatively more 
importance to Motive Acceptability. 
These results show that children attached the most importance to 
Motive Acceptability. The second most important dimension was 
Avoidability and the least importance was attached to Intentionality. 
The pattern of results displayed in Table 5.3 implies that the dif­
ferences among dimensions in terms of their influence on naughti­
ness/anger cannot be explained only in terms of whether children 
were able to interpret the dimension information correctly. Rather, 
the different magnitudes of the dimensions' effects on naughtiness/-
anger are due to the fact that children assigned differential impor­
tance to each of the dimensions when judging naughtiness and 
anger. 
Effects of Expectation on Dimension Interpretation and Use. 
The analysis described in the previous section revealed only one 
significant effect including Expectation, i.e., a Grade Level χ Expec­
tation χ Motive Acceptability χ Measure interaction F(3,86) = 3.77, 
2<.05. To further examine this interaction, additional 2 (Expectation) 
χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) mixed-design analyses of variance were 
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carried out for the IDUP and naughtiness/anger judgments of each 
Grade Level separately. The means representing the overall interac­
tion and the significant effects that resulted from the additional 
analyses are presented in Tabic 5.4. 
Table 5.4 
Means Representing the Grade Level χ Expectation (Low vs. High 
Aggressiveness) χ Motive Acceptability (Good vs. Bad) 
χ Measure (IDUP vs. Naughtiness/anger) Interaction 
kindergarten 
lew aggr. 
high aggr. 
grade 1 
lew aggr. 
high aggr. 
grade 2 
lav aggr. 
high aggr. 
grade 5 
lew aggr. 
high aggr. 
I D U P 
good bad 
motives 
2.79 
3.43 
3.37 
3.48 
2.72 
2.74 
2.79 
2.92 
motives 
4.83 
4.88 
4.64 
4.17 
4.73 
4.45 
4.77 
4.83 
naughty/angry1 
good bad 
motives 
1.97a 
3.97" 
2.79 
2.66 
2.54 
2.65 
2.54-
3.14ь 
motives 
5.36*= 
5.82е 
5.01 
5.04 
5.22 
5.32 
5.45е 
5.05е 
analyses of variance2 
I D U P naughty/ 
E 
M 
E x M 
E 
M 
E x M 
E 
M 
E x M 
E 
M 
E x M 
38.31 
. 
13.66 
86.16 
104.31 
angry 
5.28 
63.46 
5.47 
. 
30.29 
101.76 
113.26 
4.77 
1
 Superscripts reflect the results of Tukey's HSD test with Cichetty's 
(1972) extension that was carried out on each significant E x M interaction 
(see note 2). Means within columns and within rows not sharing identical 
superscripts differ significantly. 
2
 F's for the significant (p<.05) effects resulting from the 2 (Expectation) 
χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) mixed-design ANOVAs on each Grade Level's IDUP 
and naughtiness/anger judgments. (Ε-Expectation, M-Motive Acceptability). 
As can be seen in Table 5.4 (see the columns labelled "IDUP"), 
the analyses per grade level indicated that Expectation affected 
none of the agegroups' IDUP scores in a statistically reliable way. 
Thus, by presenting the dimension information clearly and unam­
biguously, we were successful in assuring that children's interpreta-
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tion of the dimension information would not be affected by having 
a high versus low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness. 
As can also be seen in Table 5.4 (see the columns labelled 
"naughty/angry"), only the naughtiness/anger ratings of the kinder­
garten and fifth-grade children were affected by Expectation in a 
statistically reliable way. The kindergarten and fifth-grade children 
who had a high- instead of a low expectation of the perpetrator's 
aggressiveness gave significantly more severe naughtiness/anger 
judgments of the good-, but not of the bad motive stories. Addition­
al Expectation χ Motive Acceptability χ Measure (IDUP vs. naughti­
ness/anger) analyses of variance for these children yielded a sig­
nificant interaction of Expectation χ Motive Acceptability χ Measure, 
F s (1,22) =5.09 and 7.05 for kindergarten and grade 5, respectively 
(g's <.05). This indicates that the difference between the naughti­
ness/anger ratings and the IDUP scores actually was significant for 
both agegroups. 
These findings imply that kindergarten and fifth-grade children 
who had a high expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness 
attached less importance to the perpetrator's good motives than 
children who had a low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressive­
ness. These rating patterns support our hypothesis that in cases 
where the dimension information is unambiguous enough to preclude 
any variations in how the information is interpreted, person-based 
expectations might still affect the importance assigned to such 
information. 
The findings reported above are intriguing in that Expectation 
affected kindergarten- and fifth grade children's judgments, but not 
those of the grade 1 and grade 2 children. This pattern of results 
resembles findings obtained in research on children's stereotyping. 
Specifically, it has been found that young children can form strong 
category-based expectations leading them to virtually ignore discon-
firming evidence. When growing older, children subsequently learn 
to focus on the available evidence and to avoid expectancy-based 
distortions of that evidence (e.g.. About, 1988; Huston, 1983). At 
the same time, as is clear from the adult literature, this develop­
ment does not result in a total disappearance of expectation-based 
biases (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987, for an overview). Rather, adult 
functioning can be characterized as being both expectation-based 
and information-based without one mode of functioning entirely 
predominating the other. As stated by Higgins and Bargh (1987): 
"People are neither largely "theory-driven" nor predominantly "data-
driven"; rather they are continually compelled by the relation bet­
ween knowledge and events." 
Accordingly, it might be hypothesized that children eventually 
reach a stage in which previously obtained expectations are in­
tegrated with the currently available evidence, thus avoiding both 
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extremes that can be seen at younger ages (see Ross, 1981). When 
applied to the development of children's use of person-based expec­
tations, the above reasoning would predict a pattern of findings 
that is in some respects similar to what we have found in the 
present study. It should be noted, however, that an interpretation 
of our findings along these lines, though consistent with the data, 
is highly speculative. It is a task for future research to sort this 
issue out. 
Judgments of Retaliation 
Children's estimates of how they would retaliate against the per­
petrator of harm were analyzed in a 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Expecta­
tion) χ 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Intentionality) x 2 (Motive Accep­
tability) mixed-design analysis of variance with Grade Level and 
Expectation as between-subject factors. This analysis yielded sig­
nificant effects of Motive Acceptability F(l,87) = 97.50, p<.001 (means 
for good vs. bad motive stories were 2.64 vs. 4.24 respectively), 
Intentionality F(l,87) = 14.18, 2<.001 (means for unintentional vs. 
intentional stories were 3.24 vs. 3.64, respectively) and Avoidability 
F(l,87) = 52.52, p-c.OOl (means for unavoidable vs. avoidable stories 
were 3.07 vs. 3.81, respectively). Clearly, these findings confirm our 
hypothesis that children's retaliation judgments would be affected 
by the same three dimensions of responsibility that also affected 
their moral- and anger-related judgments. 
In addition, significant interactions were found of Expectation χ 
Avoidability F(l,87) = 5.96, 2<.05 and Grade Level χ Expectation χ 
Avoidability F(3,87) = 3.05, g < .05. To further examine the latter inter­
action, additional 2 (Expectation) χ 2 (Avoidability) mixed-design 
analyses of variance were carried out for each Grade Level separate­
ly. The means representing the overall interaction and the sig­
nificant effects that resulted from the additional analyses are pres­
ented in Table 5.5. 
It can be seen that even though kindergarten-age children with 
a high expectation of aggressiveness gave higher retaliation judg­
ments of the evaluatively positive (i.e., unavoidable) stories than 
children with a low expectation of aggressiveness, the difference 
between both groups was even larger for the evaluatively negative 
(i.e., avoidable) stories. These results are not consistent with the 
hypothesis that having a high expectation of aggressiveness would 
lead children to give higher ratings of the evaluatively positive, but 
not of the negative stories. In addition, grade 1 children's ratings 
were also inconsistent with the hypothesis in that the high expecta­
tion children gave lower instead of higher ratings of the unavoidable 
stories. The pattern of ratings in Table 5.5 can best be described 
as indicating that Expectation affected the kindergarten- and grade 
1-, but not the grade 2 and 5 children's use of the Avoidability 
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dimension. Specifically, the kindergarten and grade 1 children with 
a low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness did not base 
their retaliation judgments on Avoidability, whereas all other chil­
dren did use this dimension. 
Table 5.5 
Means Representing the Grade Level χ Expectation χ Avoidability 
Interaction on Judgments of Retaliation 
unavoidable avoidable analyses of variance1 
kindergarten 
lav aggr. 
high aggr. 
grade 1 
lew aggr. 
high aggr. 
grade 2 
lew aggr. 
high aggr. 
grade 5 
lav aggr. 
high aggr. 
2.87-
3.60b 
3.33» 
2.69b 
2.77 
2.54 
3.17 
2.92 
3.10" 
5.02e 
3.48ac 
3.90e 
3.84 
3.69 
3.85 
3.65 
E 
A 
E x A 
E 
A 
E x A 
E 
A 
E x A 
E 
A 
E x A 
5.60 
14.11 
7.34 
-
8.99 
5.54 
-
18.06 
-
13.53 
1
 Superscripts reflect the results of Tukey's HSD test with Cichetty's 
(1972) extension that was carried out on each significant E x A interaction 
(see note 2). Means within columns and within rows not sharing identical 
superscripts differ significantly. 
z
 F's of the significant (2<-05) effects resulting from the 2 (Expectation) 
χ 2 (Avoidability) mixed-design ANOVAs on each Grade Level's judgments. 
(Ε-Expectation, A-Avoidability). 
As is clear from the fact that different effects of Expectation 
were obtained for retaliation versus naughtiness/anger (see Table 
5.5 vs. Table 5.4), the Expectation effect on the kindergarten- and 
grade 1 children's retaliation judgments was not foreshadowed in 
their interpretation- and naughtiness/anger judgments. This finding, 
as well as the way the retaliation judgments and the naughtiness/-
anger judgments were both affected by all three dimensions of 
responsibility, raise the issue regarding the extent to which both 
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measures are related to each other. Obviously, if moral evaluations 
and anger are among the factors that determine whether a person 
reacts aggressively to perceived harm (Ferguson & Rule, 1983), there 
should be a substantial relation between children's naughtiness/anger 
and retaliation judgments. To examine this possibility, Pearson 
product-moment correlations were computed between each child's 
averaged naughtiness/anger ratings and the retaliation ratings of 
the eight stories (thus treating the eight stories as the cases and 
the naughtiness/anger and retaliation ratings as the variables). 
The correlations could not be computed in 7 children's naughti­
ness/anger and/or retaliation ratings due to lack of variance. For 
the remaining 89 children, significant (p < .05, with η = 8) positive 
correlations between naughtiness/anger and retaliation were found 
for 65 children (73%), and the correlations approached significance 
(ρ<.10) for another 6 children (7%). The numbers of kindergarten, 
grade 1, grade 2, and grade 5 children with a low versus high 
expectation of aggressiveness for whom the correlation was sig­
nificant at p<.10 (maximum 12) were 7 versus 8, 6 versus 11, 8 
versus 11, and 10 versus 10, respectively. 
An additional 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Expectation) fully within-
subjects analysis of variance on a Fisher's ζ transformation of the 
correlations yielded an effect of Expectation that approached sig­
nificance, F(l,81)=2.99, 2<.10. The mean correlations for the low 
versus high expectation condition were .62 versus .78, respectively. 
Thus, there was a tendency for the correlations to be lower for 
children with a low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness 
than for children with a high expectation. Inspection of the mean 
naughtiness/anger and retaliation ratings of the 18 children for 
whom both measures were insignificantly correlated revealed that 
these children's retaliation judgments, but not their naughliness/-
anger judgments, were uniformly low across all stories. Apparently, 
these children were reluctant to retaliate against the perpetrator, 
even when they considered him to be naughty and when his behavior 
aroused their anger. 
All things considered, it can be concluded that naughtiness/anger 
and retaliation are highly related to each other for most children. 
This result is consistent with Ferguson & Rule's (1983) claim that 
moral evaluations and anger arc among the factors that determine 
whether a person reacts aggressively to perceived harm. However, 
there is an exception to this general conclusion. Some of the chil­
dren with a low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness 
tended to retaliate less than would be expected on the basis of 
their naughtiness/anger judgments. The effects represented in Table 
5.5 imply that these were largely kindergarten- and grade 1 children 
and that they especially ignored the Avoidability dimension when 
judging retaliation. 
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Unfortunately, we can only speculate on the basis of anecdotal 
evidence about why these children gave relatively low retaliation 
judgments. As an example, one kindergarten-age child commented 
after judging retaliation: "Jesus does not allow that". This remark 
suggests that some children inhibited there retaliatory responses on 
the basis of the explicit teachings of adults, religion-based or other-
wise. Since older children are more likely than younger children to 
have learned that very few adults live up to such high moral stan-
dards themselves, an age-related decrease of a principled pacifist 
attitude towards retaliation might be expected. The fact that even 
the younger children exhibited such an attitude especially with 
respect to the Avoidability dimension and primarily when having a 
low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness, indicates that 
even their rejection of the Lex Talionis is context-dependent, rather 
than absolute. 
Experiment 2 
In experiment 2 we assessed whether children's interpretation of 
cvaluatively positive dimension information would be affected when 
the source of the account about the harmful event was subjective 
and possibly biased instead of objective and neutral. It was predicted 
that children in the subjective Account Source condition would give 
more negative interpretation- and aggression-related judgments of 
the stories containing cvaluatively positive information than children 
in the objective condition. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Twenty-four children (12 boys and 12 girls) from each of four 
grade levels participated in experiment 2. Grade levels were kinder-
garten (mean age 5 years 11 months), first grade (mean age 6 years 
11 months), second grade (mean age 7 years 11 months) and fifth 
grade (mean age 10 years 9 months). Half of the children in each 
grade received an objective account of the harmful events, while 
the remaining children received an account given by the perpetrator 
himself. For purposes of efficiency, data from experiment 1 were 
used for the objective account source condition. For the subjective 
account source condition additional children, from the same schools 
as the experiment 1 children, were tested. 
Account Source Manipulation 
As was described for experiment 1, children in the objective Account 
Source condition heard the personal responsibility stories read by 
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the experimenter. Children in the subjective Account Source condi­
tion, on the contrary, heard an audiotape on which, as children 
were led to believe, "the perpetrator himself' told what had hap­
pened. The text of the stories in the subjective and objective Ac­
count Source conditions was identical except that where "he" or the 
perpetrator's name was used in the objective condition "I" was used 
in the subjective condition. The audiotape for each story theme was 
read by one of two female adults who transformed their voices to 
sound as boyish as possible. No child expressed suspicions about the 
identity of the person on the tape. Furthermore, when asked to 
guess the actor's age, children usually mentioned an age-level that 
was near their own. However, since children's answers were not 
recorded systematically, this finding cannot be documented formally. 
Procedure and Dependent Measures 
The procedure and dependent measures were identical to those 
described for experiment 1, with two exceptions. First, in the sub­
jective account source condition the audiotape was played on which 
the presumed perpetrator told what had happened, while the ex­
perimenter opened the doors of the displayboard to show the rele­
vant illustrations. Second, before asking each of the three inter­
pretation questions, the actor's statement of the relevant informa­
tion was repeated, e.g. "— (perpetrator's name) said that he wanted 
to be nice. How nice did — (perpetrator's name) want to be in 
this story?" 
Results and Discussion 
Effects of Account Source on Dimension Interpretation and Use 
The hypothesis to be tested is that children take evaluatively posi­
tive information about how the perpetrator caused harm less serious­
ly when the perpetrator himself provides that information, than 
when an objective observer provides it. This should be true both 
for dimension interpretation and dimension use. To test this hypo­
thesis, children's interpretation (IDUP) and use (naughtiness/anger) 
ratings were analyzed in a 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Expectation) χ 2 
(Account Source) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 
(Avoidability) χ 2 (Measure = IDUP vs. naughtiness/anger) mixed-
design analysis of variance with the first three factors bctween-
subjects. Since only effects including Account Source provide infor­
mation relevant to the hypothesis being tested, we concentrated on 
these effects. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of 
Account Source F(l,80)=4.91, p<.05. This effect was qualified, how­
ever, in interactions of Account Source χ Motive Acceptability 
F(t,80)=4.43, p<.05. Expectation χ Account Source χ Intentionality χ 
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Motive Acceptability F(l,80)=4.59, p<.05, and Grade Level χ Account 
Source χ Avoidability χ Motive Acceptability χ Measure F(3,80) = 3.56, 
E < . 0 5 . 
To further examine the Expectation χ Account Source χ Inten-
tionality χ Motive Acceptability interaction, additional 2 (Account 
Source) χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) mixed-design 
analyses of variance were carried out for the combined IDUP and 
naughtiness/anger judgments for each Expectation condition separ­
ately. The means representing the overall interaction and significant 
effects including Account Source that resulted from the additional 
analyses are presented in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 
Means Representing the Expectation χ Account Source χ 
Intentionality χ Motive Acceptability Effect on Children's 
Combined IDUP and Naughtiness/Anger Ratings 
good motives1 bad motives analyses of 
unint. intent, unint. intent. variance2 
lew aggr. 
objective 1.97» 3.14e 4.42"= 5.30 f A S 
subjective 3.14b 3.75«1 4.40,5 5.18 f A S x M 8.38 
A S χ I 
A S x M x I -
high aggr. 
objective 2.77a 3.74 ь 4.50^ 5.42 f A S 7.84 
subjective 3.15 a 4.82 e 5.56e 6.17 e A S x M 
A S χ I 
A S x M x I 6.32 
1
 Superscripts reflect the results of Tukey's HSD test with Cichetty's 
(1972) extension. Within each Expectation condition means within columns and 
within rows that do not share identical superscripts differ significantly. How­
ever, within each row comparisons were only made between cells that differ 
in terms of only one dimension. 
1
 F's of the significant (2<·05) effects including Account Source that 
resulted from the 2 (Account Source) χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 (Motive Accep­
tability) mixed-design ANOVAs that were carried out for the low and high 
aggressiveness conditions separately. (AS-Account Source; I-Intentionality; 
M»Motive Acceptability). 
Looking first at the IDUP and naughtiness/anger ratings of 
children with a low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness 
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(see Table 5.6, upper panel), it can be seen that children in the 
subjective condition rated the good motive stories more negatively 
than children in the objective condition. In contrast, the bad motive 
stories were not rated significantly different in both account source 
conditions. These findings confirm our prediction that receiving a 
subjective instead of an objective account of the perpetrator's 
harmful behavior leads children towards taking the positive, but not 
the negative, information less seriously. 
When turning to the children with a high expectation of the 
perpetrator's aggressiveness, however, things look different. High 
expectation children who received a subjective rather than an objec­
tive account of the harmful event, gave higher ratings of all except 
the unintentional/good motive stories. Obviously, this effect cannot 
be interpreted in terms of disbelief of evaluatively positive informa­
tion, since Account Source had the greatest effect on children's 
ratings of the stories that contained evaluatively negative informa­
tion. Rather, for the high expectation children the fact that the 
perpetrator openly and shamelessly talked about his intention to 
cause harm and about his bad motives simply confirmed their already 
negative expectations. 
The fact that this effect was not qualified by Grade Level, 
might be taken to imply that in the subjective condition the low-
aggressiveness-expecting children of all agegroups inferred that the 
perpetrator gave a positively biased account of what happened. 
Such a conclusion may be premature, since there was also a sig­
nificant interaction that included both Account Source and Grade 
Level, i.e., Grade Level χ Account Source χ Avoidability χ Motive 
Acceptability χ Measure. However, since this five-way interaction 
reflects an extremely complicated pattern of judgments, any attempt 
at interpreting the means representing it is a hazardous enterprise. 
Therefore, in examining this interaction further, we attempted to 
simplify interpretation as much as possible by concentrating on the 
cells that are primarily important in light of our hypothesis, i.e., 
those containing the evaluatively positive (unavoidable/good motive) 
and the evaluatively negative (avoidable/bad motives) stories.-45 Ac­
cordingly, the means for these stories were further examined by 
carrying out additional 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Account Source) χ 2 
(Measure) mixed design analyses of variance for the positive and 
negative stories separately. Subsequently, comparisons among means 
were made using Tukey's HSD test. 
The additional analyses revealed, first, a significant main effect 
of Account Source (F(l,88) = 4.53, p<.05 for the positive, but not for 
s
 See, however, Appendix A for a table in which all the means 
representing the five-way interaction are presented. 
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the negative stories. Second, significant Grade Level χ Account 
Source interactions were found for both the positive (F(3,88)=3.11, 
2<.05) and the negative stories (F(3,88) = 5.22, p<.()5). Finally, a sig­
nificant Account Source χ Measure interaction was found for the 
negative, but not for the positive stories F(l,88) = 8.11, p<.05. 
We will first discuss the effects of Account Source and Grade 
Level χ Account Source and then return to the Account Source χ 
Measure interaction later on in the discussion. The means represent­
ing the effects mentioned first are presented in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 
Means Representing the Grade Level χ Account Source Interactions 
that Resulted from Examining the Unavoidable/Good Motive and the 
Avoidablc/Bad Motive Cells of the Grade Level χ Account Source χ 
Avoidability χ Motive Acceptability χ Measure interaction1 
good motives/ bad motives 
unavoidable2 avoidable3 
kindergarten 
grade 1 
grade 2 
grade 5 
all 
objective 
3.26 
1.92 
2.09 
2.28 
2.39 
subjective 
2.48 
2.90 
3.59 
2.93 
2.98 
objective 
5.96 
4.81 
5.45 
5.36 
5.40 
subjec 
5.22 
6.35 
5.69 
5.47 
5.68 
1
 A full table of the means representing the five-way interaction is 
presented in Appendix A. 
г
 According to Tukey's HSD test with Cichetty's (1972) extension, only 
the ratings of the grade 1 and grade 2 children differed significantly (p<.05) 
in the objective versus subjective conditions. 
3
 According to Tukey's HSD test with Cichetty's (1972) extension, only 
the ratings of the kindergarten and the grade 1 children differed significantly 
(p<.05) in the objective versus subjective conditions. 
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It can be seen that the main effect of Account Source on the 
unavoidable/good motive stories reflects children's general tendency 
to give higher ratings in the subjective than in the objective ac­
count source condition. Second, the effect of Account Source on 
children's judgments of the cvaluatively positive stories was not 
qualified by the Measure factor. When taken together, these findings 
are consistent with our hypothesis that children would disbelieve 
the cvaluatively positive information about the perpetrator's respon­
sibility in the subjective, but not in the objective account source 
condition. 
This relatively simple picture is complicated, however, by the 
significant Grade Level χ Account Source interactions. When inter­
preting these interactions, it should be kept in mind that, according 
to our hypothesis, ratings of the cvaluatively positive stories should 
be higher in the subjective than in the objective condition, whereas 
ratings of the evaluatively negative stories should be equally high 
in both conditions. 
Inspection of Table 5.7 reveals, however, that kindergarten-age 
children in the subjective condition generally gave lower ratings of 
both the positive and the negative stories than their agemates in the 
objective condition. Grade 1 children, in contrast, gave higher 
ratings of both the positive and the negative stories in the subjec­
tive condition than in the objective condition. For the grade 2 
children only the ratings of the positive stories were significantly 
higher in the subjective when compared to the objective condition, 
whereas those of the negative stories were not. The performance of 
grade 5 children was similar to that of grade 2 children, except 
that for grade 5 the subjective versus objective difference for the 
positive stories did not quite reach significance. 
Thus, the rating patterns of both younger groups are inconsistent 
with our hypothesis, whereas those of the older children are largely 
consistent with it. It is difficult to see why the kindergarten- and 
grade 1 children responded as they did. One could argue that the 
confrontation with the "real-life" perpetrator on the audiotape led 
kindergarten-age children in the subjective condition towards giving 
generally mild judgments. One could also argue that the fact that 
the perpetrator talked openly and shamelessly about his misdeeds 
led grade 1 children in the subjective condition towards giving 
relatively severe judgments. However, even though it might be 
possible to explain each of the kindergarten and grade 1 children's 
response patterns as such, it still remains a mystery why there is 
such a sharp transition between the subjective condition ratings of 
both youngest agegroups. 
Leaving aside the issue of how to interpret the youngest chil­
dren's performance, the fact that the older, but not the younger 
children did conform to some extent to our hypothesis, does make 
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sense when seen in the light previous research. To perform in a 
way that is consistent with our hypothesis, children in the subjec­
tive condition had to take into account the possibility that the 
perpetrator tried to give a favorable impression of himself. Children 
thus needed to have some idea about the psychological make-up of 
the perpetrator. That is, they needed to have a (possibly implicit) 
theory about another person's mind. Accordingly, our results can be 
seen in the light of recent findings on children's developing theories 
of mind. (See, for example, Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988). Our 
findings are consistent with this work in that they imply that the 
same developmental trend also exists in a previously unrcscarchcd 
domain, i.e., that of children's appreciation of excuse making. 
Even though the age trends that were found arc consistent with 
what could be expected on the basis of earlier research, the present 
study might nevertheless underestimate the younger children's abil­
ities. That is, experiment 2 may not have provided children with an 
optimal opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge about other 
people's use of impression management strategies. Specifically, the 
pictures that accompanied each story could be interpreted as provid­
ing objective information about the harmful event. Children may 
then have used the pictures to check the actor's account of the 
harmful event. The use of such a strategy would have led to a 
global confirmation of what the actor said, thus limiting the possible 
effect of the subjective Account Source condition considerably. 
Thus, in the present experiment the need to use material that 
children find attractive and interesting may have worked against 
creating an optimal opportunity for children to show that they had 
a theory about the perpetrator's mind. Consequently, it may be 
possible in future research to devise an experiment that shows 
much stronger effects of Account Source than were found here. 
Finally, we now return to the Account Source χ Measure effect 
on the avoidable/bad motive stories. The mean IDUP and naughti­
ness/anger ratings representing this interaction were for the objec­
tive versus the subjective account source condition 5.07 versus 5.70, 
and 5.71 versus 5.80, respectively. Thus, for these stories the IDUP 
scores were somewhat higher in the subjective- than in the objec­
tive condition, whereas the naughtiness/anger ratings were about 
equally high in both conditions. This interaction indicates that 
there was a (relatively minor) discrepancy between the children's 
interpretation judgments of the avoidable/bad motive stories and 
their naughtiness/anger judgments of these stories. 
As such, the interaction indicates that the support for our hypo­
thesis that Account Source would affect dimension interpretation 
and dimension use in similar ways is not without exceptions. How­
ever, what is remarkable about this interaction is not so much that 
it exists, but rather that it is the only example of an Account 
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Source χ Measure interaction in experiment 2. The lack of other 
effects of this type testifies to the general validity of the hypo­
thesis that Account Source would affect dimension interpretation 
and use in parallel ways. 
Effects of Account Source on Judginents of Retaliation 
Children's judgments of how they would retaliate against the per­
petrator were analyzed in a 4 (Grade Level) χ 2 (Expectation) χ 2 
(Account Source) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 
(Avoidability) mixed-design analysis of variance with the first three 
factors as the between-subjects factors. As before, the discussion 
will concentrate on significant effects which include Account Source. 
The only such effect was an interaction of Account Source χ 
Expectation χ Motive Acceptability, F(l,80) = 5.97, p<.05. To further 
examine this interaction, additional 2 (Account Source) χ 2 (Motive 
Acceptability) mixed-design analyses of variance were carried out 
for the low- and the high expectation conditions separately. The 
means representing the interaction and the significant effects that 
resulted from the additional analyses are presented in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 
Means Representing the Expectation χ Account Source χ Motive 
Acceptability Effect on Judgments of Retaliation. 
lav aggr. 
objective 
subjective 
high aggr. 
objective 
subjective 
good 
DDtives1 
2.44-
3.45b 
2.77° 
З ^ 
bad 
motives 
4.54е 
4.09«= 
4.37«= 
5.11d 
analyses of 
variance2 
AS 
AS xM 
AS 
AS xM 
10.98 
3.00: 
1
 Superscripts reflect the results of Tukey's HSD test with Cichetty's 
(1972) extension. Within each Expectation condition means within columns and 
within rows that do not share identical superscripts differ significantly. 
7
 F's for effects including Account Source (p<.05, unless indicated other­
wise) that resulted from the 2 (Account Source) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) 
mixed-design ANOVA's that were carried out for the low and high aggressive­
ness conditions separately. (AS-Account Source; M=Motive Acceptability). 
3
 E<.10. 
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As can be seen in Table 5.8, the pattern of childrcns' retaliation 
judgments resembles the pattern of their IDUP and naughliness/-
anger ratings that was presented in Table 5.6. That is, for children 
with a low expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness Account 
Source affected judgments of the good-, bul not of the bad motive 
stories. This finding is in line with our hypothesis that the subjec-
tive account source would lead children to disbelieve evaluatively 
positive information. For children with a negative expectation, in 
contrast, Account Source affected both the judgments of the good 
and of the bad motive stories. 
Unlike the findings in experiment 1, the effects of Account 
Source on children's retaliation judgments largely parallel those on 
their naughtiness/anger- and interpretation judgments. That is, 
virtually the same pattern of effects as was found for retaliation 
also appeared for interpretation and naughtiness/anger. These find-
ings are consistent with the hypothesis that Account Source affects 
how children interpret evaluatively positive information, and thereby 
also how much blame they assign to the perpetrator, how angry 
they get and how much they want to retaliate. 
General Discussion 
At a general level, our aim in carrying out experiments 1 and 2 
was to experimentally validate the distinction that was made in 
Chapter IV between the interpretation of responsibility information 
and the importance assigned to such information. The idea was that 
the Expectation manipulation would primarily affect dimension impor-
tance and that the Account Source manipulation would primarily 
affect dimension interpretation. Confirmation of these hypotheses 
would lend further credence to the validity of the interpretation 
versus importance distinction. 
Both experiments have been reasonably successful. Experiment 1 
demonstrated that Expectation affected the importance that children 
of at least some agegroups assigned to the Motive Acceptability 
dimension. In addition, experiment 2 demonstrated that Account 
Source affected dimension interpretation and dimension use in large-
ly similar ways. This is consistent with the hypothesis that Account 
Source affects the use of responsibility information through its 
effect on the interpretation of such information. 
These results raise the issue of what determines whether an 
external factor like Expectation or Account Source influences the 
interpretation or the importance of responsibility information. It 
appears that there may be a hierarchy of types of influence. If 
possible, an external factor will affect the interpretation of informa-
tion. Thus, if responsibility information is ambiguous or unclear, an 
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expectation will influence the interpretation of that information 
(see Dodge, 1980). Similarly, if there are reasons to doubt the truth 
of even clear and explicit information (e.g., as was the case in our 
subjective Account Source condition), the interpretation of that 
information will also be affected. If, however, there is no way in 
which the external factor can reasonably influence the interpretation 
of responsibility information, because the information is clear and 
explicit and its truth is beyond doubt (e.g., as was the case in 
experiment 1), the importance attached to that information will be 
affected. 
The fact that clarity and unambiguity of information are impor-
tant, might imply that whether interpretation or importance of 
information is affected also depends on age. A young child can be 
expected to form a less clear and explicit representation of the 
available information than an older child. Consequently, the younger 
child's interpretation of the information may be more open to exter-
nal influences than that of the older child. Future research can 
examine this idea further. 
Finally, it should be stressed that although the opcrationalization 
of the concept of importance that was developed in Chapter IV was 
to some extent experimentally validated in this chapter, it still has 
one severe limitation. Both in Chapter IV and in experiment 1 of 
this chapter the importance of a dimension is measured only in-
directly, in that it is operationally defined as the discrepancy bet-
ween dimension interpretation and dimension use. In future research 
this particular opcrationalization of importance should ideally be 
validated by asking subjects directly how important the dimension 
information is for making moral judgments (see Birnbaum & Stegner, 
1981). It might, however, be very difficult to use such a validation 
procedure with young children. 
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Appendix A, 
Means Representing the Grade Level χ Account Source (Objective 
vs. Subjective) χ Avoidability (Unavoidable vs. Avoidable) 
χ Motive Acceptability (Good vs. Bad) χ Measure (IDUP vs. 
Naughty/Angry) Interaction 
good motives/ 
unavoidable 
kindergarten 
grade 1 
grade 2 
grade 5 
good motives/ 
avoidable 
kindergarten 
grade 1 
grade 2 
grade 5 
bad motives/ 
unavoidable 
kindergarten 
grade 1 
grade 2 
grade 5 
bad motives/ 
avoidable 
kindergarten 
grade 1 
grade 2 
grade 5 
I D U P 
obj. 
3.19 
2.19 
2.24 
2.40 
4.00 
3.75 
3.32 
3.24 
4.65 
3.46 
4.10 
3.85 
5.58 
4.42 
5.07 
5.21 
subj. 
2.65 
3.11 
3.60 
2.94 
4.31 
4.56 
4.69 
4.06 
4.03 
4.81 
5.17 
4.74 
5.38 
6.21 
5.81 
5.39 
naughty/angry 
obj. 
3.33 
1.65 
1.94 
2.15 
3.83 
3.02 
3.08 
3.15 
5.13 
4.50 
5.33 
4.42 
6.33 
5.19 
5.83 
5.50 
subj. 
2.31 
2.69 
3.58 
2.91 
4.52 
5.17 
4.42 
3.90 
4.75 
5.35 
5.42 
4.98 
5.06 
6.48 
6.10 
5.54 
analyses of variance1 
effect 
AS 
G x A S 
Mx AS 
G x M x A S 
AS 
G x A S 
Mx AS 
G x M x A S 
AS 
G x A S 
Mx AS 
G x M x A S 
AS 
G x A S 
Mx AS 
G x M x A S 
F 
4.53 
3.11 
-
-
12.95 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5.22 
8.11 
-
Note - F's for the significant (p<.05) effects resulting from Ί (Grade) χ 
2 (Account Source) χ 2 (Measure) mixed-design AHOVAs on the judgments of 
stories representing each combination of Avoidability χ Motive Acceptability 
(AS-Account Source, G-Grade, M=Measure). 
94 
Chapter VI 
The Hierarchically-Nested versus Orthogonal Nature of 
Children's Conceptions of Responsibility 
A common element in the studies reported in Chapters III to V was 
that three dimensions of responsibility, i.e., Avoidability, Inten-
tionality, and Motive Acceptability were manipulated. The primary 
focus of the studies was on whether measures of interpretation, 
moral evaluation, anger and retaliation were similarly or differently 
affected by these dimensions and on whether contextual factors 
influenced the nature of the dimension's effects. Accordingly, little 
explicit attention was given to how the Avoidability, Intentionalily, 
and Motive Acceptability dimensions themselves were interrelated in 
children's judgments. Studying the interrelations (or the lack there­
of) among the three dimensions can potentially yield valuable infor­
mation about children's conceptions of responsibility. Therefore, in 
the present chapter, the judgments of all children who participated 
in one of the previously reported experiments will be reanalyzed in 
terms of how the three dimensions were interrelated. 
Both theorists (e.g., Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985) and researchers 
(e.g., Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Fincham, 1981) have distinguished at 
least five ways in which a person can be held responsible for harm 
that occurred. These five types of responsibility are usually treated 
as levels of a underlying continuum of responsibility and are label­
led: Association (a person Ρ is held responsible for harm that oc­
curred without having caused the harm); Accidental (P caused the 
harm, but unavoidably); foreseeable (P caused harm avoidably, but 
unintentionally); benevolent (P caused harm avoidably and intention­
ally, but with good motives) and malevolent (P caused harm avoidab­
ly, intentionally and with bad motives) (Fincham & Jaspars, 1979; 
Shullz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981; Shultz, Wright, & Schleifer, 1986). 
In some studies, the five levels of responsibility have been shown 
to form a Guttman type scale (Fincham & Jaspars, 1979; Fishbcin & 
Ajzen, 1973). In other studies it has been found, however, that the 
five levels are not always ordered in the same way. Specifically, 
reversals have been found for the unforeseeable versus benevolent 
levels (Ferguson & Rule, 1980; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; see also Shaver, 
1985, pp. 88-95). To account for such reversals, Ferguson and Rule 
(1983) proposed that the Heiderian-bascd levels of responsibility can 
belter be seen as reflecting a Hierarchically Nested (HN) structure 
of four dimensions of responsibility that can be differentially weigh­
ted, i.e., Causality, Avoidability, Intentionalily and Motive Accep­
tability. In this conception, the association level differs from the 
accidental, foreseeable, benevolent and malevolent levels in terms 
of Causality, the accidental level differs from the foreseeable, 
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benevolent, and malevolent levels in terms of Avoidabilily, the 
foreseeable level differs from the benevolent and malevolent levels 
in terms of Intcntionality and, finally, the benevolent versus malev-
olent levels differ in terms of Motive Acceptability. A graphical 
representation of this interpretation of the levels of responsibility 
is presented in Figure 6.1, excluding the association level. This 
level and the corresponding Causality factor will not be considered 
in the present analysis, because the investigations that were repor-
ted in Chapters III to V have focussed on situations in which it is 
clear that a perpetrator caused the harm. 
Avoidable? 
Bad Motives? 
yes 
Accidental Foreseeable Benevolent Malevolent 
Figure 6.1. Four levels of personal responsibility depicted as the 
hierarchical nesting of the Avoidability, Intentionality, and Motive 
Acceptability dimensions 
Representing the accidental, foreseeable, benevolent, and malev-
olent levels of responsibility as a HN structure makes clear that 
the use of only these four levels in research on children's concep-
tions of responsibility is based on the implicit assumption that 
children actually treat the Avoidabilily, Intentionality and Motive 
Acceptability dimensions as forming a hierarchically nested structure. 
Now, in the studies reported in Chapters III to V this assumption 
was not made. That is, the three dimensions of responsibility were 
manipulated as three independent factors, rather than as being 
hierarchically nested. Children were always presented with stories 
representing the eight orthogonal combinations of the three dimen-
sions, rather than with stories representing the four levels of res-
ponsibility that have traditionally been used in research on chil-
dren's conceptions of responsibility. In Figure 6.2 the HN structure 
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is depicted again, but now the additional distinctions that we made 
by manipulating the three dimensions orthogonally are also depicted. 
Avoidable? 
Intentional? 
no 
Bad Motives? Bad Motives? Bad Motives? Bad Motives? 
л л л л 
ηο
;
. yes no у . yes no/ '.yes no/ \yes 
na/ni/gm na/ni/bm na/i/gm na/i/bm a/ni/gm a/ni/bm a/i/gm a/i/bm 
Figure 6.2. The Avoidability, Intentionality, and Motive Acceptability dimen­
sions manipulated as orthogonal factors. Broken lines represent the distinctions 
that are theoretically "irrelevant" from the viewpoint of the Hierarchically 
Nested structure of responsibility, but that were nevertheless made in the 
present study. The eight stories that resulted from the orthogonal manipulation 
of the three dimensions are listed on the bottom line (na= not avoidable; 
a-avoidablej ni- not intentional; i-intentional; gm- good motives; bm- bad 
motives). 
The aim of the present study is to examine how children respon­
ded to the new distinctions that we made. Therefore, the judgments 
of all children who participated in one of the previously reported 
experiments will be reanalyzed in terms of how children evaluated 
the dimension-combinations that have traditionally not been incor­
porated in responsibility research. 
As is clear from inspection of Figure 6.2, we have presented 
information in several stories that is irrelevant for evaluating the 
perpetrator's responsibility, given the HN structure. For example, in 
the stories where the perpetrator could not avoid causing harm, 
children were also informed that he caused the harm cither uninten­
tionally (in the story in which a dog jumped on him) or intentionally 
(in the story in which his mother commanded him to cause harm). 
The HN structure implies that the perpetrator's intent to cause 
harm in the mother story does not add to his responsibility, because, 
even though the perpetrator's intentions were instrumental in caus-
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ing the harm, they did not originate in his free will. As was stated 
by Shaver (1985, p. 80) with respect to responsibility: "... an in-
dividual actor can be (correctly) held responsible only in inverse 
proportion to the amount of external coercion" and as was already 
staled by Seneca with respect to anger (Dutch translation by C. 
Verhoeven, 1983, p.102): "Iemand handelt op bevel: wie die niet 
onrechtvaardig is, zal boos worden op iets onvcrmijdclijks?". 
Similarly, in the unavoidable-and-unintentional, unavoidable-but-
intenlional, and avoidablc-but-unintentional stories additional infor-
mation was given about the perpetrator's motives in the context of 
causing the harm. That is, in the stories in which the perpetrator's 
harmful behavior was due to being jumped on by a dog, or to being 
commanded by his mother, or to his own carelessness, children 
were also informed about whether the perpetrator had good or bad 
motives in the context of the event where harm occurred. Using 
the HN structure it can be argued that this additional motive infor-
mation is, logically speaking, irrelevant, because the perpetrator's 
motives were not an element of the causal chain that led to the 
harmful outcome. Therefore, an "ideal observer" who assigns respon-
sibility in accordance with the HN structure, will not use the theo-
retically irrelevant Intentionality and Motive Acceptability informa-
tion that we presented in six of the eight stories. 
The purpose of the present study is to examine whether children 
actually behaved as ideal observers by not using information that 
was, according to the HN structure, irrelevant. There are reasons to 
doubt whether children would be ideal observers, especially when 
they arc young. For example, to ignore Intentionality in the case of 
unavoidablc-but-intentional harm, children have to discount some of 
the immediately visible and highly salient characteristics of the 
perpetrator's behavior (i.e., those conveying his intentions) on the 
basis of information about the situation in which that behavior 
occurred (conveying the unavoidability of his behavior). As has 
been demonstrated repeatedly in the area of emotion recognition 
(e.g., Wiggers & Van Lieshout, 1985; Hoffner & Badzinsky, 1989), 
children's tendency to discount immediately available behavioral 
(i.e., facial expressive) information on the basis of situational infor-
mation increases with age. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that 
older, but not the younger children will ignore the immediately 
available and salient, but theoretically irrelevant, Intentionality 
information when harm is caused unavoidably. In general, older 
children might be expected to belter appreciate the logic lhat the 
Intentionality dimension is irrelevant in the case of unavoidable 
harm and Motive Acceptability is irrelevant in the case of un-
avoidable and/or unintentional harm. That is, they might be expected 
to utilize the logic of the HN structure of responsibility more than 
younger children. 
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To examine the extent to which 5-to-15 year-old children's 
judgments conformed to the HN structure of responsibility, the data 
of the previous studies were partially reanalyzed to assess the 
inlcrdcpcndcncies among the Avoidability, Intcnlionality and Motive 
Acceptability dimensions. Since this study examines children's con-
ceptions of responsibility, our primary focus will be on the measure 
that most closely reflects children's assignment of responsibility, 
i.e., their naughtiness ratings. However, since it might argued that 
the concepts of naughty and bad motive overlap in meaning to 
some extent, any finding that Motive Acceptability affects children's 
naughtiness ratings might be tautological. The obvious way to ex-
amine this and related possibilities is to lest whether the results 
obtained for naughtiness can also be obtained for other respon-
sibility-related measures. Accordingly, the reanalysis of children's 
judgments will also be carried out for their ratings of anger. 
It should be stressed that the objective of the present study is 
to assess whether at least some children exhibited one particular 
pattern of dimension use, i.e., the pattern corresponding to the HN 
structure of responsibility. Thus, the study does not try to describe 
and to explain individual and age-related differences in dimension 
use per se. This would be impossible, since the four experiments 
differed in ways which are likely to affect dimension use. Nonethe-
less, the studies were similar in that the orthogonal combinations 
of the Avoidability, Intcnlionality and Motive Acceptability dimen-
sions were presented to children in each of them. Therefore, the 
question whether a child conformed to the HN structure of respon-
sibility can be addressed for each of the participants in each of 
the studies. 
Method 
Participants 
The naughtiness ratings of 260 children were used in the present 
study. Eighty of these children had participated in the experiment 
reported in Chapter III, 36 children participated in the experiment 
of Chapter IV and 144 children participated in the Chapter V ex-
periments. Children were divided across 6 grade levels, i.e., kinder-
garten (n = 64, mean age 5-10 years), grade 1 (n = 64, mean age 6-11 
years), grade 2 (n = 36, mean age 7-11 years), grade 3 (n = 28, mean 
age 9-0 years), grade 5 (n = 52, mean age 10-10 years) and grade 9 
(n = 16, mean age 15-2 years). There were equal numbers of boys and 
girls in each grade level. 
Since no anger judgments were given by the children who par-
ticipated in the study reported in Chapter IV, the reanalysis of the 
anger judgments included 224 children. Children were again divided 
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across 6 grade levels, i.e., kindergarten (n = 52, mean age 5-10 years), 
grade 1 (n = 52, mean age 6-11 years), grade 2 (n = 36, mean age 7-11 
years), grade 3 (n = 16, mean age 9-1 years), grade 5 (n = 52, mean 
age 10-10 years) and grade 9 (n=16, mean age 15-2 years). There 
were equal numbers of boys and girls in each grade level. 
Procedure 
Since all children participated in the four experiments that were 
reported in Chapters HI, IV and V, the reader is referred to these 
chapters for an overview of the materials and experimental proce-
dures that were used. 
Results and Discussion 
Scoring and Overview of Analyses 
Answering questions about the intcrdependencies among the three 
dimensions of responsibility requires dependent measures that indi-
cate which of the possible discriminations among the levels of the 
three dimensions were actually made by each individual child. There-
fore, we first determined for each dimension which pairs of stories 
differed from each other only in terms of that particular dimension. 
There were four such pairs for each of the three dimensions. For 
each of the 12 resulting story pairs it was determined whether the 
child's naughtiness and anger ratings of the evaluatively negative 
story did or did not exceed the same ratings of the evaluatively 
positive story by at least one scale point. If so, the child was 
considered to have appropriately discriminated between both stories 
of the pair and a discrimination score of 1 for that pair was as-
signed to the child; if not, a 0 was assigned. By treating all story 
pairs in this way, each child obtained a profile of ones and zeros 
for the 12 story pairs both for naughtiness and for anger, indicating 
which discriminations the child made for each measure. 
Inspection of these profiles revealed that there was no child 
where cither the naughtiness or the anger profile conformed com-
pletely to the HN structure of responsibility. The use of a more 
liberal criterion (i.e., one deviation from the ideal pattern allowed) 
did not lead to an improvement for naughtiness and to the iden-
tification of just one child whose anger ratings almost conformed 
to the HN structure. These findings make clear that virtually no 
child came even close to completely conforming to the HN structure 
when judging naughtiness and anger. It is nonetheless possible that 
the HN structure is used in at least some respects by at least some 
children. To examine this possibility, cluster analysis was used to 
sort children into groups that were more or less homogeneous with 
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respect to the naughtiness and anger discrimination score profiles. 
Each group's ratings were then examined using analysis of variance. 
The naughtiness- and anger discrimination scores for the twelve 
story pairs were used as the clustering variables in two separate 
cluster-analyses with individual children as the to-be-clustered cases. 
Using the 12 discrimination scores as the variables implies that the 
only aspect that influenced the resulting clusterings of children was 
whether a child did or did not make particular discriminations. Thus, 
neither the magnitude of the discriminations, nor the part of the 
response scale that children used to give their ratings influenced the 
results of the cluster analyses. The resulting clusters of children 
were further examined using analyses of variance on the original 
untransformed naughtiness and anger ratings. 
Naughtiness Judgments 
The cluster analysis (Ward's method) yielded six clusters of children. 
The clusters were examined in terms of their division across age 
groups, using a Chi square analysis. To obtain groups of older 
children that were about equally large as the kindergarten- and 
grade 1 groups (n = 64 for both groups), children in grades 2 (n = 36) 
and 3 (n = 28) were combined into one age group and the same was 
done for children in grades 5 (n = 52) and 9 (n = 16). Subsequently, a 
4 (Age group) χ 6 (Naughtiness Discrimination Cluster) Chi square 
analysis was carried out. This analysis yielded a significant Chi 
square of 62.93, 2<.001 (df=15), indicating that children in the four 
age groups were not evenly divided across the six Naughtiness 
Discrimination clusters. The number of children from each age 
group that was assigned to each of the six clusters is presented in 
the graphs of Figure 6.3. 
We next examined whether the clusters successfully identified 
groups of children with different patterns of dimension use. The 
original naughtiness ratings of the eight stories were analyzed in a 
6 (Naughtiness Discrimination Cluster) χ 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Inten-
tionality) χ 2 (Motive Acceptability) mixed-design analysis of vari­
ance with Naughtiness Discrimination Cluster as the only between-
subjccls factor. The results indicated that all main effects and 
interactions of Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive Acceptability 
were qualified significantly by Naughtiness Discrimination Cluster 
(all p's <.001). The cluster analysis thus successfully identified 
groups of children with different patterns of dimension use. 
To examine the nature of the differences between clusters, 
additional 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Intentionality) χ 2 (Motive Accep­
tability) analyses of variance were carried out separately for each 
of the six Naughtiness Discrimination Clusters. It should be realised 
that judgments which conform to the HN structure of responsibility 
should yield a specific pattern of significant effects in an ANOVA. 
101 
Mean Naughtiness Ratings and 
Proportions of Children from each 
Agegroup included in the Cluster 
Analyses of Variance 
Cluster 1 
Χ η 
kg : .17 (H) 
gl : .08 ( 5) 
g23 : .28 (18) 
g5? : .29 (20) 
N ' X 
Effect F ( l , 5 3 ) 
7 8 . 3 2 
8 . 7 8 
2 5 2 . 7 7 
1 2 . 1 3 
5 8 . 9 6 
χ M 
Cluster 2 
χ M 
F ( l , 3 4 ) 
1 4 2 . 1 9 
8 .04 
7 .64 
1 7 . 3 4 
Cluster 3 kg : .21 (13) 
gl : .24 (15) 
g23 : .11 ( 7) 
g59 : .07 ( 5) 
χ M 
F U , 3 9 ) 
2 3 . 9 6 
9 . 3 3 
8 .27 
3 2 . 5 7 
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2 4 . 2 9 
1 1 . 2 9 
ligure 6.3. Naughtiness ratings for each of the dimension-discrimination 
clusters. For each cluster group the rating scale is represented on the X axis 
and the levels of aggregation are represented on the Y axis (G- general mean 
score across all stones; A- mean scores for the unavoidable [broken line] 
versus avoidable [solid line] stories; I- mean scores for the unintentional 
[broken lines] versus intentional [solid lines] stories at each level of Avoidab­
ility; M- mean scores for acceptable motive [broken lines] versus unacceptable 
motive [solid lines] stories at each level of Avoidability χ Intentionality). The 
size of the angle between broken versus solid lines reflects the magnitude of 
a dimension effect. Note, that an angle consisting of a right-hand broken line 
and a left-hand solid line represents a reversal of the desired effect for the 
dimension. 
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Specifically, since the HN structure predicts that only the Avoidab-
ility dimension is used independently of both other dimensions, a 
significant main effect of Avoidabilily, but not necessarily of Intcn­
tionality and Motive Acceptability, is to be expected. Furthermore, 
the HN structure predicts that Intcntionality is only used in the 
case of avoidable harm. Therefore, a significant Avoidabilily χ 
Intcntionality interaction is also to be expected. Finally, since the 
HN structure predicts that Motive Acceptability is used only when 
harm is caused both avoidably and intentionally, a significant three-
way interaction of Avoidability χ Intcntionality χ Motive Accep­
tability can also be expected if children's ratings conform to this 
structure. It should, however, be noted that the significance of the 
predicted effects as such does not necessarily imply that children 
conform to the HN structure. Apart from being significant, the 
interactions should also have the specific form that is predicted. 
The results of the analyses, together with graphical representa­
tions of the ratings of children in each cluster, are presented in 
Figure 6.3. The discussion of Figure 6.3 will first concentrate on 
the relation between Intcntionality and Avoidability. As indicated by 
the lack of significant Avoidability χ Intcntionality interactions in 
the rating patterns of clustcrgroups 1, 3, and 6, Intcntionality use 
did not reliably depend on the level of Avoidabilily for these chil­
dren. Thus, the cluster 1, 3, and 6 children's use of Intcntionality 
did not conform to the HN structure. One of these patterns, i.e., 
that of cluster 6, occurred relatively often among the oldest, but 
not among the youngest children. This finding is surprising in the 
light of our prediction that children would increasingly conform to 
the logic of the HN structure when growing older. 
For cluster 2 children there was a significant Avoidability χ 
Intcntionality interaction, but since a significant Avoidability main 
effect was absent, this interaction cannot be interpreted as indicat­
ing that these children conformed to the HN structure. This leaves 
us with two clusters, i.e., Clusters 4 and 5, in which significant 
Avoidabilily χ Intcntionality interactions were obtained, indicating 
that for these children the use of Intcntionality did depend on the 
level of Avoidability. As can be seen in the graph that represents 
their ratings, Cluster 4 children used Intcntionality in the case of 
avoidable harm, but not in the case of unavoidable harm, while the 
reverse was true for cluster 5. The cluster 4 pattern, but not the 
cluster 5 pattern, is consistent with the HN structure of respon­
sibility, and the use of the cluster 4 pattern, but not of the cluster 
5 pattern, sharply increased with increasing age. This finding is 
consistent with our prediction that older children would conform 
more to the HN structure of responsibility than younger children. 
These findings indicate that a considerable number of the older, 
but not of the younger children used Inlenlionalily in accordance 
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with the HN structure of responsibility. However, even the older 
children who used Intentionalily in accordance with the HN struc­
ture (i.e., the cluster 4 children) were outnumbered by their age-
mates who used Intenlionality not only in the case of avoidable 
harm, but also in the case of unavoidable harm (i.e., clusters 1, 3, 
and 6). On the one hand, the sharp age-related increase in the use 
of the cluster 4 pattern docs provide some support for the hypo­
thesis that there is a developmental trend towards respecting the 
logic of the HN structure, according to which it is morally ir­
relevant if a perpetrator causes harm intentionally as long as she 
cannot avoid doing so. On the other hand, the fact that there was 
also an age-related increase in the use of Intenlionality both when 
the harm was caused avoidably and unavoidably, indicates that the 
hypothesized developmental trend is by no means universal. 
An inspection of the patterns of significant effects of children's 
use of Motive Acceptability in Figure 6.3 reveals that the main 
effect of Motive Acceptability reached significance in all cluster-
groups ratings. Assuming the use of the HN structure, this is a 
highly unexpected finding since this structure is based on the as­
sumption that only one of the four Motive Acceptability discrimina­
tions is made, i.e., the discrimination at the avoidable-and-intention-
al level of both other dimensions. This assumption renders a sig­
nificant main effect highly unlikely, although not impossible. Inspec­
tion of the Motive Acceptability discriminations in the graphs of 
children in clusters 1, 2, 4, and 6 reveals that these children used 
Motive Acceptability in each combination of Avoidability χ Inten­
lionality, which is quite unlike the pattern that was predicted by 
the HN structure. 
As can be seen when inspecting the Motive Acceptability dis­
criminations in the graphs of cluslergroups 3 and 5, these children's 
use of Motive Acceptability did depend to some extent on the levels 
of Avoidability and Intentionalily, but this dependency was quite 
unlike the dependency that was predicted by the HN structure. 
Specifically, cluster 3 children used Motive Acceptability most when 
harm was caused unavoidably-but-intcntionally or avoidably-but-
unintentionally. It seems as if these children only used Motive 
Acceptability to resolve the inconsistency that resulted when the 
level of Avoidability was evaluativcly inconsistent with the level of 
Intentionalily. Cluster 5 children made little use of Motive Accep­
tability when harm was caused avoidably-but-unintentionally, but 
they did use Motive Acceptability in all other cases. Both patterns 
are inconsistent with the HN structure. The assumption that the HN 
structure of responsibility guides children's use of information 
regarding Motive Acceptability when judging naughtiness is thus not 
supported by these data. Rather, most children used Motive Accep­
tability even when the harm was unavoidable and/or unintentional. 
105 
Mean Anger Rat ings and P r o p o r t i o n s 
of Chi ldren from each Agegroup 
Included in t h e C l u s t e r 
Analyses of Variance 
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Figure 6.A. Anger ratings for each of the dimension-discrimination clusters. 
For each cluster group the rating scale is represented on the X axis and the 
levels of aggregation are represented on the Y axis (G- general mean score 
across all stories; A- mean scores for the unavoidable [broken line] versus 
avoidable [solid line] stories; 1- mean scores for the unintentional [broken 
lines] versus intentional [solid lines] stories at each level of Avoidability; M-
mean scores for acceptable motive [broken lines] versus unacceptable motive 
[solid lines] stories at each level of Avoidability χ Intentionality). The size of 
the angle between broken versus solid lines reflects the magnitude of a dimen­
sion effect. Note, that an angle consisting of a right-hand broken line and a 
left-hand solid line represents a reversal of the desired effect for the dimen­
sion. 
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All things considered, the success of the HN structure in predict­
ing children's naughtiness judgments was only meager, in that only 
some of the older children used Intcntionality, but not Motive 
Acceptability, as was predicted. We will now examine children's 
judgments of anger to see whether the above findings are specific 
for the naughtiness measure. 
Anger Judgments 
The cluster analysis on children's anger discrimination scores (Ward's 
method) yielded acceptable solutions at more than one level of 
aggregation. To facilitate comparison between the results of the 
anger versus naughtiness cluster analyses, the six-cluster solution 
of the analysis on children's anger discrimination scores was chosen 
as the basis for further analysis. A 4 (Age group) χ 6 (Anger Dis­
crimination Cluster) Chi square analysis with the same age groups 
as used for naughtiness, revealed that children from different age 
groups were not evenly divided across the clustergroups, Chi square 
= 39.60 (df=15), p<.001. The proportions of children from each age 
group that were assigned to each of the six clusters are presented 
in the graphs of Figure 6.4. 
We again examined whether this analysis was successful in iden­
tifying groups of children with different patterns of dimension use. 
A 6 (Anger Discrimination Cluster) χ 2 (Avoidability) χ 2 (Intcn­
tionality) x 2 (Motive Acceptability) mixed-design analysis of vari­
ance with Anger Discrimination Cluster as the only betwecn-subjects 
factor indicated again that all main effects and interactions of 
Avoidability, Intcntionality and Motive Acceptability were qualified 
significantly by Anger Discrimination Cluster (all p's <.001). Thus, 
the cluster analysis was again successful in identifying groups of 
children with different patterns of dimension use. 
The results of six separate Avoidability χ Intcntionality χ Motive 
Acceptability fully wilhin-subjects ANOVA's for each Anger Dis­
crimination cluster, together with graphical representations of each 
clustergroup's pattern of dimension use, are presented in Figure 6.4. 
As before, the discussion will first concentrate on the intcr-
dependency of Avoidability and Intcntionality. As indicated by the 
lack of significant Avoidability χ Intcntionality interactions in the 
rating patterns of cluster 3 and 6 children, these children's use of 
Intcntionality did not depend on the level of Avoidability in a 
statistically reliable way. For cluster 3 children, this is likely to be 
due to the fact that Intcntionality did not affect their ratings at 
all. The cluster 6 children, in contrast, clearly used Intcntionality 
both when the harm was caused avoidably and when it was caused 
unavoidably. This pattern of Intentionality use increased with in­
creasing age. 
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There were significant Avoidability χ Intcntionalily interactions 
in the ratings of children in clusters 1, 2, 4, and 5, indicating that 
for these children the use of Intcntionalily did depend on the level 
of Avoidability. Inspection of the graphs reveals that children in 
clusters 1 and 5 used Inlentionality more when harm was unavoidable 
than when it was avoidable, thus reflecting a dependency among 
both dimensions that is the reverse of what would be predicted on 
the basis of the HN structure. The cluster 2 and 4 children, in 
contrast, used Inlentionality less when the harm was unavoidable 
than when it was avoidable, indicating that these children used 
Intcntionalily in a way which conforms to the HN structure. Since 
the use of Avoidability and Intcntionalily by cluster 2 children was 
rather weak in the first place, the rating pattern of cluster 4 chil­
dren best exemplifies the dependency that was predicted by the HN 
structure. Furthermore, the use of the cluster 4 pattern increased 
with age. 
As was found for naughtiness, the main effect of Motive Accep­
tability reached significance for the anger ratings of each cluster. 
Furthermore, inspection of the Motive Acceptability discriminations 
in the graphs of Figure 6.4 reveals that Motive Acceptability use 
was not restricted to the case of avoidablc-and-intenlional harm in 
any of the clusters. This was true even though the magnitude of 
the Motive Acceptability discriminations varied for most clusters 
depending to some extent on the levels of Avoidability and Inlen­
tionality. Taken together, these findings indicate that the assump­
tions of the HN structure concerning Motive Acceptability use were 
violated in the anger judgments of children in all clusters. 
Two conclusions can be made on the basis of the analyses of 
children's judgments of anger. First, with respect to the use of 
Intcntionalily, the older that children were, the more they chose 
either for conformance to the HN structure (see cluster 4) or for 
using Inlentionality independently of Avoidability (see cluster 6). 
Second, Motive Acceptability affected children's judgments not only 
in the case of avoidable-and-intentional harm, but also when the 
harm was caused unavoidably and/or unintentionally. Both con­
clusions are consistent with those for naughtiness and thus do not 
support a claim that the naughtiness results were due to specific 
characteristics of that particular measure. 
General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine whether children would base 
their judgments of a perpetrator's harmful behavior on the Hierar­
chically Nested structure of responsibility that has traditionally 
been assumed to underlie moral judgments. In answering this ques-
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lion, a distinction should be made between children's use of the 
Intentionality dimension versus their use of the Motive Acceptability 
dimension. 
With respect to Intentionality use, there appeared to be differen­
ces among children. Both cluster analyses revealed a group of chil­
dren who made their in accordance with the HN structure by not 
taking Intentionality into account when the perpetrator could not 
avoid causing harm intentionally (i.e., Naughtiness Cluster 4 and 
Anger Cluster 4). These clusters consisted mainly of older children, 
which is consistent with our hypothesis that older children would 
respect the HN structure more than younger children. However, 
there were also clusters of children who used Intentionality regard­
less of the level of Avoidability (i.e., Naughtiness Cluster 6 and 
Anger Cluster 6). As was true for the cluster that best represented 
the HN structure (i.e., Cluster 4), the use of the Cluster 6 pattern 
also increased with age. Taken together, these findings indicate 
that with respect to the AvoidabilityДntenlionality relation, the 
hypothesis of an age-related increase in the use of the HN structure 
did not receive unequivocal support. 
It seems as if the older children differ from each other in terms 
of whether they consider it to be morally reprehensible and anger-
provoking if a perpetrator actively causes harm after being com­
manded to so by some higher authority. This state of affairs is 
probably not unlike the situation in society at large. Actually, the 
issue of how blameworthy the perpetrator is in the case of "un­
avoidable-intent" (operationali/ed in our stories as being commanded 
by mother or father to cause harm), is in one respect similar to 
the issue of how responsible low-ranking members of a hierarchical 
organization are for the crimes that they commit while obeying the 
orders of their superiors1. In the post-war Nlrnberg trials some of 
the Nazi-Germany war-criminals denied responsibility for their 
crimes by stating: "Befehl ist Befehl" in order to stress that they 
could not have acted otherwise. In many cases this claim was rejec­
ted by the court, but it is important to realize that this rejection 
did not imply a rejection of the principle that unavoidable-intent is 
not blameworthy. Rather, it was argued that just receiving a com-
1
 It should be noted that this comparison is in no way meant to imply 
that the behavior of parents and children in our stories is in some sense 
similar to the behavior of war-criminals and their superiors in Nazi-Germany. 
The point to be made here is only that the way in which evaluators attribute 
responsibility depends in both cases on whether they consider the principle of 
the lack of blameworthiness of unavoidable-intent to be relevant in each 
situation. 
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mand is not enough to make an act unavoidable, because ways 
could have been found to not obey it. 
The above example implies that in society at large, and possibly 
also among our respondents, it is not the principle of the lack of 
blameworthiness of unavoidable-intent itself, that is at stake. 
Rather, it might be that children differed in terms of the extent to 
which they actually considered it to be unavoidable for the per-
petrator to ruin the castle. After all, the perpetrator could have 
tried to argue against his mother, or he could even have refused to 
obey the command. Especially for the older children the latter 
possibility might have appeared a real option. In general, observers 
lend to believe that they themselves would not have obeyed a 
command to cause harm, even though an overwhelming majority of 
people actually does obey such commands in experimental situations 
(Mceus & Raaijmakers, 1984; Milgram, 1965). Even when an actor is 
brought in an experimental situation that has been designed so that 
there really is no choice but to cause harm, observers still are very 
reluctant to accept the unavoidability of the actor's behavior (Jones 
& McGillis, 1976; see Ferguson & Rule, 1983). Thus, at least some 
of our subjects might simply not have believed that it was un-
avoidable for the actor to ruin the other boy's castle. Such in-
dividual differences in the interpretation of the Avoidability infor-
mation would then have resulted in individual differences in the use 
of Intentionalily information in the case of unavoidable harm. 
Since in some of the studies the respondents actually rated how 
avoidable it was for the perpetrator to cause the harm, the validity 
of this explanation can be tested empirically. The avoidability ratings 
of the unavoidable-intent stories of children in Naughtiness clusters 
1, 3, 5 and 6 (who took Intentionalily into account even when 
causing harm was unavoidable), were contrasted with the ratings of 
children in cluster 4 (who did not take the perpetrator's un-
avoidable-intent into account). If the above reasoning is valid, the 
first group should judge the harm to be more avoidable than the 
second group. The analysis was carried out separately for both the 
good and the bad motive story conveying unavoidable-intent. Results 
for the good motive story indicated that children who did use the 
unavoidable-intent information considered the harm to be more 
avoidable than children not using that information (F(l)122)=7.86, 
p<.01. (means 2.80 vs. 1.59). For the bad motive story no significant 
differences were found (means 3.37 vs. 3.17). Similar results were 
obtained when a division among children was made on the basis of 
their use of unavoidable-intent when judging anger. 
These findings imply that if children did not conform to the HN 
structure in their use of Intentionalily, this might well be due to 
how they interpreted the information regarding the unavoidability 
of intentionally causing harm. Children who interpreted the parent's 
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command as implying that the causation of harm was unavoidable 
(which was how we intended it to be understood) subsequently did 
not use the Intcntionality information. In contrast, children who 
were less convinced that the command implied the unavoidabilily of 
harm, did base their judgments on the perpetrator's intentions to 
cause harm. 
Turning now to children's use of Motive Acceptability, it was 
clear that their use of this dimension was generally not in accor-
dance with the HN structure of responsibility. Apparently, most 
children considered information about the perpetrator's motives to 
be relevant for their naughtiness and anger judgments, even when 
causing the harm did not originate directly from these motives. 
This finding is not as surprising as it might seem if one considers 
the nature of the Motive Acceptability information. In those cases 
where the perpetrator had bad motives in the context of causing 
harm unintentionally and/or unavoidably, children could have reason-
ed that the fact that the harm did not directly originate from the 
perpetrator's bad motives was irrelevant. That is, if the perpetrator 
had not been interrupted when acting according to his bad motives 
(i.e., by the dog, the mother or the father), he would have caused 
harm anyway. When staled in more general terms: Being informed 
that a person has bad motives elicits the inference that the tenden-
cy to cause harm is a stable characteristic of that person's per-
sonality. This inference is in itself a sufficient basis for giving 
negative moral judgments. Such negative judgments may be softened 
upon hearing that the perpetrator could not avoid and/or did not 
intend to cause the harm, but the latter information is by no means 
sufficient to undo the effect of the negative personality inference. 
The answer to the question of whether children used the HN 
structure of responsibility when giving moral- and anger-related 
judgments is a conditional "yes" with respect to Inlentionality use, 
and an unequivocal "no" with respect to Motive Acceptability use. 
That is, children who interpreted the harm in our unavoidable-intent 
stories as being really unavoidable (as did a considerable number of 
children from age 11 and older) actually used Intcntionality in 
accordance with the HN structure. That the remaining children did 
not use the HN structure is more likely to be due to their inter-
pretation that the harm in our unavoidable-intent stories was not 
really unavoidable, than to their ignorance of the moral principle 
implied in the HN structure that unavoidable-intent is not blamewor-
thy. Motive Acceptability, in contrast, was used in complete dis-
agreement with the HN structure, in that it affected the judgments 
of children of all age groups at any level of Avoidability and Intcn-
tionality. 
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Chapter VII 
Cognitive Requirements of the Quantitative Rating Scale 
Methodology in Moral Developmental Research1 
Several methods have been used in research designed to assess the 
cognitive processes that underlie children's social behavior. Among 
these are: structured interviews, paired comparison methodologies, 
and, as with the studies reported in the previous chapters, judg-
ments of individual stimuli on quantitative rating scales. The results 
obtained with any of these methods necessarily reflect not only the 
social-cognitive processes that the method is meant to assess, but 
also children's abilily to deal with the requirements of each method. 
For example, children's answers to open-ended questions reflect not 
only their ideas about the topic under investigation, but also their 
ability to express such ideas verbally. Similarly, in the area of 
moral judgment research, the use of the Piaget's (1932/1977) paired 
comparison methodology has been criticized, because it requires 
children to attend to two stimuli at the same time (Berg-Cross, 
1975; Grueneich, 1982a). Young children's poor performance on 
Piagetian paired comparison tasks has therefore been explained in 
terms of their difficulties in mastering the requirements of the 
paired comparison method rather than their failure to use certain 
moral criteria. Considerably less attention has been paid to the 
demands that the method used in the present series of studies (i.e., 
making judgments of individual stimuli on a quantitative rating 
scale) places on its users. The rating method has nevertheless been 
praised in the moral judgment literature because it is presumably 
more sensitive than both the structured interview and the Piagetian 
paired comparison methodology (Berg-Cross, 1975; Grueneich, 1982a; 
Helkama & Scppancn, 1987). 
The aim of the present study is to examine the demands that the 
individual rating methodology places on the rater and thereby to 
facilitate the interpretation of data that are collected using this 
method. We will first theoretically analyze the method in terms of 
its method-inherent requirements. Predictions that can be derived 
from this analysis will then be tested experimentally. 
1
 The text of this chapter is a preliminary version of a manuscript that 
will be submitted for publication. The ms. was authored by Tjeert 01thof, 
Tamara J. Ferguson and Toon Gillessen. The research reported was the 
masters thesis project of the third author, who was supervised by the first 
and the second author (see Cillessen, 1985). 
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Any method for assessing a respondent's use of a manipulated 
dimension, including the individual rating method, imposes at least 
two requirements on respondents. First, in order to make appropriate 
distinctions between different levels of manipulated dimensions, the 
respondent must be able to discriminate between the levels of the 
manipulated dimension. If he or she is unable to do this, these levels 
will obviously not be distinguished regardless of the method that is 
used. Second, the respondent must consider the manipulated dimen­
sion to be of some importance for the response dimension. If a 
respondent is perfectly able to discriminate among the manipulated 
levels of a dimension, but considers the distinction of no importance 
for the response dimension, she will not discriminate between the 
manipulated levels. Children's failure to use a particular manipulated 
dimension in their judgments usually has been interpreted in terms 
of their failure to fulfill one or both of these two conditions in 
research on moral development, even though the two conditions 
have not been appropriately distinguished from one another in this 
literature (cf. Grueneich, 1982a; Scdlak, 1979). 
There is, however, a third precondition for successful perfor­
mance that is specific for the individual rating method. An analogy 
from a different domain might clarify this. Imagine an experiment 
in which the respondents have to determine the height of each of 
two persons A and B, with the criterion for success being that the 
taller person has to be assigned the greater height. Successful 
performance in this task would be greatly enhanced if respondents 
could use some device against which to compare the height of A 
and the height of В (e.g., a yardstick). Such a device provides the 
respondent with a common frame of reference for determining the 
height of A and of B. 
Similarly, successful performance in an individual rating task 
would be greatly enhanced if the ratings of different stimuli would 
have a common frame of reference. Since no physical devices are 
available that can be used to establish this for the dimensions 
underlying moral judgments, a psychological alternative for such a 
device is needed. In our view, this alternative is a particular type 
of representation of both the manipulated dimension and of the 
response dimension, i.e., one that includes clearly defined instances 
of the theoretical endpoints of these dimensions. Only such repres­
entations are stable enough to serve as a common frame of refer­
ence during the process of judging all of the experimental stimuli. 
If such a common frame of reference is available, the judgments of 
different stimuli are directly comparable to each other and reliable 
discriminations among stimuli can be made. 
In our view, not having stable representations of the manipulated 
dimension and of the response dimension can limit children's perfor­
mance in a rating task even when they are able to distinguish 
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between the levels of the manipulated dimension and even when 
they consider this dimension to be relevant for the response dimen­
sion. This can most easily be seen in the case when the manipulated 
dimension is the same as the response dimension. For example, 
consider an experiment in which children have to judge two manipu­
lated levels of Intentionality2 in terms of perceived intentionality. 
Assuming that children are able to distinguish between the two 
levels of Intentionality (condition 1) and that they consider the 
Intentionality manipulation to be important for judging intentionality 
(condition 2), they also must have a stable representation of the 
Intentionality dimension (condition 3). That is, children must be 
able to use the endpoints of the dimension (i.e., unintentional and 
intentional) as the anchor points against which to evaluate each of 
the to-be-judged instances. Subsequently, estimates of the distances 
between the to-be-judged instances and the dimension's end points 
have to be "translated" in terms of the actual η-point range of the 
scale on which the ratings have to be made. Thus, while condition 
1 only assumes the ability to relate the two manipulated levels to 
each other, condition 3 assumes the ability to relate each instance 
to the theoretical endpoints of the Intentionality dimension. 
Our analysis implies that making appropriate discriminations in a 
individual rating task requires a thorough understanding of the 
dimensions involved. Furthermore, the analysis implies that a less 
sophisticated level of mastery also exists, i.e., one in which the 
respondent has some understanding of the manipulated dimension 
and the response dimension and of the relation between the two 
(conditions 1 and 2), without yet having stable representations of 
those dimensions. In this case, the respondent would be expected to 
perform well on a task in which only the appropriate distinction 
between the levels of the manipulated dimension has to be made. 
The paired-comparison task, that has been so widely criticized in 
the area of moral judgment (e.g., Berg-Cross, 1975; Grueneich, 
1982a), would thus be a task that is ideally suited to our imaginary 
respondent's abilities. 
2
 In Chapters IV, V and VII a distinction is made between manipulated 
dimensions of responsibility and the corresponding subjective response dimen­
sions in terms of which the respondents interpret the responsibility informa­
tion. To indicate typographically whether reference is made to a manipulated 
dimension or to the corresponding subjective dimension, capitals will be used 
in the former and lower case characters in the latter case. (For example, 
"Intentionality" refers to the dimension as manipulated and "intentionality" to 
the subjective dimension that underlies children's estimates of the extent to 
which a perpetrator caused harm intentionally.) 
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The example of determining height can again clarify this. Suppose 
that our respondent does not have a device that can be used to 
establish a common frame of reference against which the heights of 
persons A and В can be compared. Obviously, it would be rather 
difficult to perform successfully under these conditions. However, if, 
in a different trial, persons A and В were simultaneously present, 
our respondent could perform successfully simply by comparing A 
and В directly to each other. To do this, the respondent would only 
need to have some idea of what the concept of height means. 
How, then, can wc explain the findings of Berg-Cross (1975), 
Grueneich (1982b) and Helkama and Seppanen (1987) that children 
perform worse on the paired comparison when compared to the 
rating task? In our view, these findings are not due to inherent 
differences between the paired-comparison versus rating tasks per 
se, but to differences in the complexity of the content material 
that was used in both tasks. Specifically, in the classic Piagetian 
paired comparison task that was used by Berg-Cross and Grueneich, 
children had to indicate whether the actor in a low-in-
tent/sevcre-outcome story was more or less naughty than an actor 
in a high-intenl/mild-oulcome story. Thus, the Intentionality and 
Outcome Severity dimensions were varied simultaneously in such a 
way that they contradicted each other. In this type of task, children 
can only show Intentionality use if they let the Intentionality dif­
ferences between the stories override the Outcome Severity differen­
ces. 
The situation is different with rating tasks in which two or more 
dimensions are manipulated. Usually, ratings are analyzed in an 
ANOVA with the manipulated dimensions as within-subject factors. 
In such an analysis, a significant Intentionality effect (indicating 
Intentionality use) occurs when the perpetrator in a high intent 
story is assigned higher ratings than the actor in a low-intent 
story, all other things being equal. Thus, in the Piagetian paired 
comparison task, Intentionality has to override the contrary effect 
of Outcome Severity. In contrast, in the rating task, Intentionality 
has to have its effect when other factors remain constant. This 
difference in complexity between the paired comparison versus 
rating methodologies, as they have been used in moral developmental 
research, may be the cause of the apparent superior sensitivity of 
the rating methodology rather than any inherent characteristic of 
these methods. 
To test these ideas, wc asked 36 5-to-8 year-old children to 
judge stories in which a perpetrator damaged someone else's proper­
ty. Children made three types of judgments that differed in terms 
of the extent to which constant representations of the manipulated 
dimension and the response dimension were required to perform 
successfully. 
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First, the individual rating (IR) method was used. That is, chil-
dren judged several individual stories on a 7-point quantitative 
rating scale. The stories varied in terms of whether one of three 
dimensions of responsibility was the to-be-judged manipulated dimen-
sion (further designated as the "target dimension"). The three dimen-
sions that were manipulated have been shown to affect children's 
moral judgments and can be labelled Avoidabilily (could the actor 
have avoided causing the negative outcome?), Intentionality (was 
the actor trying to produce the negative outcome?), and Motive 
Acceptability (were the actor's motives, in the context of producing 
the negative outcome, good or bad?). 
Second, in addition to completing the IR task, children also 
completed a paired comparison (PC) task in which they compared 
both levels of each of the target dimensions directly to one another. 
According to the reasoning presented above, children should perform 
better in the PC task than in the IR task if both tasks are of equal 
complexity. 
Third, a task was included that was similar to the IR task in 
that it did involve giving quantitative ratings of individual stories, 
but was the intermediate of the IR and PC methods in terms of the 
extent to which successful performance requires a stable representa-
tion of the target dimension as well as of the response dimension. 
Specifically, immediately after making a choice in a paired com-
parison trial, children were asked to rate each of the stories in 
that trial individually on the 7-point rating scale used in the IR 
task. In this pairwise rating (PR) task, children still had to use 
their representation of the target dimension as a frame of reference 
for rating the first story of the pair, but not necessarily for rating 
the second story of the pair. That is, because of the short time 
span between both ratings, the first rating can be expected to 
serve as a point of reference for the second. If this reasoning is 
valid, the PR task can be expected to be of intermediate difficulty 
when compared to the IR and PC tasks. 
For each of the IR, PC, and PR tasks, children judged each 
story/story pair in terms of their understanding of the target dimen-
sion itself (e.g., in the cases that Intentionality was the target 
dimension, they made judgments in terms of how much the actor 
had tried to damage the property on purpose). We considered judg-
ments in terms of understanding of the target dimension itself, 
rather than, for example, in terms of naughtiness, to be the most 
pure test of our hypotheses for two reasons. 
First, for judgments in terms of understanding, the response 
dimension is by definition identical to the target dimension. Thus, 
for these judgments, but not for any other type of judgments, it is 
necessarily true that the target dimension is important (condition 2, 
see above) for the response dimension. Therefore, interindividual 
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differences in the assignment of importance to the target dimension 
can be expected to not affect understanding judgments, but would 
form a nuisance factor for any other type of judgment. 
Second, since we assume that children need a stable representa-
tion of the target dimension and of the response dimension to 
perform well in the IR task, the interpretation of the data is most 
straightforward when both dimensions are identical (as is true for 
understanding judgments), rather than different (as would be true 
for any other type of judgment). 
Our purpose was to assess the effects of using the IR versus PR 
versus PC tasks on children's performance independently of the 
effects of using differentially complex stimulus material. Therefore, 
the hypothesis concerning performance differences between tasks 
was tested for three sets of stories that differed from each other 
in terms of the level of content complexity, i.e., in terms of 
whether and how information about the non-target dimensions was 
presented. At the "simple" level only information about the target 
dimension was presented. Thus, at the simple level of complexity, 
there were two stories that reflected only the two levels of Avoid-
ability (i.e., avoidable vs. unavoidable), two additional stories reflec-
ted only the two levels of Intentionality (unintentional vs. intention-
al), and two other stories reflected only the two levels of Motive 
Acceptability (good vs. bad motives). At the middle level of com-
plexity (further called "complex"), information about the target and 
the non-target dimensions was present in each story, but the non-
target information was kept constant across the stories representing 
the "high" and "low" levels of the target dimension. Finally, at the 
most complex level ("very complex") the levels of the non-target 
dimensions that were presented were cvaluatively opposed to the 
level of the target dimension that was presented. For example, in 
one of the two stories in which Avoidability was the target dimen-
sion, information that the harm was unavoidable was accompanied 
by information revealing that the harm was caused intentionally and 
in the context of bad motives. In the second story information that 
the harm was caused avoidably was accompanied by information 
revealing that it was also caused unintentionally and in the context 
of good motives. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Twelve children (6 boys, 6 girls) from each of the grades kindergar-
ten (M = 5.11, range 5.4 to 6.3), first grade (M = 6.11, range 6.6 to 7.1) 
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and third grade (M = 8.10, range 8.1 to 10.2) participated3. The chil-
dren came from lower- and middle-class backgrounds. 
The belwccn-subjects factor Grade (kindergarten, first, third) 
and within-subjects factors Task (Paired Comparisons, Pairwise 
Ratings, Individual Ratings), Complexity (Simple, Complex, Very 
Complex) and Dimension (Avoidabilily, Intcntionality, Motive Accep-
tability) were combined to form a 3x3x3x3 mixed factorial design 
for children's judgments. 
Several factors were counterbalanced to reduce their influence 
on the results. These factors were: the order in which the three 
dimensions were presented within the complex and very complex 
stimulus stories, the left- or right-hand position of the stimulus 
stories for the paired comparison and pairwise rating tasks, the 
combination of tasks with stimulus story themes and the order in 
which the Paired Comparison + Pairwise Rating versus Individual 
Rating Tasks, combined with the three levels of complexity, were 
presented. 
Materials 
For each of two themes, eight stimulus stories were composed 
consisting of the factorial combination of the two levels of each of 
the dimensions Avoidability, Motive Acceptability and Intcntionality. 
In each story, one boy (the transgressor) damaged another boy's 
(the victim's) property. In the "castle" theme, Henk ruined Wim's 
castle and, in the "robot" theme, Klaas broke Piet's robot. Each 
story began with an introduction of the two characters, what they 
were doing, and what happened to the victim's property (see Table 
7.1). In each story, information was then given about the events 
that led to the property being damaged, including the transgressor's 
motives, his ability to avoid the property damage, and intentions to 
produce the damage. 
Each story was presented orally and was accompanied by nine 
cartoon-like illustrations designed to clarify the text. The illustra-
tions were presented in an upright wooden box (12x40cm). Four 
introduction illustrations were visible throughout the story presenta-
tion. The five remaining illustrations were hidden behind doors 
which could be opened to reveal them at the text-appropriate time. 
Three of the five remaining illustrations depicted Motive Accep-
3
 These children also participated in the experiment that was reported in 
Chapter IV (see footnote 1 of Chapter IV). Some of the measures that were 
used in the Chapter IV study (i.e., children's interpretation ratings) are used 
here to represent six cells of the 3x3x3 design (i.e., the complex and very 
complex levels of the Individual Rating method for each dimension). 
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Table 71 
Stones Used lo Represent the Eight Motive Acceptability χ 
Intcntionalily χ Avoidability Combinations 
for the Castle Theme 
All stones were preceded by the following mlroduclion This is a siorv about (wo 
bovs, Harry and Wim (1)" Look, here you can sec thai Wim has built a castle made 
out of blocks It's a reallv pretty castle, but it's not finished yet (2) Now, Wim has lo 
go home lo eat his lunch (3) When Wim comes back from eating his lunch, he brings 
some other boys with hun so that ihcy can see his pretty casi le But, what has 
happened0 Wun's castle is completely ruined, and Налу is the one who ruined it' (4) 
And, now I m going to tell you how that happened' 
Good MotivafUnavoidabícfUninUnuonal 
[AM]b Harry saw Wim s castle and he 
thought "Wim would really like it if 1 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
castle, so that hts castle can get even 
bigger" Harry wanted to help Wim Harry 
wanted to do something that Wim would 
like Harry wanted to be nice (5) Then, 
Harry walked over to Wun's castle (6) 
[UA] But, then, suddenly, a great big 
strong dog came and be jumped up against 
Harry really hard, so that Harry couldn t 
$іал standing up Harrv couldn't help it, 
it was the dogs fault (7) 
[HI] Harrv fell He irti right on top of 
\λ un s castle and the castle was completely 
ruined (8) Harry *a* vcrv shocked when 
he saw the ruined castle, since it was an 
accident and he didn t mean it (9) 
Good motives IAvotdablelUnwtennoruji* 
[AM] Harrv saw Wims castle and he 
thought "Wim would really like it if 1 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
castle so that his castle can get even 
bigger' Harry wanted to help Wim Harry 
wanted lo do somcthmg that Wim would 
like Harry wanted to be nice (5) Then, 
Harry walked over to Wims castle (6) 
[A] But, then, Harry was walking too fast, 
he was not paying any attention to where 
he was walking or where he put his feet 
down and he walked right into Wun's 
castle So, Harry could help it He 
could'vc paid more attention (14) 
[UI] Harry fell He fell nghl on top of 
Wun's castle and the castle was completely 
ruined (8) Harry was very shocked when 
he saw the ruined 
castle, since it was an acadent and 
he didn't mean it (9) 
Bad Moova/Uruntotdabte/Ururüeníional 
[UM] Harry sav Wim s castle and he 
thought "Wim would really hale it if I 
threw sand all over his castle', since 
Harry wanted to do something that would 
bug Wim Harry wanted to do something 
that Wim really hates. Harry wanted to be 
mean (10) Then, Harry walked over to 
Wim's castle (6) 
[UA] Bui, then, suddenly a great big 
strong dog came and he jumped up against 
Harry really hard, so that Harry couldn't 
stay standing up Harry couldn t help it, 
it was the dogs fault (7) 
[Ul] Harrv fell He fell right OD top of 
Wims castle and the castle was completeIv 
ruined (8) Harry «as very shocked when 
he saw the ruined castle, since it was an 
accident and be didn t mean it (9) 
Bad Moiivcs/AvotdablcfUrunicnaonal 
[UM] Harrv saw Wim s castle and he 
thought "Wim would really hate it if I 
threw sand all over his castle", since 
Harrv wanted to do something that would 
bug Wim Harry wanted to do something 
that Wim would really hate Налу wanted 
to be mean (10) Then, Harry walked over 
to Wims castle (6) 
[A] But, then, Harry was walking too fast, 
he was not paying any attention to where 
he was walking or where be put his feet 
down and he walked right into Wun's 
castle So, Harry could help iL He 
could'vc paid more attention (14) 
[UI] Harry fell He fell nghl on top of 
Wim's castle and the castle was completely 
ruined (8) Налу was very shocked when 
he saw the mined castle, since it was an 
acadent and be didn't mean it (9) 
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Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Good Mouva/Urujvotdûble/InUTiùoruiF 
I AM] Harry sav, Wims casi le and he 
thought 'Л ип would really like il if 1 
went and fetched some more blocks for his 
castle, so that his castle can get even 
bigger" Harry wanted to help ^ i m Harry 
wanted to do something that Wim would 
like Harry wanted to be nice (5) Then, 
Harrv walked over to Wim's castle (6) 
[UA] But, then, suddenly it started 
raining really hard It was really windy 
and it was raining really hard. Harry's 
mother came out of the bouse and she 
shouted at Harry "You'd better bnng all 
of those blocks inside nghl now, or 
you're going to get it1' Harry could bnng 
the blocks inside only if he mined WmTs 
castle So, he had to He couldn't help 
it, his mother made hun do it (11) 
[I] Harry wanted just to lake the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work So, be 
started pushing the castle rcalK hard 
Harry pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was trying to break the castle (12) He 
kept on pushing long enough until (he 
castle was completely ruined (13) 
Good Motivcs/AvouiabU/Intcntuxud 
[AM] Harry was thinking "Wim would 
really like it if I help him", since Harry 
really wanted lo help Wim Harry wanted 
to do something that Wim would really 
like Harry wanted to be nice (15) 
|A] So, Harry thought about the things he 
could do with the castle There were lots 
and lots of different things that he could 
do with the casi le He thought about this 
and then he made a choice about what he 
would do So, Harry could help it, since 
he was the one who made up his mind 
about what would happen with the caslle 
(16) Harry thought Ί think that Wim is 
already busy with ruining his castle So 
TU help him nun iL 
[I] Harry wanted just to take the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work. So, he 
started pushing the castle really hard. 
Harry pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was trying to break the castle (12) He 
kept on pushing long enough until the 
castle was completely ruined (13) 
Au/ MoùvesfUnavoidabUUnienùOnal 
(UM) Harry saw Wim's castle and he 
thought "Wim would really hate it if I 
threw sand all over his castle", since 
Harry wanted to do something that would 
bug Wim Harry wanted to do something 
that Wire would really hate Harry wanted 
to be mean (10) Then, Harry walked over 
to Wim's castle (6) 
[UA] But, then, suddenly it started 
raining really hard It was really windy 
and it was raining really hard Harry's 
mother came out of the house and she 
shouted at Harry "You'd belter bnng all 
of those blocks inside right now, or 
you're going to gel it·' Harry could bnng 
the blocks inside only if he ruined Wim's 
castle So, he had to He couldn't help 
it, his mother made him do it (11) 
[I] Harry wanted just lo lake the blocks 
apart, but that didn't work So, he 
started pushing the castle really hard 
Harrv pushed and pushed hard, because he 
was trying to break the castle (12) He 
kept on pushing long enough until the 
castle was completely ruined (13) 
Bad MotiveslAvoidableHrUenJiOnai 
(UM) Harry was thinking. "Wim will be 
pretty upset if I bug him", since Harry 
wanted lo bug Wim Harry wanted lo do 
something that Wim really hates Harry 
wanted to be mean (17) 
[A] So, Harry thought about the things be 
could do with the castle There were lots 
and lots of different things that he could 
do with the castle He thought about this 
and then be made a choice about what be 
would do So, Harry could help it, since 
he was the one who made up his mind 
about what would happen with the castle 
(16) 
| I | Hairy wauled just to take the blodu 
apart, but that didn't work. So, be 
started pushing the castle really hard. 
Harry pushed aod pushed hard, because be 
was trying to break the castle (12). He 
kept on pushing long enough until the 
castle was completely ruined (13) 
" Numbers in parentheses refer to pictures illustrating the particular 
part of the story. Detailed descriptions of the pictures can be obtained from 
the first author. 
ь
 AM-acceptable motives, UM-unacceptable motives, UA-unavoidable, 
A-avoidable, Ul-unintentional, I-intentional. 
β
 Consistent with the attributional approach, unavoidable versus avoidable 
harm that was unintended was operationalized as the absence versus presence 
of foreseeability. In contrast, unavoidable versus avoidable harm that was 
intended was operationalized as the absence versus presence of freedom of 
choice. 
121 
lability information, transition information, and Avoidability informa­
tion, respectively. Finally, two illustrations depicted Intentionality 
information. With one exception, the illustrations depicting Inten­
tionality and Motive Acceptability were identical across the eight 
stories within a theme. The exception was that the pictures il­
lustrating Motive Acceptability at the avoidable-and-intcntional 
level of both other dimensions differed slightly from the pictures 
illustrating Motive Acceptability at the remaining levels of Avoidab­
ility χ Intentionality. For Avoidability two different illustrations for 
each level were needed for each theme, depending on the level of 
Intentionality with which it was to be combined (see Table 7.1). 
Task and Complexity Manipulations 
In the paired comparison and pairwise rating tasks, children saw 
and heard two stories comprised of an introduction and, depending 
on the level of complexity, information about at least one of the 
dimensions. They then made their choices about the pair and they 
subsequently gave ratings of both stories in the pair. In the in­
dividual rating task, children were presented with a story, comprised 
of one or more dimensions, after which they made rating judgments. 
The story pairs used for the paired comparisons and pairwise 
ratings at the simple level thus consisted of stories that included 
the target dimension only, e.g., one story of the pair conveying 
that harm was caused unavoidably and the other story conveying 
that harm was caused avoidably. 
Story pairs used for the complex paired comparisons and pairwise 
ratings also consisted of one story conveying the "low" level of the 
target dimension (i.e., unavoidable) and one story conveying the 
"high" level of the target dimension (i.e., avoidable). In addition, 
the two nontarget dimensions were also included in the stories, but 
their levels were identical across both stories of a pair (e.g., unin­
tentional and good motives for both stories). 
The very complex pairs also consisted of one story conveying 
the "low" level of the target dimension and one story conveying the 
"high" level of the target dimension, with the nontarget dimensions 
being present in both stories. However, in the very complex condi­
tion the nontarget dimensions were manipulated in the evaluatively 
opposite direction as was the target dimension. That is, in the 
story conveying the "low" level of the target dimension, both non-
target dimensions were manipulated at the "high" level, whereas in 
the story conveying the "high" level of the target dimension, both 
nontargcl dimensions were manipulated at the "low" level. For ex­
ample, in the case that Avoidability was the target dimension, one 
story was conveyed as unavoidable, intentional and bad motives and 
the other story as avoidable, unintentional and good motives. 
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The complexity manipulations for the individual rating method 
were identical, except that the two stories that had been presented 
on one trial for the paired comparisons were now presented on two 
different trials. For example, in the case in which Avoidabilily was 
the target dimension and the level of complexity was simple, chil-
dren made ratings of the unavoidable story on one trial and then, 
at some other point in the trial sequence, made ratings of the 
avoidable story. 
Note that in the individual rating task the same set of ratings of 
the eight stories that consisted of the combinations of all three 
dimensions could be used to opcrationalize both the complex and the 
very complex levels. For example, for the trials having Avoidabilily 
as the target dimension, children's avoidabilily ratings of the un-
avoidable, intentional, and bad motive story were used to opcration-
alize both the complex level (i.e., when compared with ratings of 
the avoidable, intentional and bad motive story), but also to opcra-
tionalize the very complex level (i.e., when compared with ratings 
of the avoidable, unintentional and good motive story). 
Dependent Measures 
Children's understanding of each dimension was assessed in the 
individual- and pairwisc-rating task by asking them to rate how 
nice the actor wanted to be (motive acceptability), how much the 
actor could help it that the property was damaged (avoidability), 
and how much the actor had tried to damage the property (inten-
tionality). These ratings were made on a 7-point scale, ranging 
from 1= not at all to 7= a very whole lot. For the paired-comparison 
task they were asked to choose the story in which the actor wanted 
to be nice, could do almost nothing to avoid damaging the properly, 
or tried lo damage the property. 
For the paired comparisons, a child was given credit for under-
standing the dimensions when she chose the good motive actor as 
wanting to be nice, the unavoidable actor as the one who could not 
help damaging the property, and the intentional actor as the one 
who had tried to damage the property. For the rating tasks, a child 
was given credit for dimension understanding when her rating of 
the story representing the "high" level of the target dimension was 
at least one scale point higher than her rating of the story repre-
senting the "low" level of the target dimension (see Leon, 1979). 
All analyses were carried out on the proportion of appropriate 
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discriminations that a child made for a dimension across all replica-
tions.4 
It should be noted that we used the most liberal possible criter-
ion in scoring the individual- and pairwise ratings. In this way we 
avoided the risk of introducing a bias in favor of our hypothesis 
that children would perform better on the paired comparison task 
than on the individual rating task. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually by a male or female experimenter 
in a quiet location on the schoolgrounds. Each child participated in 
several sessions (M=6.9, range 6.0-9.0), each of which lasted ap-
proximately 20 min. The average inter-session interval was 4.2 days 
with a range of 1.6-to-7.8 days. All children were enthusiastic 
about participating in the study and remained so throughout its 
entire course. 
The first session always began with a rating scale training and 
practice trials. The rating scale consisted of seven size-graduated 
vertical rectangles that were drawn on a piece of while cardboard 
(21x30cm). The experimenter began the training by pointing to each 
rectangle and verbalizing the appropriate label (not at all, a very 
little bit, a little bit, a bit, a lot, a whole lot and a very whole 
lot). The experimenter then explained how the scale could be used, 
using as an example how scary different animals arc (the animals 
used were lambs, mice, big dogs, lions, and crocodiles). The child 
was then asked to use the scale to show how strong different 
people are (babies, big kids, old ladies, fathers, policemen, and 
giants). The scale training continued until the child appropriately 
discriminated his or her ratings according to the presented stimuli. 
After the scale training, children completed four practice trials 
which were meant to show them that the rating scale could also be 
used to judge the behavior of a story character. Children rated 
four stories in terms of how naughty the story character was. 
* The complexity manipulation as described above yields different numbers 
of replications per Dimension for the three levels of complexity. There are 
four replications for each dimension at the complex level (target dimension 
varied, non-target dimensions held constant), because there are four patterns 
in which the four non-target dimensions can be held constant (positive+posi-
tive; positive+negative; negative+positive and negative+negative). At the simple 
and very complex levels, however, there was no way of systematically repeat-
ing patterns. To avoid imbalance in the design and nevertheless remain within 
the limits of what could reasonably be presented to the children, all off the 
simple and very complex trials were presented twice to each child. 
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These stories have been successfully used in other research (Fer­
guson, Ollhof, Luiten, & Rule, 1984) and were based on Heider's 
(1958) continuum of personal responsibility. No child had problems 
with these ratings. 
Children then made their ratings and paired comparison judgments 
for the various combinations of Task χ Complexity. These tasks 
were distributed across several sessions, with the restriction that 
the individual rating and the paired comparison + pairwise rating 
tasks were evenly distributed across the sessions. Each block of 
Task χ Complexity trials required approximately the same amount of 
administration time. 
For the paired comparison and pairwise rating trials, two wooden 
boxes were placed in an upright position on a table at a comfortable 
viewing distance from the child. The experimenter began by reading 
the introduction and pointing to the introductory illustrations, 
which were the same for both stories. The experimenter then opened 
each door of the left-hand box and verbalized the corresponding 
text. This procedure was repeated for the right-hand box, and the 
child was then asked to make his or her understanding choice in 
terms of the target dimension and then to rate each story in the 
pair in terms of the same dimension, using the 7-point rating scale. 
The procedure for the individual rating task was similar, except 
that only one box was used and that children only made ratings. 
Results and Discussion 
Our reintcrpretation of Berg-Cross' and Grueneich's research hinges 
on the assumption that children's performance would be an inverse 
function of the complexity of the stimulus material. The means for 
the significant main effect of Complexity that was found (F(2,33) = 
60.21, p<.001), support this idea. Means for the simple, complex and 
very complex stories were .85, .72, and .52, respectively, with the 
latter mean being significantly lower than the other two according 
to Tukey's HSD test. Thus, children performed worse with the very 
complex stories ihan with the complex or simple stories. Clearly, 
the introduction of nontarget information in the evaluatively "wrong" 
direction undermined children's performance. 
The question arises now as to whether increasing complexity 
undermines children's performance for each of the dimensions to an 
equal extent. The answer to this question is an unequivocal "no", as 
indicated by the significant Dimension χ Complexity interaction 
F(2,33) = 13.36, p<.001. This interaction qualifies the significant main 
effect of Dimension that was also obtained, F(2,33) = 10.89, p<.001. 
The means for the Dimension χ Complexity interaction are presented 
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in Table 7.2 together with the results of simple effects analyses 
that were carried out for each dimension separately. 
Table 7.2 
Children's Performance as a Function of 
Dimension and Complexity 
ccnplexity sinple effects 1 
dimension sinple cmplex very F (2,34) 
conplex 
motive acceptability .90a .81ь .76ь 13.68 
avoidability .81" .71" .45* 25.99 
intentional i ty .85" .64ь .36«= 44.45 
Note - The F values of the simple effects of Complexity are all sig­
nificant at £<.001. Superscripts reflect the results of using Tukey's HSD test 
on the means of each significant simple effect of Complexity. Means within 
rows not sharing identical superscripts differ significantly. 
As shown in Table 7.2, the level of complexity had less influence 
on children's understanding of the Motive Acceptability dimension 
than on their understanding of either the Avoidability or Inten-
tionality dimensions. Children's understanding of the Avoidability 
dimension declined at the very complex level, and their correct 
understanding of the Intentionalily dimension declined progressively 
from the simple to the very complex levels. 
Recall that both the complex and the very complex tasks always 
consisted of a target dimension that was combined with information 
regarding the nonlarget dimensions. To receive credit for a correct 
answer, the child thus had to center on the target dimension and 
ignore the two nontarget dimensions. The Dimension χ Complexity 
interaction can be explained in terms of this need to center on the 
target dimension. Specifically, the interaction reflects the fact that 
children were better able to center on Motive Acceptability as the 
target dimension than on either Avoidability or Intentionalily as the 
target dimension. Or, said differently, children were better able to 
ignore Avoidability and Intentionalily as nontarget dimensions, than 
to ignore Motive Acceptability as a nontarget dimension. These 
findings reflect a difference among the three dimensions that has 
repeatedly been found in the present series of studies, i.e., that 
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Motive Acceptability is a more powerful factor in influencing chil­
dren's judgments than cither Avoidability or Intentionality. 
The major question addressed in this research was whether the 
paired comparison (PC) method, which does not require the respon­
dent to have a constant representation of the dimension of judg­
ment, yields better performance than the individual rating (IR) 
method. Significant main effects of Method F(2,33) = 56.88, p-c.OOl, 
indicate that the method employed did influence children's perfor­
mance. Specifically, correct dimension understanding became progres­
sively worse across the PC, PR, and IR tasks ( M ' s = ·83> .67, and 
.59, respectively). Thus, in contrast to what would be expected 
based on the results and arguments provided by Berg-Cross and by 
Grueneich, our major hypothesis that the paired comparison method 
would reveal more instead of less competence than the individual 
rating method was confirmed. Comparisons among the means for the 
three tasks with Tukey's HSD test revealed that performance on the 
PR task did not differ significantly from the performance on each of 
the other tasks. Thus, our second hypothesis that the PR task is of 
intermediate difficulty when compared to both other tasks, was also 
confirmed, providing further support for our ideas concerning the 
need to have a stable representation of the dimension of judgment 
when giving individual ratings. 
While these ideas were generally borne out, the complexity of the 
stimulus material affected their generality to some extent as indi­
cated by a significant Method χ Complexity interaction F(2,33) = 5.34, 
2<.01, (see Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 
Children's Performance as a Function of 
Method and Complexity 
cmplexity 
sinple 
corpi ex 
very carpi ex 
P C 
.94-
.89a 
.67= 
method 
P R 
.85 b 
.68 b 
.48 b 
I R 
.77 e 
.59 e 
. 4 1 b 
sinple effects 
F(2,34) 
23.31 
53.53 
15.95 
Note - PC- paired comparison; PR™ pairwise rating; IR- individual rating. 
The F values of the simple effects of Method are all significant at 2<-001. 
Superscripts reflect the results of using Tukey's HSD test on the means of 
each significant simple effect of Method. Means within rows not sharing iden­
tical superscripts differ significantly. 
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Inspection of Table 7.3 reveals that children performed better on 
the PC task in comparison to the IR task at all levels of complexity, 
thus providing strong support for our major hypothesis. Furthermore, 
the PR task was of intermediate difficulty at both the simple and 
complex levels of complexity, which is consistent with our second 
hypothesis. The only finding that is not consistent with our second 
hypothesis is that the PR performance with the very complex stories 
was not significantly belter than the IR performance with these 
stories. The latter Finding implies that, apart from the need to have 
a constant representation of the dimension of judgment, there are 
other factors which distinguish the IR and PR tasks from the PC 
task when the stories are very complex. 
As before, these factors involve the need for the respondent to 
center on the target information when judging the complex or very 
complex stories. Specifically, in the paired comparison task centering 
on the target information is facilitated by the fact that the task 
requires respondents to directly compare the stories in the pair to 
each other. Directly comparing both stories enables them to isolate 
the particular aspect of the stories on the basis of which the judg-
ment has to be made. In the IR task, in contrast, it is impossible 
to use direct comparisons to center on the target information. In 
the PR task it would be possible to make such comparisons before 
rating the stories, but, unlike the PC task, the PR task does autom-
atically elicit the use of such a strategy. Since centering on the 
target information requires a more careful comparison between 
stories at the very complex level than at the complex level, it is 
not surprising that children's performance at the very complex level 
decreases when the task does not enable or elicit direct comparisons 
between stories. 
It can be concluded from the present findings that serious atten-
tion should be given to the demands that the employed method 
places on respondents, before making inferences about what children 
can or cannot achieve in research on any aspect of children's so-
cial-cognitive development. More specifically, the present findings 
imply that discriminating appropriately between the levels of a 
manipulated dimension in an individual rating task not only indicates 
the respondent's ability to differentiate between those levels, but 
also her having a rather thorough grasp of that particular dimension. 
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Chapter VIH 
Conclusions 
The studies that were presented in Chapters IH-to-VI centered 
around one or both of two main issues that emerged from the 
discussion of social-cognitive analyses of aggression in Chapter II. 
The first issue was the relations among responsibility assignment, 
moral evaluation, anger, and retaliatory aggression. The second 
issue concerned the distinction that was postulated between the 
interpretation of information in aggression-provoking situations 
versus the assignment of importance to such information. In the 
present chapter, I will first recapitulate what these studies have 
taught us about each of these two issues. Subsequently, what the 
present series of studies has taught us about the nature of anger 
and aggression in general will be discussed. The methodological 
issues that were raised in Chapters II and VII will be incorporated 
into this discussion. Finally, I will discuss the developmental implica­
tions of these studies. 
Responsibility, Moral Evaluation, Anger, and Retaliation 
A central theoretical assumption that guided our research was that 
a child A's aggressive behavior towards another child В is a function 
of A's anger response to some previous behavior of B, with the 
anger depending on A's moral evaluation of B's behavior (Ferguson 
& Rule, 1983). As is clear from this formulation, this assumption 
specifics one particular type of interrelation between A's cognitive 
(i.e., moral evaluative), emotional (i.e., anger-related), and behavioral 
(i.e., retaliatory) responses to B's behavior. To empirically address 
the issue of how these three types of responses are interrelated, 
two different strategics were used in the present series of studies. 
First, an experimental manipulation was designed that could be 
reasonably expected to affect the theoretically most fundamental 
response, i.e., children's moral evaluations. We then examined 
whether this manipulation also affected the responses that were 
hypothesized to depend on the moral evaluations, i.e., children's 
anger-related and retaliatory responses. Finding such effects would 
obviously support Ferguson & Rule's theory. The second strategy 
was to actually examine the interrelations among the cognitive, 
emotional and behavioral dependent measures. Finding significant 
interrelations among the three measures would again be consistent 
with theoretical ideas that were outlined above. 
The experimental manipulation that was used to affect children's 
moral judgments of another child's behavior was again derived from 
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Ferguson and Rule's (1983) analysis. Specifically, child A's moral 
evaluation of B's behavior was hypothesized to depend on whether 
A believed that В had caused harm and on A's use of information 
about three aspects of B's responsibility for causing the harm, i.e., 
Avoidability, Intenlionality and Motive Acceptability. 
The results which were reported in Chapters III and IV, showed 
that the three dimensions of responsibility affected children's moral 
evaluations of a perpetrator's harmful behavior. In addition, the 
three dimensions also affected their estimates of how angry the 
victim would get and how much the victim would retaliate against 
the perpetrator (see Chapters III and V). 
In line with the second strategy to test our primary hypothesis, 
each child's moral evaluations were correlated with her anger- and 
aggression-related judgments in two studies (see Chapters III and V). 
These analyses revealed that all three measures were closely related 
to each other for the large majority of children. Thus, the manip­
ulation of morally-relevant information affected children's anger-
and bchavior-relaled responses in ways that were very similar to 
how it affected children's moral judgments. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that children's anger and aggression-
related responses to a perpetrator's harmful behavior are a function 
of their moral evaluations of that behavior. 
In Chapter II it was predicted that older children would differen­
tiate more among the levels of the three dimensions of responsibility 
than younger children. The results reported in Chapter III and the 
reanalysis of all children's naughtiness and anger judgments (see 
Chapter VI) indicated that this prediclion was largely confirmed, 
with kindergarten- and grade 1 children using Avoidability and 
Intenlionality to a lesser extent than the older children. Neverthe­
less, the study described in Chapter VI revealed that there were 
considerable individual differences in the extent to which each of 
the dimensions was used by children at all grade levels. 
It is clear that some children make little use of the responsibility 
information because they lack the requisite skills. This raises the 
issue of the nature of these children's anger and retaliatory respon­
ses, which was investigated in Chapter III. The results indicated 
that not using the responsibility information was associated with 
giving relatively high anger judgments. Similarly, in Chapter V it 
was found that children who had no information about the per­
petrator's responsibility whatsoever, nevertheless gave relatively 
severe naughtiness/anger and retaliation judgments. When taken 
together, these findings imply that analyzing a perpetrator's harmful 
behavior in terms of Avoidability, Inlentionalily and Motive Accep­
tability is not a necessary condition for exhibiting high degrees of 
anger and retaliation. Rather, the reverse might be true, i.e., that 
the use of these dimensions is a necessary condition for not getting 
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angry at a perpetrator who caused harm unavoidably, unintentionally 
and in the context of good motives. (Sec Meerum Terwogt & Olthof 
(1989) and Olthof & Ferguson (1989) for elaborations on this idea). 
Interpretation versus Importance 
In Chapter II it was argued that whether a dimension of respon-
sibility affects children's moral evaluations (and thereby their anger-
and aggression-related responses) depends on two separate proces-
ses, i.e., the interprelation of the dimension-relevant information 
and the assignment of importance to that information. In the studies 
which were described in Chapters IV and V, attempts were made to 
empirically isolate the importance assigned to dimensions from the 
interpretation of dimension information. The general strategy was 
to compare the effects of manipulated dimensions of responsibility 
on measures of dimension interpretation with their effects on meas-
ures of dimension use. Since the use measures were assumed to 
jointly reflect dimension interpretation and dimension importance, 
comparing the interpretation and use measures to each other enabled 
us to make inferences about dimension importance. 
Three different approaches were followed to empirically distin-
guish between interprelation versus importance. First, the magnitude 
of the three dimensions' effects on measures of naughtiness and 
anger were examined in terms of whether observed differences 
should be ascribed to differential interpretation of the dimension 
information or to differences in the importance assigned to each of 
the dimensions (see Chapters IV and V). Second, children's rating 
patterns were classified both in terms of dimension interpretation 
and in terms of the assignment of importance to dimensions (see 
Chapter IV). Finally, in Chapter V two experimental manipulations 
were used to independently affect cither dimension interprelation or 
dimension importance. 
Using the first approach, it was found that differences among 
dimensions in terms of the extent to which they were used for 
judging naughtiness and anger could not be fully explained on the 
basis of dimension interpretation only (Chapters IV and V). Results 
indicated that the Intcntionalily dimension was used less than could 
be predicted on the basis of Intcntionalily interpretation, implying 
that relatively little importance was assigned to this dimension. In 
Chapter V it was also found that Motive Acceptability was used 
more than could be predicted on the basis of Motive Acceptability 
interpretation, implying that relatively more importance was assigned 
to this dimension. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that 
differential dimension use cannot be explained only in terms of 
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differential dimension interpretation, but also requires the concept 
of dimension importance. 
Using the second approach in Chapter IV, the results revealed 
that differences among individual children in dimension interpreta-
tion can be used to predict differences in dimension use. In addition, 
differential interpretation appeared to be related to children's age. 
In the remainder of the Chapter IV study, a procedure was develop-
ed to differentiate among children in terms of the importance that 
they assigned to each of the three dimensions of responsibility. The 
results implied that there exist individual differences among children 
in the assignment of importance to the Avoidability and Motive 
Acceptability dimensions. However, since these results still need 
independent validation, they should be treated as preliminary. 
For the third approach, two experimental manipulations were 
designed to affect either dimension interpretation or dimension 
importance (see Chapter V). Specifically, in experiment 1 an attempt 
was made to experimentally manipulate dimension importance, but 
not dimension interpretation. This was done by inducing in different 
groups of children a low versus a high expectation of the per-
petrator's aggressiveness, while at the same time holding dimension 
interpretation constant by presenting the relevant information as 
unambiguously and as explicitly as possible. To some extent this 
attempt was successful. That is, the kindergarten and grade 5 chil-
dren with a high expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness 
responded in agreement with our prediction, in that they assigned 
less importance to Motive Acceptability when judging naughtiness 
and anger than did same-aged children with a low expectation of 
aggressiveness. 
However, two facts qualify these findings. First, the predicted 
effects occurred only in kindergarten and grade 5 children's ratings, 
but not in those of grade 1 and grade 2 children. Second, and more 
importantly from the viewpoint of explaining aggressive behavior, 
similar effects did not appear in children's judgments of retaliation. 
In short, as an attempt to further validate the concept of dimension 
importance the results of experiment 1 are promising, because the 
predicted effects were actually obtained for two age groups. How-
ever, since no parallel effects appeared for the retaliation measure, 
it remains to be seen whether manipulations of dimension importance 
can yield effects that are robust enough to become manifest in 
other dependent measures than those on which the inferences about 
dimension importance were based. 
Finally, the second experiment of Chapter V manipulated chil-
dren's interpretation of dimension information, and thereby their 
judgments of naughtiness, anger, and retaliation, while using the 
same degree of explicitness of information as was used in experiment 
1. This was done by varying the trustworthiness of the source from 
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which children received the information about the harmful event. 
For those children who had a low expectation of the perpetrator's 
aggressiveness, the hypotheses were supported. That is, children 
who received the information from the perpetrator himself gave 
more negative judgments of the stories that contained strong evalua-
tively positive information, than children who received an objective 
account of the event. As testified by the fact that parallel effects 
were obtained for measures of interpretation, naughtiness/anger and 
retaliation, the effects of the Account Source manipulation were 
quite robust. 
The results of our efforts to empirically distinguish between 
interpretation versus importance can be summarized as follows. First, 
we clearly confirmed Scdlak's (1979) conclusion that individual 
differences in the interpretation of Intcntionality information can be 
used to predict the use of that information when making moral 
evaluations. This replication of Sedlak's findings is all the more 
convincing because of the different response mode (quantitative 
ratings instead of open-ended questions) and the different type of 
information (three dimensions of responsibility instead of Intcn-
tionality only) that we used. Second, it appeared to be possible to 
influence children's interpretation of personal responsibility informa-
tion without making that information itself unclear of ambiguous, 
i.e., by manipulating the trustworthiness of the source of the ac-
count about the harmful event. Third, by comparing dimension 
interpretation and dimension use to each other, it could be demon-
strated that the concept of dimension importance is needed to 
account for the use data. Fourth, suggestive (though not definite) 
evidence was obtained for the claim that there exist individual 
differences among children in terms of the importance that they 
assign to different aspects of personal responsibility. Finally, an 
attempt to experimentally manipulate the importance that children 
assigned to dimension information was partially successful, but 
further research is needed to examine the robustness of such ef-
fects. 
Explaining the Differential Assignment of Importance 
The findings regarding dimension importance raise the issue of why 
children assign more importance to Motive information than to 
Intcntionality information. An explanation can be provided, based 
on the following two assumptions. First, when seen from the stand-
point of someone towards whom harm has been caused, the costs of 
getting angry and of retaliating (that is, of behaving aggressively) 
against the perpetrator might be considerable (e.g., one might get 
harmed oneself, the conflict might escalate into a fight with uncer-
tain outcomes, etc.). If, however, the potential benefits of such 
aggressive behavior outweigh its potential costs, it does make sense 
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to behave aggressively. Second, the most important potential benefit 
of retaliating against a perpetrator of harm is to prevent the per-
petrator from repeating her harmful behavior. Obviously, this type 
of benefit only occurs in those cases where the perpetrator can be 
expected to repeat her harmful behavior. 
When taken together, these two assumptions imply that the 
crucial factor that determines how much importance pcrccivcrs 
assign to each of the dimensions of responsibility is the extent to 
which the information regarding that dimension permits the in-
ference that the perpetrator is likely to cause harm again. Now, 
Motive Acceptability information allows such an inference (see Jones 
& Davis, 1965), whereas Intentionality, as it was opcrationalized 
here, does not. That is, a perpetrator who malevolently causes harm 
today is likely to have the same motives tomorrow and to act ac-
cordingly. Intentionality, in contrast, is a short-term affair. That 
is, knowing that a perpetrator caused harm intentionally is not in 
itself a reason to expect the same behavior in the future, because 
the perpetrator might not have been able to avoid causing the harm 
and/or she might have had benevolent motives when causing the 
harm. Rather, such an expectation would only be justified when the 
intentions arose from the perpetrator's bad motives, which, of 
course, further illustrates my point. 
My conjecture, then is that children assign the most importance 
to Motive Acceptability information, because a perpetrator who 
malevolently causes harm is likely to cause harm again and again1. 
In such a case, the potential benefits of expressing anger and of 
retaliating against the perpetrator might well outweigh its costs. 
Intentionality information, in contrast, is of little importance, be-
cause it does not lead to an expectation of repeated harmful be-
havior, which makes it unlikely that the benefits of retaliating 
against a perpetrator who caused harm intentionally will outweigh its 
costs. 
Culture and the Assignment of Importance 
In general, it can be concluded from the data that children's moral 
evaluations (and thereby their anger- and retaliation-related respon-
ses) of a perpetrator's harmful behavior definitely depend on their 
cognitive capacities, i.e. on those that are needed to interpret the 
information concerning the perpetrator's responsibility for causing 
harm. However, the findings regarding dimension importance imply 
1
 This argument does not imply that children are consciously aware of 
the reasons for assigning more or less importance to a dimension of respon-
sibility. Knowing how much importance to assign most likely results from 
implicit learning processes, rather than from explicit teachings. 
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that limited cognitive abilities are not the only source of variance 
in children's use of responsibility information. Specifically, the 
consistently obtained finding that more importance was assigned to 
Motive Acccplability than to Intentionality, implies that children's 
system of values also affects their evaluative judgments. This raises 
the issue of how children acquire such a system of values. 
Traditionally, it has been argued that developmental changes in 
the importance that children attach to "intent" information (where 
"intent" includes aspects of Avoidability, Intentionality, and Motive 
Acceptability) depend on changes in how parents interact with their 
children (Costanzo & Dix, 1983; Piaget, 1932/1977). Similarly, it 
might be argued that individual differences in the importance para-
meters that constitute children's value systems (provided that such 
differences exist, see Chapter IV), result from different child-rearing 
strategies. To the extent that individuals within a culture agree 
about dimension importance (as seemed to be true for Intentionality 
in our studies, see Chapters IV and V), such value systems might 
also reflect the common wisdom that has been developed within a 
culture. Indeed, the preoccupation with predictability and temporal 
stability that I assumed to underlie children's pattern of importance 
assignment (see the previous subsection), might well reflect a char-
acteristic of Western culture in general. 
It should be noted, however, that it is not necessarily the case 
that children's value systems are unique for each culture. If the 
explanation that was given in the previous paragraph is valid, it 
could be argued that the value system that children actually ap-
peared to use in our studies is an optimal strategy in terms of 
cost/benefit considerations. Accordingly, the possibility that the 
moral value system that was identified in Chapters IV and V is 
inherent to living in any social group should not be excluded. Ob-
viously, the way to address these issues is to carry out cross-cul-
tural studies in which adults' and children's patterns of importance 
assignment are compared across different cultures. 
What Have Wc Learned About Anger and Aggression? 
As was indicated above, our findings are largely consistent with 
what was predicted on the basis of Ferguson and Rule's (1983) 
theory. That is, the data provide support for the idea that both 
anger and hostile aggression arc a function of the aggressor's moral 
evaluation of her victim's previous harmful behavior, which in turn 
depends on the aggressor's interpretation of that behavior in terms 
of Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive Acceptability and on the 
importance that is assigned to each of these dimensions. 
135 
There is, however, an important methodological caveat. This 
conclusion assumes that children's judgments regarding the angry-
and retaliatory responses of a hypothetical victim of harm arc 
somehow indicative of their own real-life responses in situations 
where actual harm has been caused to them. Even though we took 
several steps to remain as close as possible to the ideal method of 
observing children's real-life anger- and aggression-related behavior 
in real-life aggression-eliciting situations (see Chapter II), a sceptic 
might nevertheless argue that all that has been done in the present 
work is to gather information about children's ideas about the 
elicitors of anger and retaliation, which might or might not be 
related to their actual behavior. Obviously, only studies in which 
the presently used methods are combined with observational measures 
of aggression in natural situations can provide a more definitive 
answer to the question of whether the presently obtained results 
can be extended to real-life aggression. 
However, having said this, I also want to stress that the develop-
ment of children's ideas about morality, anger and aggression is an 
important area of investigation in and of itself. Even when rejecting 
the claim that data on children's ideas can serve as a basis for 
making inferences about the cognitive processes that underlie chil-
dren's actual angry and aggressive behavior in real-life situations, 
it can nevertheless be maintained that children's ideas arc likely to 
increasingly shape and control their actual behavior. When discussing 
moral development, Kagan (1984) argued that after having entered 
Piaget's concrete operational stage, children actively try to reach 
consistency between their moral beliefs and their behavior (p. 134). 
Thus, when a child tells us that the victim of harm only retaliates 
when the perpetrator causes harm avoidably instead of unavoidably, 
this does not necessarily inform us directly about the eliciting 
conditions of the child's actual retaliatory behavior, but it does 
inform us about the child's ideas about when to retaliate, and these 
ideas will increasingly guide her actual behavior when growing older. 
What Have We Learned About Development? 
In Chapter II it was argued that the social-cognitive approach 
towards studying aggression is well-suited to an examination of 
developmental issues. To some extent, this promise was fulfilled in 
the present series of studies, in that some age-related differences 
in the use of personal responsibility information have been found. 
Before elaborating on these differences, however, I will discuss 
briefly an important methodological issue. Specifically, it could be 
argued that whereas our findings yield information regarding the 
differences between age groups, they do not permit any conclusions 
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regarding the occurrence of developmental change. According to 
this argument, a difference between age groups might as well reflect 
the fact that the age groups necessarily represent different genera­
tions of individuals (see Wohlwill, 1973, p. 125 and p. 128/129). In 
this Une of reasoning, conclusions regarding age-related changes 
can only be justified on the basis of longitudinal research in which 
the same generation of children is followed over time. 
In my view, the above reasoning is overly restrictive regarding 
the conclusions that can be based on cross-sectional research, 
because in some cases an explanation of age-related differences in 
terms of inter-generational differences can reasonably be excluded. 
This is so if (a) the to-be-compared groups differ only a few years 
in age and (b) similar age-related differences have been found in 
different studies that were conducted in subsequent years. Since 
both conditions were fulfilled in the present series of studies, I 
consider it to be extremely unlikely that the age-related differences 
that we found actually reflect inter-generational-, rather than truly 
developmental differences2. 
When turning to the age-related differences that were actually 
found, it should be noted that these differences were usually not 
impressive. This was, for example, indicated by the fact that hardly 
any significant Age χ Dimension two-way interactions were found. 
The age-related differences that were found appeared either in the 
form of higher order interactions, or in the form of individual 
differences among the youngest children, some of whom performed 
considerably worse than the older children, whereas others did not. 
With the wisdom of hindsight, it could be argued that our youngest 
respondents were, given the methods that were used, already too 
old for the purpose of establishing substantial developmental changes 
in the use of personal responsibility information. 
This provision is an important one, however. The fact that rela­
tively few age-related differences in dimension use were found, 
x
 This claim is not meant to imply that cross-sectional research in 
general is as informative for answering developmental questions as longitudinal 
research. For example, as was convincingly argued by Wohlwill (1973), the 
cross-sectional method is of no use for a researcher who aims to describe the 
shape of a developmental function at the level of the individual. My claim 
does imply, however, that some interesting developmental questions only re­
quire an answer in terms of whether children's performance on a set of theo­
retically interesting tasks generally does or does not change with growing 
age. The latter type of questions can perfectly wall be addressed by carrying 
out research that is both cross-sectional and experimentally oriented (see 
Harris, Olthof, & Vos, 1980). 
137 
should be seen in the light of the fact that children generally 
received very explicit information about whether the perpetrator 
caused harm avoidably, intentionally and with bad motives. Given 
the fact that age-related differences in dimension use are to an 
important extent due to differential interpretation of the presented 
information (Sedlak, 1979; see Chapter IV), it seems likely that 
more age-related differences would have been found had we made 
the interpretation of information more difficult by using less explicit 
information. Since people in the real world are seldom as explicit 
about their motives and intentions as we were about the motives 
and intentions of our perpetrator, it could well be argued that the 
picture of the younger children's abilities that was sketched in the 
previous studies is far too optimistic relative to their performance 
in the real world. A similar argument could, however, be made in 
precisely the reverse direction by stating that the stimulus informa-
tion in our hypothetical situations was much less vivid and involving 
than would have been the case in the real-world equivalents of 
those situations. Such an argument might be taken to imply that 
the picture that was sketched of children's abilities may even be 
too pessimistic, rather than too optimistic. 
Considering another aspect of the methodology that was used, 
i.e., the use of quantitative rating scales, might also lead one to 
the same conclusion. In Chapter VII it was shown that the use of 
rating scales requires a rather sophisticated understanding of the 
to-be-evaluated information. The conclusions that were reached in 
Chapter VII imply that an even more optimistic picture of children's 
abilities, and thereby probably even less age-related differences, 
would have been found had we used the paired comparison methodol-
ogy instead of the quantitative rating scale methodology to assess 
children's understanding and use of information regarding the three 
dimensions of responsibility. 
In my view, the above considerations lead to the conclusion that 
it is does not make much sense to try to establish at what age a 
child is "able" to use Intcntionality, Motive Acceptability or what-
ever. There simply exists no such thing as a general "ability to do 
X". The only thing that does exist is the "ability to do X within 
the set of stimulus conditions Y and while using response mode O". 
Once an ability of the latter type has been established for stimulus 
condition Y and response mode Q, additional research is needed to 
establish whether that ability can still be found in condition Y* 
and when using response mode Q*. The study that was presented in 
Chapter VII provides a modest beginning towards this type of anal-
ysis, in that two different response modes were compared to each 
other. Obviously, a full-fledged programme in this vein would include 
more response modes and, most importantly, it would include dif-
ferent ways of presenting the same stimulus information. Only after 
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carrying out such a research programme, conclusions of a more 
general nature about which type of information children of a given 
age are able to use could be drawn. 
The above section may sound somewhat disconcertingly for a 
developmentally oriented reader. Fortunately, the account that was 
given above forms only half of the story that can be told. Even if 
the specificity of stimulus conditions and response modes preclude 
any general conclusions about children's abilities at different ages, 
there is another, and in my view more promising, way to reach 
conclusions of a general nature. That way is to focus not so much 
on the abilities of children of a given age, but rather on the nature 
of the age-related changes that were found, and possibly even more 
importantly, on the interrelations between different types of agc-
rclaled changes. To give one example: The fact that virtually all 
kindergarten-age children used Motive Acceptability information 
when evaluating a perpetrator's behavior, but that only some of 
them also used Intcntionality and Avoidability, might or might not 
generalize to situations in which the dimension information is more 
or less explicitly available and in which other response modes arc 
used. What is likely to generalize, however, is the fact that Motive 
information is used at a younger age than both other types of 
responsibility information. 
When seen in this light, several points might be listed to answer 
the question that formed the title of this subsection. First, it was 
found that children's use of the dimensions of responsibility tended 
to increase with age, and that the use of these dimensions lead in 
many situations towards less severe angry and retaliatory responses 
than would have resulted from not using the dimensions. When 
combined with each other, these two findings imply a social-cogni-
tive explanation for the often reported fact that the frequency of 
children's aggressive behavior decreases with increasing age (Parke 
& Slaby, 1983). Specifically, this age-related decrease in aggressive 
behavior might be due to an age-related increase in children's 
tendency to take into account the fact that a perpetrator of harm 
is not always fully responsible for causing the harm. Using informa-
tion about diminished responsibility would lead them towards not 
getting angry and towards not retaliating in cases where they would 
have done so at a younger age. Another implication of this reason-
ing is that the problems of overly aggressive children may to some 
extent be due to their tendency to not take into account the fact 
that someone who caused harm to them is not always fully respon-
sible for doing so. 
Second, it was clear from the Chapter IV study that to the 
extent that there arc age-related differences in dimension use among 
children from age 5 onwards, such differences can to a considerable 
extent be ascribed to differences in how children interpreted the 
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dimension information. At the same lime, individual differences in 
the assignment of importance were not reliably related to age. The 
latter finding was based on the ratings of a small number of chil-
dren and should therefore not be taken as definite evidence against 
the claim that developmental differences in dimension use are to 
some extent due to differences in the assignment of importance to 
dimensions (see Costan/o & Dix, 1983). However, all things con-
sidered, the results do imply that differential interpretation of 
information is in the age range that was examined a more important 
source of age-related differences than is differential assignment of 
importance. 
To put the latter conclusion in its proper perspective, a caution-
ary note should be made about the concept of dimension importance 
as it was defined and operationalized in the present series of 
studies. We have assumed that the process of importance assignment 
only occurs in a child, if, and only if, the child is able to properly 
interpret the dimension-relevant information to at least some extent. 
Said differently, the ability to properly interpret information has 
logical and temporal priority over the assignment of importance to 
that information. Making this assumption was necessary, since no 
methods were available to directly assess the importance that chil-
dren assign to information. It should be realized, however, that this 
assumption makes it logically impossible to reach the conclusion 
that children did not interpret a piece of information appropriately, 
because they did not assign any importance to that information. 
This limitation is unfortunate, because it could well be argued that 
children only start learning to interpret a certain type of informa-
tion after having acquired some sense of the importance of that 
information. Accordingly, it should be realized that the above con-
clusion that differential interpretation of dimension-relevant infor-
mation explains more of the age-related variance in dimension use 
than does the differential assignment of importance, is limited. 
Specifically, this conclusion deals only with the importance that 
children assign to information once they have learned to interpret 
that information appropriately. If it would be shown on some day 
that the importance that children assign to responsibility information 
influences their ability to interpret that information, this finding 
would again open the possibility that the assignment of importance, 
rather than the interpretation of information, is the primary vehicle 
of developmental change in the use of personal responsibility infor-
mation. 
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Summary 
The studies that were presented in the Chapters III to VI of this 
thesis addressed one or both of two issues that were raised by 
Ferguson and Rule's (1983) atlributional perspective on anger and 
aggression. This perspective implies that a child A's aggressive 
behavior towards another child В is a function of A's anger response 
to some previous behavior of В that A perceived as harmful. A's 
anger, in turn, depends on her moral evaluation of B's behavior. 
Finally, A's moral evaluation is assumed to depend on her inter-
pretation of B's behavior in terms of the extent to which В is 
responsible for causing the harm and on the extent to which A 
considers various aspects of B's responsibility to be important. 
The first issue concerned the relations among responsibility 
assignment, moral evaluation, anger, and retaliatory aggression. The 
second issue concerned the distinction that Ferguson and Rule made 
between the interprelation of information in aggression-provoking 
situations versus the assignment of importance to such information. 
One additional issue was addressed that is indirectly relevant to 
developmental social-cognitive research on aggression. Specifically, 
we examined in Chapter VII one aspect of the methodology that 
was used in all previous chapters, i.e., children's use of quantitative 
rating scale methodology. 
Moral Evaluation, Anger, and Retaliation 
To empirically address the issue of how A's cognitive (i.e., moral 
evaluative), emotional (i.e., anger-related), and behavioral (i.e., 
retaliatory) responses to B's behavior are interrelated, two different 
strategies were used. First, an experimental manipulation was design­
ed that could be reasonably expected to affect the theoretically 
most fundamental response, i.e., children's moral evaluations. We 
then examined whether this manipulation also affected the responses 
that were hypothesized to depend on the moral evaluations, i.e., 
children's anger-related and retaliatory responses. The second stra­
tegy was to actually examine the interrelations among the cognitive, 
emotional and behavioral dependent measures. 
To experimentally manipulate children's moral judgments of 
another child's behavior, children between 5 and 15 year old were 
presented with several stories in which a perpetrator caused harm. 
The stories were varied in terms of three aspects of the per­
petrator's responsibility for causing the harm, i.e., Avoidabilily 
(could the perpetrator have avoided the harm), Intentionality (was 
the perpetrator trying to produce the harm), and Motive Accep­
tability (were the perpetrator's motives acceptable or not). The, 
three dimensions were treated as being orthogonal t©. one another. 
Results showed that the three dimensions of responsibility affected 
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children's moral evaluations of a perpetrator's harmful behavior 
(Chapters III and IV). In addition, the three dimensions also affected 
their estimates of how angry the victim would get and how much 
the victim would retaliate against the perpetrator (Chapters III and 
V). 
The orthogonal manipulation of the Avoidability, Intentionality, 
and Motive Acceptability dimensions permitted us to examine the 
interrelations among the dimensions themselves in children's judg-
ments. Contrary to what has traditionally been assumed in research 
on children's conceptions of responsibility, it was found that Motive 
Acceptability affected the judgments of children of all age groups 
at any level of Avoidability and Intentionality (Chapters III and VI). 
In line with the second strategy to test our primary hypothesis, 
children's moral evaluations were correlated with their anger- and 
aggression-related judgments in two studies (see Chapters III and 
V). These analyses revealed that all three measures were closely 
related to each other for the large majority of children. Thus, the 
manipulation of morally-relevant information affected children's 
anger- and behavior-related responses in ways that were very similar 
to how it affected children's moral judgments. These Findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that children's anger and aggression-
related responses to a perpetrator's harmful behavior are a function 
of their moral evaluations of that behavior. 
In general, kindergarten- and grade 1 children used Avoidability 
and Intentionality to a lesser extent than the older children (Chap-
ters III and VI). Nevertheless, the study described in Chapter VI 
revealed that there were considerable individual differences in the 
extent to which each of the dimensions was used by children at all 
grade levels. The results also indicated that not using the respon-
sibility information when making moral judgments was associated 
with giving relatively high anger judgments (Chapter III). Similarly, 
in Chapter V it was found that children who had no information 
about the perpetrator's responsibility whatsoever, nevertheless gave 
relatively severe naughtiness/anger and retaliation judgments. When 
taken together, these findings imply that analyzing a perpetrator's 
harmful behavior in terms of Avoidability, Intentionality and Motive 
Acceptability is not a necessary condition for exhibiting high 
degrees of anger and retaliation. Rather, the reverse might be true, 
i.e., that the use of these dimensions is a necessary condition for 
noi getting angry at a perpetrator who caused harm unavoidably, 
unintentionally and in the context of good motives. 
Interpretation versus Importance 
Based on Ferguson and Rule's analysis, it was argued that whether 
a dimension of responsibility affects children's moral evaluations 
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(and thereby their anger- and aggression-related responses) depends 
on two separate processes, i.e., the interpretation of the dimension-
relevant information and the assignment of importance to that 
information. In the studies which were described in Chapters IV 
and V, attempts were made to empirically isolate the importance 
assigned to dimensions from the interpretation of dimension informa-
tion. The general strategy was to compare the effects of manipulated 
dimensions of responsibility on measures of dimension interpretation 
with their effects on measures of dimension use. Since the use 
measures were assumed to jointly reflect dimension interpretation 
and dimension importance, comparing the interpretation and use 
measures to each other enabled us to make inferences about dimen-
sion importance. 
The results of these efforts can be summarized in the following 
way. First, it was found that differences among dimensions in terms 
of the extent to which they were used for judging naughtiness and 
anger could not be fully explained on the basis of dimension inter-
pretation only (Chapters IV and V). The Intentionality dimension 
was used less than could be predicted on the basis of Intentionality 
interpretation, implying that relatively little importance was assigned 
to this dimension. In Chapter V it was also found that Motive 
Acceptability was used more than could be predicted on the basis 
of Motive Acceptability interpretation, implying that relatively more 
importance was assigned to this dimension. Taken together, these 
findings demonstrate that differential dimension use cannot be 
explained only in terms of differential dimension interpretation, but 
also requires the concept of dimension importance. 
Second, the results revealed that differences among individual 
children in dimension interpretation can be used to predict differen-
ces in dimension use. In addition, differential interpretation appeared 
to be related to children's age (Chapter IV). In the remainder of 
the Chapter IV study, a procedure was developed to differentiate 
among children in terms of the importance that they assigned to 
each of the three dimensions of responsibility. The results implied 
that there exist individual differences among children in the assign-
ment of importance to the Avoidability and Motive Acceptability 
dimensions. However, since these results still need independent 
validation, they should be treated as preliminary. 
Third, two experimental manipulations were designed to affect 
either dimension interpretation or dimension importance (Chapter 
V). In one experiment an attempt was made to experimentally man-
ipulate dimension importance, but not dimension interpretation. This 
was done by inducing in different groups of children a low versus a 
high expectation of the perpetrator's aggressiveness, while at the 
same time holding dimension interpretation constant by presenting 
the relevant information as unambiguously and as explicitly as 
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possible. To some extent this attempt was successful. That is, kin-
dergarten and grade 5 children with a high expectation of the 
perpetrator's aggressiveness responded in agreement with our predic-
tion, in that they assigned less importance to Motive Acceptability 
when judging naughtiness and anger than did same-aged children 
with a low expectation of aggressiveness. 
Finally, the second experiment of Chapter V manipulated chil-
dren's interpretation of dimension information, and thereby their 
judgments of naughtiness, anger, and retaliation, while using the 
same degree of explicitness of information as in the first experi-
ment. This was done by varying the trustworthiness of the source 
from which children received the information about the harmful 
event. For those children who had a low expectation of the per-
petrator's aggressiveness, the hypotheses were supported. That is, 
children who received the information from the perpetrator himself 
gave more negative judgments of the stories that contained strong 
evaluatively positive information, than children who received an 
objective account of the event. As testified by the fact that parallel 
effects were obtained for measures of interpretation, naughtiness/-
angcr and retaliation, the effects of the Account Source manipula-
tion were quite robust. 
Cognitive Requirements of the Quantitative Rating Scale Methodology 
In the studies that were presented in Chapters III to VI children 
used a quantitative rating scale to respond to the stimulus stories. 
In the final study (Chapter VII), the cognitive requirements of this 
response mode were examined by contrasting it to one other method 
that has been used extensively in moral judgment research, i.e., the 
paired comparison task. In the moral developmental literature ratings 
have been praised as more sensitive than paired comparisons in 
establishing the basis for age-related differences in moral judgment. 
Close examination of the two methods nevertheless revealed that 
ratings are actually more difficult than paired comparisons when 
unconfounded from stimulus material complexity. The rating method 
requires children to have a stable representation of the to-be-judged 
dimensions, whereas the paired comparison method requires only an 
understanding of the ordinal relations among the dimensions. These 
ideas were tested with 5 to 10 year-old children who made under-
standing judgments about transgressive incidents that differed in 
terms of Motive Acceptability, Intenlionality, and Avoidability. The 
incidents were presented as individual ratings, paired comparisons, 
or pairwise ratings of a simple, complex, or very complex nature. 
Our assertions regarding the difficulty of the rating method were 
confirmed. Pairwise judgments of the dimensions generally led to 
the best performance. These findings imply that discriminating 
appropriately between the levels of a manipulated dimension in an 
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individual rating task not only indicates the respondent's ability to 
differentiate between those levels, but also her having a rather 
thorough grasp of that particular dimension. 
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Samenvatting1 
Inleiding (Hoofdstuk I en II) 
Net als volwassenen, gedragen kinderen zich soms agressief. Dat wil 
zeggen, ze proberen doelbewust een ander lichamelijke, geestelijke 
of materiele schade toe te brengen. Het in dit proefschrift beschre­
ven onderzoek is uitgevoerd met de bedoeling om meer inzicht te 
verwerven in de psychologische processen die kinderen van verschil­
lende leeftijden er toe brengen zich agressief te gedragen. 
Het theoretische uitgangspunt van dc/e studies was een sociaal-
cognitieve benadering van agressie. In zo'n benadering wordt het 
agressieve gedrag van een agressor A tegenover een slachtoffer В 
opgevat als een uitvloeisel van de gedachten en gevoelens die А 
koestert over hoe В zich eerder tegenover haar heeft gedragen. 
Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer A boos wordt omdat zij zich benadeeld voelt 
door iets wat В heeft gedaan, dan kan dat voor A aanleiding zijn 
om В doelbewust schade te berokkenen, m.a.w. om zich agressief 
tegenover В te gedragen. Wanneer we nu de agressie van A willen 
verklaren, is het, volgens deze gcdachtengang, belangrijk te weten 
welk soort gedachten en emoties over het gedrag van В er precies 
toe leiden dat A zich agressief gaat gedragen. 
Om die vraag te beantwoorden heb ik mij grotendeels gebaseerd 
op de theorie van Ferguson en Rule (1983). Volgens deze theorie is 
de boosheid en de agressie van A ten opzichte van В een uitvloeisel 
van het feit dat A zich benadeeld voelt door В en dat A vindt dat 
В moreel verantwoordelijk is voor het ondervonden nadeel. 
De theorie stelt verder dat het oordeel van A over de morele 
verantwoordelijkheid van В voor een bepaald ondervonden nadeel in 
de eerste plaats afhangt van de wijze waarop A het gedrag van В 
interpreteert. Dat wil zeggen, hoe meer A vindt dat B: (1) had kun­
nen vermijden dat A nadeel zou ondervinden, (2) het nadeel voor А 
opzettelijk veroorzaakte, en (3) slechte motieven had bij het veroor­
zaken van het nadeel, des te meer vindt A ook dat В moreel ver­
antwoordelijk is voor het door haar ondervonden nadeel. 
Volgens Ferguson en Rule (1983) hangt A's morele oordeel over 
B's gedrag echter niet alleen af van hoe zij dat gedrag van В inter­
preteert, maar ook van het belang dat zij toekent aan elk van de 
aspecten vermijdbaarheid, intentionaliteit en slechtheid van de mo­
tieven. Stel, bijvoorbeeld, dat A het door В veroorzaakte nadeel 
interpreteert als weliswaar vermijdbaar, maar ook als niet opzet-
1
 Ik heb geprobeerd deze samenvatting ook. voor niet-vakgenoten lees­
baar te houden. Vakgenoten kunnen tevens hoofdstuk VIII of de engelse sa­
menvatting raadplegen voor een overzicht van de resultaten en conclusies. 
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telijk en niet met slechte motieven veroorzaakt. Nu hangt A's mo­
rele oordeel over B's gedrag af van hoeveel belang zij hecht aan 
het aspect vermijdbaarheid. Wanneer ze het erg belangrijk vindt dat 
В het nadeel had kunnen vermijden, dan zal ze een betrekkelijk 
streng oordeel vellen over B's gedrag. Wanneer ze echter niet zo'n 
groot belang hecht aan vermijdbaarheid, dan zal haar oordeel over 
B's gedrag mild zijn. 
De in dit proefschrift beschreven studies hebben betrekking op: 
(a) het in Ferguson en Rule's theorie veronderstelde verband tussen 
morele oordelen en boosheid en agressie (de hoofdstukken III en V), 
(b) het onderscheid tussen de interpretatie en het belang van infor­
matie over verantwoordelijkheid (de hoofdstukken IV en V), (c) de 
onderlinge verhouding van de aspecten vermijdbaarheid, opzet en 
motieven (de hoofdstukken III en VI) en (d) de methodologie van 
het onderzoek naar de wijze waarop kinderen informatie interprete­
ren en beoordelen (hoofdstuk VII). 
Verantwoordelijkheid, morele oordelen en boosheid (Hoofdstuk Ш) 
In het in hoofdstuk III beschreven experiment gaven kinderen en 
jongeren van 5, 6, 9, 11 en 15 jaar morele oordelen en boosheids­
oordelcn naar aanleiding van acht verschillende verhaaltjes waarin 
de hoofdpersoon iets van een ander kapot maakte. Dat kapot maken 
gebeurde wel of niet vermijdbaar, wel of niet met opzet en wel of 
niet met slechte motieven. 
Op grond van de theorie van Ferguson en Rule werd voorspeld 
dat zowel de morele oordelen als de boosheidsoordelcn hoger zouden 
zijn bij vermijdbare-, opzettelijke-, of met slechte motieven veroor­
zaakte schade dan bij, respectievelijk, niet vermijdbare, niet opzet­
telijke of met goede motieven veroorzaakte schade. Verder werd 
voorspeld dat oudere kinderen meer rekening zouden houden met 
vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven dan jongere kinderen en dat 
dergelijke verschillen tussen de leeftijdsgroepen voor de boosheids­
oordelcn niet anders zouden zijn dan voor de morele oordelen. 
Tenslotte werd voorspeld dat voor elk kind afzonderlijk het patroon 
van de booshcidsoordelen over de acht verhaaltjes sterk zou lijken 
op dat van de morele oordelen over diezelfde verhaaltjes. 
De resultaten bevestigden alle drie de voorspellingen, hetgeen 
uiteraard de theorie van Ferguson en Rule ondersteunt. Een vierde 
bevinding maakte het echter mogelijk de aard van het verband tus­
sen morele oordelen en boosheid nauwkeuriger te specificeren dan 
Ferguson en Rule doen in hun theorie. Het bleek nl. dat naarmate 
kinderen in hun morele oordelen meer rekening hielden met de as­
pecten vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven, ze minder vaak hoge 
boosheidsoordelcn gaven. Dit resultaat lijkt er op te wijzen dat de 
over de leeftijd toenemende vaardigheid om rekening te houden met 
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vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven een matigende werking heeft op 
boosheid. 
Interprelatie en belang van informatie over verantwoordelijkheid 
(Hoofdstuk IV) 
In de in hoofdstuk IV beschreven studie ging het om het onder-
scheid tussen hoe kinderen hel gedrag van iemand die schade ver-
oorzaakt interpreteren in termen van vermijdbaarheid, opzet en 
motieven en het belang dat ze toekennen aan elk van die aspecten 
bij het geven van een moreel oordeel. Evenals in hoofdstuk III, 
gaven kinderen morele oordelen over het gedrag van een jongen die 
wel of niet vermijdbaar, wel of niet met opzet en wel of niet met 
slechte motieven schade veroorzaakte. Dit keer waren de kinderen 
echter 5- tot 8 jaar oud en gaven ze niet alleen morele oordelen 
over het gedrag van de boosdoener, maar ook hun interpretatie van 
dat gedrag. Dat wil zeggen, de kinderen beoordeelden niet alleen 
hoe stout ze de boosdoener vonden, maar ook in hoeverre de boos-
doener in elk verhaaltje de schade (a) had kunnen vermijden, (b) 
met opzet veroorzaakte en (c) met goede of slechte motieven ver-
oorzaakte. 
De eerste vraag was nu of de interpretatie-oordelen van de kin-
deren iets zouden voorspellen over hun morele oordelen. De tweede 
vraag was of kinderen, rekening houdend met hoe ze de verhaaltjes 
hadden geïnterpreteerd, bij het geven van een moreel oordcel een 
verschillend belang zouden toekennen aan elk van de aspecten ver-
mijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven. Tenslotte vroegen we ons af of de 
kinderen van elkaar zouden verschillen wat betreft het belang dat 
ze toekennen aan de aspecten vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven. 
De resultaten wezen uit dat enkele (meest jonge) kinderen in 
hun interpretatie van het gedrag van de boosdoener niet of nauwe-
lijks rekening hielden met de informatie die was gegeven over 
vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven. Deze kinderen bleken bij het 
geven van een moreel oordeel evenmin veel rekening te houden met 
die informatie. Onder de overige kinderen bleken verschillen in hoe 
ze de gegeven informatie interpreteerden samen te gaan met ver-
schillen in de morele oordelen. Kortom, de morele oordelen waren 
vrij goed te voorspellen uil hoe kinderen de informatie hadden 
geïnterpreteerd. 
Toch bleek de male waarin elk van de aspecten vermijdbaarheid, 
opzet en motieven de morele oordelen beïnvloedde niet alleen af te 
hangen van interpretatie. Met name het aspect 'opzet' beïnvloedde 
de morele oordelen minder dan was te verwachten op grond van de 
interpretatie-oordelen. In onze gedachtengang betekent dil dat kin-
deren aan dit aspect, in vergelijking met de aspecten vermijdbaar-
heid en motieven, weinig belang hechtten. 
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Tenslotte is in hoofdstuk IV een poging gedaan om na te gaan 
of kinderen die de verhaaltjes op soortgelijke wijze hadden geïnter-
preteerd, desondanks onderling verschilden wat betreft het belang 
dat ze hechtten aan de aspecten vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motie-
ven. Deze analyse leverde aanwijzingen op dat sommige kinderen 
meer belang hechtten aan vermijdbaarheid dan aan motieven, terwijl 
voor andere kinderen juist het omgekeerde gold. 
De invloed van verwachtingen en van de infonnatiebron 
(Hoofdstuk V) 
In hoofdstuk V worden twee experimenten beschreven waarin kin-
deren van 5 tot 10 jaar opnieuw verhaaltjes beoordeelden waarin 
een jongen op acht verschillende manieren een werkstuk van een 
ander kapot maakte. Deze keer werden de verhaaltjes zo verteld 
dat de informatie over vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven zeer 
expliciet en zo eenduidig mogelijk werd gegeven. Verder lieten we 
de kinderen niet alleen morele- en boosheidsoordelen over het 
gedrag van de boosdoener geven, maar vroegen we hen ook om te 
beoordelen wat het slachtoffer terug zou doen ('vergelding'). Dit 
maakte het mogelijk om het verband tussen de verschillende typen 
oordelen nader te bestuderen. Het bleek dal er bij veruit de meeste 
kinderen een sterk verband was tussen de morele- en boosheidsoor-
delen enerzijds en de vergcldingsoordelen anderzijds. Alleen bij 
enkele (meest jonge) kinderen was het verband zwak of afwezig 
doordat ze in situaties waarin de boosdoener in sterke mate verant-
woordelijk was weliswaar antwoordden dat hij zeer stout was en 
dat het slachtoffer erg boos zou worden, maar tegelijkertijd ook 
dat het slachtoffer geen wraak zou nemen. 
Ook op andere punten verschilde de opzet van de eerdere studies. 
In de eerste plaats gaven de kinderen in experiment 1 hun oordelen 
twee keer, nl. voor het eerst toen ze alleen nog maar gehoord had-
den dat de boosdoener iets kapot had gemaakt en later nog eens 
toen ze ook de informatie over vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven 
hadden gekregen. Het bleek dat deze informatie de kinderen er 
meestal toe bracht om lagere morele, booshcids- en vergeldingsoor-
delen te geven dan ze aanvankelijk hadden gedaan. Dit resultaat 
bevestigt en versterkt onze eerdere conclusie (zie hoofdstuk III) dat 
het rekening houden met vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven vaak 
een matigende werking heeft op boosheid en agressie. 
De belangrijkste wijziging ten opzichte van de eerdere studies 
was echter dat de kinderen de hoofdpersoon al kenden vóór dat hen 
werd verteld hoe hij het werkstuk van een ander kapot maakte. De 
helft van de kinderen verwachtte agressief gedrag van de hoofdper-
soon. Ze hadden hem namelijk leren kennen als iemand die voort-
durend klappen uitdeelde aan iedereen die hem voor de voelen 
kwam. De andere kinderen verwachtten juist geen agressief gedrag, 
156 
want ze hadden de hoofdpersoon leren kennen als iemand die allijd 
bereid was anderen te helpen. Verder werden in een tweede experi-
ment de oordelen van een deel van de kinderen uit experiment 1 
vergeleken met de oordelen van andere kinderen die weliswaar 
precies dezelfde informatie ontvingen over hoc de hoofdpersoon 
andermans eigendom kapot maakte, maar uil een andere bron. Zij 
hoorden het verhaal namelijk niet uit de mond van de proefleider 
van het experiment, maar (zogenaamd) uit de mond van de boos-
doener zelf. 
Het variëren van de informatiebron en van de verwachting die 
kinderen hadden, was bedoeld om het in hoofdstuk IV gemaakte 
onderscheid tussen de interpretatie van informatie en het belang 
dat wordt gehecht aan die informatie nader aan te kunnen scher-
pen. Onze hypothese was dat het verschil in informatiebron van 
invloed zou zijn op hoe kinderen de informatie zouden interprete-
ren, terwijl de agressieve vs. de nict-agressieve verwachting van 
invloed zou zijn op het belang dat kinderen aan de informatie 
zouden toekennen. De hypothese dat informatiebron vooral inter-
pretatie zou beïnvloeden was gebaseerd op het idee dat (in elk 
geval de oudste) kinderen geen geloof zouden hechten aan bewe-
ringen van de boosdoener zelf als zou de schade niet te vermijden 
zijn geweest en als zou er geen sprake zijn geweest van opzet 
en/of slechte bedoelingen. De hypothese dat een agressieve ver-
wachting vooral het belang en niet de interpretatie van de door de 
proefleider gegeven informatie zou beïnvloeden, was gebaseerd op 
het idee dat de informatie zo expliciet en eenduidig werd aangebo-
den, dat er weinig of geen ruimte zou zijn voor afwijkingen in de 
interpretatie van deze informatie. 
De resultaten van experiment 1 wezen uit dat zowel de kleuters 
als de 10-jarigen die agressief gedrag verwachtten minder belang 
hechtten aan informatie over de motieven van de boosdoener dan 
kinderen van dezelfde leeftijd die geen agressief gedrag verwacht-
ten. Dergelijke effecten konden echter niet worden vastgesteld bij 
de 6- en de 7-jarigen. Dus onze hypothese kon alleen bij de jong-
ste en bij de oudste, maar niet bij de middelste leeftijdsgroepen 
worden bevestigd. 
Uit de resultaten van experiment 2 bleek dal de kinderen die 
geen agressief gedrag verwachtten precies conform de hypothese 
reageerden: Degenen die van de boosdoener /elf hoorden wal er 
was gebeurd, hechtten, blijkens hun interpretatie-oordelen en hun 
morele en booshcidsoordelen, minder geloof aan de bewering dat hij 
het goed had bedoeld, dan de kinderen die dezelfde informatie 
ontvingen van de proefleider. Kennelijk gingen de kinderen die de 
informatie van de boosdoener zelf ontvingen er van uit dat hij 
zichzelf van schuld vrij probeerde te pleiten. Overigens waren er 
ook aanwijzingen dat het vooral de kinderen van 7 jaar en ouder 
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waren die rekening hielden met de neiging van de boosdoener om 
zich van schuld vrij te pleiten. 
Bij de kinderen die wel agressief gedrag verwachtten, werd alle 
informatie, en niet alleen die met een verontschuldigend karakter, 
zwaarder beoordeeld door degenen die van de boosdoener zelf hoor-
den wat er was gebeurd dan door degenen die door de proefleider 
werden geïnformeerd. 
Al met al zijn we er tot op zekere hoogte in geslaagd om het 
theoretische onderscheid tussen de interpretatie en het belang van 
veranlwoordelijkhcidsinformatie empirisch te bevestigen. Bij allhans 
enkele leeftijdsgroepen beïnvloedde een slechte verwachting, over-
eenkomstig de voorspelling, het belang en niet de interpretatie van 
die informatie. Verder bleek de potentieel onbetrouwbare infor-
matiebron, althans bij de kinderen die geen slechte verwachting 
hadden, overeenkomstig de voorspelling juist de interpretatie van 
verontschuldigende informatie te beïnvloeden. 
De onderlinge verhouding van de drie aspecten van verantwoorde-
lijkheid (Hoofdstuk VI) 
In de hoofdstukken III lot V lag de nadruk vooral op het verband 
tussen de verschillende soorten oordelen die de kinderen gaven. In 
hoofdstuk VI ging het daarentegen vooral om de onderlinge verhou-
ding tussen de aspecten van verantwoordelijkheid zoals die in elk 
van de eerder beschreven studies werden gevarieerd. Uit het werk 
van theoretici en onderzoekers op het terrein van de toeschrijving 
van verantwoordelijkheid valt op te maken dat slechts vier combina-
ties van de aspecten vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven een zinvol, 
want logisch consistent, geheel opleveren. De/e combinaties zijn: (1) 
'niet vermijdbaar', (2) 'wel vermijdbaar, maar niet met opzet', (3) 
'wel vermijdbaar, met opzet, maar met goede bedoelingen' en (4) 
'vermijdbaar, met opzet en met slechte bedoelingen'. Uit deze op-
somming wordt duidelijk dat men een hierarchische verhouding 
veronderstelt tussen de aspecten vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motie-
ven: Het onderscheid tussen opzet en geen opzet wordt alleen ge-
maakt bij vermijdbare schade en het onderscheid tussen goede en 
slechte motieven wordt alleen gemaakt bij schade die zowel ver-
mijdbaar is als opzettelijk veroorzaakt. 
Onze hypothese was echter dat wanneer kinderen morele oor-
delen geven, boos worden en agressie plegen, ze zich er wel eens 
weinig van zouden kunnen aantrekken of bepaalde informatie logisch 
gezien wel of niet van belang is. Daarom hebben we in elk van de 
in dit proefschrift gerapporteerde studies de kinderen niet de vier 
genoemde (logisch consistente) combinaties voorgelegd, maar in 
plaats daarvan alle acht mogelijke combinaties van wel en niet 
vermijdbaar, wel en niet met opzet en wel en niet met slechte mo-
tieven. Daarmee boden wc kinderen informatie aan die ze, volgens 
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de logica van het hiërarchische schema, eigenlijk zouden moeten 
negeren bij het geven van hun oordeel. 
Uit de resultaten van een heranalysc van de morele- en de 
boosheidsoordclen van alle 260 kinderen die mee hadden gedaan aan 
de in hoofdstuk III tot V beschreven studies, bleek dat geen van 
hen zich ook maar bij benadering had gehouden aan het hiërar-
chische schema van verantwoordelijkheid, zoals dat in de literatuur 
wordt verondersteld. 
De belangrijkste schending trad op in die gevallen waarin de 
boosdoener de schade niet kon vermijden en/of niet met opzet ver-
oorzaakte. Strikt genomen konden in dergelijke situaties de (even-
tueel slechte) motieven van de boosdoener logischerwijze geen rol 
spelen in het ontstaan van de schade. Desondanks baseerden vrijwel 
alle kinderen hun oordelen voor een belangrijk deel op de infor-
matie over de motieven van de boosdoener in de betreffende situa-
ties. 
Vaardigheden die nodig zijn om een ratingschaal te kunnen 
gebruiken (Hoofdstuk VII) 
In elk van de eerder gerapporteerde studies beoordeelden kinderen 
achtereenvolgens enkele situaties op een 7-puntsschaal. In plaats 
van deze methode te gebruiken hadden we ook andere methoden 
kunnen kiezen. We hadden de kinderen bijvoorbeeld kunnen vragen 
om in woorden een antwoord te formuleren op de vraag hoe stout 
ze de boosdoener vonden, hoc boos het slachtoffer zou worden etc. 
We hadden ook, in navolging van Piaget (1932), de kinderen steeds 
uit twee verhaaltjes de meest stoute (boos makende, opzettelijke, 
etc.) variant kunnen laten kiezen. Het is te verwachten dat deze 
methoden niet alle dezelfde resultaten zouden hebben opgeleverd, 
omdat elke methode andere eisen stelt aan de vaardigheden van de 
kinderen. Het in hoofdstuk VII beschreven onderzoek was bedoeld 
om na te gaan welke eisen worden gesteld aan een beoordelaar die 
een reeks afzonderlijk aangeboden verhaaltjes moet beoordelen op 
een kwantitatieve ratingschaal. (In hoofdstuk VII en in het vervolg 
van deze samenvatting wordt deze methode aangeduid als de Indi-
vidual Ratings' ofwel 'IR' methode). Daartoe werd deze methode 
gekontrasteerd met een procedure waarin kinderen de verhaaltjes 
steeds twee aan twee met elkaar vergelijken. 
Het belangrijkste eis die de IR methode aan de beoordelaar stelt 
is dat de oordelen over alle aangeboden verhaaltjes op consistente 
wijze worden gegeven. Die oordelen moeten immers onderling wor-
den vergeleken om na te gaan in hoeverre de beoordelaar onder-
scheid maakt tussen de verschillende verhaaltjes. Dat betekent dat 
de beoordelaar een vaste maatstaf nodig heeft waartegen elk af-
zonderlijk verhaaltje kan worden beoordeeld. Zoals we een meetlat 
gebruiken om op consistente wijze te kunnen bepalen hoe lang ver-
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schillende personen zijn, zo hebben we ook een vaste maatstaf 
nodig om op consistente wijze te beoordelen in hoeverre iemand, 
bijvoorbeeld, 'met opzet' schade veroorzaakt. Onze hypothese is nu 
dat in het laatste geval de 'maatstaf bestaat uit de voorstelling die 
de beoordelaar zelf heeft van wat het is om 'met opzet' of juist 
'niet met opzet' schade te veroorzaken. Kortom, de vaste maatstaf 
die nodig is om elk concreet geval op consistente wijze te beoor-
delen, is een heldere voorstelling van de theoretische eindpunten 
van de dimensie 'opzet'. 
Deze gedachtengang maakt aannemelijk dat er ook beoordelaars 
bestaan die het begrip 'opzet' slechts in zoverre beheersen dat ze 
het verschil herkennen tussen 'niet met opzet' en 'wel met opzet', 
zonder echter een heldere voorstelling te hebben van de uiteinden 
van de dimensie 'opzet'. Het is te verwachten dat dergelijke beoor-
delaars niet goed zullen presteren bij gebruik van de IR methode, 
maar wel wanneer /e alleen maar uit twee paarsgewijs aangeboden 
verhaaltjes de meest 'opzettelijke' variant hoeven te kiezen. (In het 
vervolg zal de laatstgenoemde methode worden aangeduid als de 
'Paired Comparison' ofwel 'PC' methode). 
Deze conclusie is vooral opmerkelijk omdat in eerder onderzoek 
naar de morele oordelen van kinderen precies het omgekeerde is 
gevonden. Verschillende auteurs hebben betoogd dat de door Piaget 
(1932) gebruikte PC methode juist moeilijker is dan de IR methode, 
en niet gemakkelijker (Berg-Cross, 1975; Grueneich, 1982; Helkama 
& Seppanen, 1987). Nadere bestudering van de gebruikte methoden 
leert echter dat deze onderzoekers bij de PC methode altijd twee 
aspecten tegelijk in tegengestelde richtingen hebben gevarieerd. In 
de analyse van de IR gegevens werd daarentegen van elk aspect 
afzonderlijk nagegaan in hoeverre de beoordelaars verschil maakten. 
Met andere woorden, onze hypothese was dat eerdere onderzoekers 
een nogal complexe vorm van de PC methode vergeleken met een 
minder complexe vorm van de IR methode en dat zij als gevolg 
daarvan ten onrechte concludeerden dat de IR methode gemakke-
lijker is. 
Om onze hypothesen te toetsen boden we opnieuw kinderen van 
5, 6 en 8 jaar verhaaltjes aan waarin de aspecten van verantwoor-
delijkheid vermijdbaarheid, opzet en motieven werden gevarieerd. De 
kinderen gebruikten zowel de IR als de PC methode om oordelen te 
geven over de vermijdbaarheid en de opzettelijkheid waarmee de 
hoofdpersoon in de verhaaltjes de schade veroorzaakte en over de 
aard van zijn motieven. De oordelen werden gegeven op drie ver-
schillende niveaus van complexiteit, namelijk 'eenvoudig' (in elk 
verhaaltje kwam slechts een van de drie aspecten van verantwoorde-
lijkheid voor), 'complex' (in elk verhaaltje kwamen alle drie de 
aspecten voor, maar alleen het te beoordelen aspect verschilde 
binnen een paar) en '/eer complex' (niet alleen het te beoordelen 
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aspect, maar ook de beide andere aspecten werden -in de tegen-
gestelde richting- gevarieerd binnen een paar). 
Tenslotte gaven kinderen op elk niveau van complexiteit ook nog 
oordelen volgens een derde methode, nl. die van de paarsgewijze 
ratings (afgekort tot 'PR'). De PR methode heeft met de IR me-
thode gemeen dat de oordelen bestonden uit ratings (en niet uit 
keuzen) en met de PC methode dat de oordelen werden gegeven 
over paren (in plaats van over afzonderlijke) verhaaltjes. Omdat de 
PR methode een compromis vertegenwoordigt tussen de beide andere 
methoden, verwachtten we dat de kinderen op de PR taak beter 
zouden presteren dan op de IR taak, maar slechter dan op de PC 
taak. 
De resultaten vormden een vrijwel volledige bevestiging van 
onze hypothesen: Op alle niveaus van complexiteit presteerden kin-
deren beter met de PC- dan met de IR methode. Verder waren de 
prestaties op de PR taak op twee van de drie niveaus van 
complexiteit overeenkomstig de predictie, nl. tussen die van de 
beide andere methoden in. De enige uitzondering op dit patroon was 
dat de PR methode op het zeer complexe niveau niet duidelijk 
betere prestaties opleverde dan de IR methode. 
Alles bij elkaar genomen vormen deze resultaten een onder-
steuning voor het idee dat kinderen die afzonderlijke verhaaltjes 
beoordelen op een ratingschaal alleen dan goed presteren wanneer 
ze een diepgaand begrip hebben van de te beoordelen aspecten. 
Daarnaast bestaat er ook een oppervlakkiger vorm van begrip die 
echter onvoldoende is om goed te presteren met de IR methode, 
maar die wel goede prestaties oplevert wanneer de oordelen bestaan 
uit keuzen in een paarsgewijze vergelijkingen laak. 
Conclusies (Hoofdstuk VIII) 
De bevindingen ondersteunen de theorie van Ferguson en Rule 
(1983), in die zin dat er een nauw verband is gevonden tussen, 
enerzijds, hoe kinderen oordeelden over de morele verantwoordelijk-
heid van een boosdoener en, anderzijds, hoe boos en hoe agressief 
het slachtoffer zich volgens hen zou gedragen ten opzichte van die 
boosdoener. Daarnaast bleek dat het in aanmerking nemen van 
informatie over verantwoordelijkheid er toe leidde dat kinderen in 
minder situaties zeiden dat het slachtoffer erg boos zou worden en 
dat hij het gedrag van de boosdoener zwaar zou vergelden. 
Verder is steun gevonden voor het idee dat de morele oordelen 
van kinderen over het gedrag van een boosdoener in de eerste 
plaats afhankelijk waren van de vraag of de schade die de boos-
doener had aangericht in de ogen van de kinderen (a) vermijdbaar 
was, (b) met opzet was veroorzaakt en (c) met slechte motieven 
was veroorzaakt. Aan de informatie over opzet werd echter minder 
belang gehecht dan aan informatie over motieven en vermijdbaarheid. 
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Stellingen 
behorend bij het proefschrift van Τ Olthof 
'Blame, Anger and Aggression m Chúdrtn. A Social-Cognitive Approach' 
L Naarmate kinderen beter inzien dat iemand die hen nadeel heeft berokkend 
met altijd moreel verantwoordelijk is voor de aangerichte schade, reageren ze 
minder vaak boos en agressief. (De hoofdstukken UI en V) 
2. Een onderzoeker die kinderen eenvoudige meerkeuze vragen stelt om na te 
gaan of ze een hypothetische situatie goed begrijpen, mag uit het feit dat 
correcte antwoorden worden gegeven met afleiden dat de betreffende situatie 
door alle kinderen op eenzelfde manier is geïnterpreteerd (Naar aanleiding 
van hoofdstuk IV) 
3 Hoewel de motieven van degene die een ander per ongeluk benadeelt alleen 
indirect een rol spelen bij het ontstaan van de schade, bepalen zij in belang-
njke mate de reactie van het slachtoffer (Hoofdstuk VI) 
4 De naar verhouding slechte prestaties van jonge kinderen op de paarsgewijze-
vergelijkingen-taak van Piaget (1932) berusten niet op het onvermogen van die 
kinderen om te decentreren, maar op de complexiteit van de door Piaget 
gebruikte stimulusparen. (Hoofdstuk VII) 
5 Om op grond van een sociaal cognitief experiment geldige conclusies te kunnen 
trekken over wat kinderen wel en niet kunnen, is een theorie nodig die 
beschrijft hoe hun reacties worden beïnvloed door de levensechtheid van de 
gebruikte stimulussituaties en door de mate waarin de gebruikte response-
modus reflectie op eigen of andermans gedrag vereist (Zie de hoofdstukken II 
en VIII) 
6 Zo naïef als het is om aan te nemen dat de cognitieve processen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan de ideeën van kinderen over hun gedrag ook ten grond-
slag liggen aan dal gedrag ¿elf, zo kortzichtig is het om aan te nemen dat 
dergelijke ideeën op geen enkele wijze van invloed zijn op het gedrag (Zie 
hoofdstuk VIII) 
7 Het onderscheid tussen assertief gedrag en onbeschoft gedrag is vaak zo 
subtiel dat gevreesd moet worden dat naarmate meer mensen het eerste na-
streven, het tweede vaker zal voorkomen 
8 Er schuilt iets onreebtvaardigs in het feit dat wij door ons ingrijpen in de 
natuur toekomstige generaties het leven zuur kunnen maken, zonder hun morele 
verontwaardiging, boosheid en agressie te hoeven vrezen 
9 Aangezien het uitzicht dat de treinreiziger wordt geboden meestal supcneur is 
aan (a) hetgeen de gebruiker van de autosnelweg te aen krijgt en (b) het 
gemiddelde aanbod op de vaderlandse televisie, is het verbazend dat velen van 
hen die klagen over te lange reistijden per trein geheel vrijwillig zo veel 
tijd doorbrengen met autorijden en tv kijken 



